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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines a sample of Western Cape' clothing employers' perceptions with 
regard to different levels of collective bargaiJ~. 1 ~he examination takes place at two 
- ; J 
points in time: in 1991, when bargaining ;took place at the regional level, and in 1995, 
I 
when bargaining was taking place at the hational level. The change in the level at which 
bargaining took place between these years allows for a retrospective examination of the 
reasons why employers agreed to engage in national bargaining. The objective of the 
research was to determine, from the perspective of employers' preferences, why collective 
bargaining comes to be situated at a particular level. 
Th~ __ study relies primarily on a qualitative research _method, namely in-depth interviews 
, with employers. The focus is therefore on the subjective expression of interests and 
preferences with regard to alternative levels of bargaining, and the way in which 
employers make decisions about this issue. This approach differs from most other attempts 
to explain the determination of bargaining levels. Rather than attributing preferences to 
employers through an examination of the relationship between existing bargaining 
structures and factors such as industrial structure, trade union density, and the statutory 
framework for collective bargaining, the methodology used for this dissertation focusses 
on the role of employers as social actors that mediate between such environmental factors 
in developing their preferences for a particular level of bargaining. Particular emphasis is 
placed on the politics of collective decision-making by employers as an explanatory 
variable in the determination of the level of bargaining. 
The study also provides a quantitative and structural examination of the relationship 
between employers' preferences for different levels of bargaining and environmental 
factors such as the statutory framework for collective bargaining and industry structure. 
The influence of these factors can then be evaluated despite the fact that they are often not 
recognised by employers when expressing their preferences for a particular level of 
bargaining. The aim of using b6th qualitative and quantitative approaches is to provide a 
vi 
more rounded understanding of the way that employers form their preferences and make 
decisions about the level at which they wish to bargain, and how their preferences may 
change over time. 
The study found that in 1991 a large majority of employers in the Western Cape clothing 
industry supported the existing regional bargaining arrangement. Most were, furthermore, 
strongly opposed to national bargaining. About one year later, however, employers agreed 
to enter a national bargaining forum and agreed in principle to the formation of a national 
industrial council. In 1995 the support for regional bargaining had declined somewhat but 
it remained the most popular level of bargaining. Bargfilning_aLnationaLand~ ~J!!~~ris~ 
1~_gairied almos~q!lal ~l1R.P~rt. 
The reasons for favouring regional and national bargaining did not change much between 
1991 and 1995, but the experience of national bargaining confirmed the objections of 
many employers to bargaining at this level. On~.Jll!_t~Qtne was an increasej!J._prf?ferel_!~t?s 
r- ----- .. -.,----=-:-.....-..,,_...,...~.,_ .. -==-,....,_,..,,_ _ _.,. ..,,.,--,-_-, --,.-_._,,~~-- -- ----- - ------ - --'- _;._ ---~ 
for enterprise __ QMgaining. Another significant change in 1995 was the importance of 
~-~--~~-------
certain infrastructural factors. Changes in the economic environment underlay the 
""--~-,~::o·F_-~--~~"""---=:=--""""'.-=--,- c-_-,,~=--"'- ,,.,_.--,---- """-~-"-::"..---0 -, ,_-_._-·_,,__ 
ern.ergeqce of these factors in 1995 as certain employers sought greater flexibility in the 
. bargaining structure. 
The study identifies seven key findings in explaining a theory of levels of bargaining in the 
clothing sector. They are as follows: 
1. Efi1pl9ye_rs Jook. account 0£ a wide range of factors in developing preferences for a 
p(lfticulru,- level. of bargaining. Most of these factors have been identified in previous 
research but the study also discovered additional factors. However, these factors took a 
particular form in the Western Cape clothing industry in the period during which the 
research was conducted, and employers' perceptions of these factors were therefore 
context dependent and historically rooted. 
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2. The methodological approach adopted for this study revealed that employers were not 
only deeply influenced by their environment and their history, but that they were also to a 
greater or lesser extent future-oriented. They therefore brought with them a perceptual 
framework wrought in a particular historical context but they also evaluated future 
prospects and possibilities in order to seek proactive solutions to the questions that faced 
them. However, this future-oriented thinking was not necessarily strategic and was subject 
the problems discussed in point 6 below. 
3. The importance of factors changed over time as changes occurred in the business and 
industrial relations environment, as well as in the broader political-economy of the 
country. Determining influences on preferences for different levels of bargaining are 
therefore in a continual dynamic interplay, with some more prominent than others during 
certain periods, and with some creating pressures for change while others constrain those 
pressures and stabilise the existing bargaining arrangement. 
4. Employers did not pursue narrow econollllc interests when evaluating the 
appropriateness of bargaining at a particular level. While economic interests were the most 
important considerations for employers, they were not able to simply divorce themselves 
from their role as actors in the wider society when they evaluated the pro's and con's of 
different levels of bargaining. Employers, as social actors, introduced additional 
considerations which sometimes distorted or contradicted their purely economic interests. 
The most obvious example of this was the discounting by many employers, for various 
reasons, of the potential benefits of equalising labour costs throughout the country 
through national bargaining. 
5. There was a great deal of diversity in the way that employers interpretecJ factors and 
forces that favoured or opposed alternative levels of bargaining. Not only did they choose 
different factors but they also prioritised their reasons differently and articulated them in 
different ways. Political and ideological positions played a part in the variety of reasoning 
viii 
that employers displayed, as well as their individual work experiences. Employers' 
preferences were therefore not determined functionally by environmental factors. 
6. The de~ision-making process engaged in by employers was not 'rational' in the sense 
that rational choice theorists use the term. Decision-making was fraught with problems of 
limited understanding and information, as well as fear of the risks and uncertainty attached 
to an untried bargaining structure. In this situation the politics of collective decision-
making within the employers' associations was at least as important as the 'rational' 
assessment of costs and benefits in arriving at a decision about the level of bargaining. 
7. Power emerged as the key determinant of the level of bargaining. Firstly, the power of 
the trade union was of great importance in convincing many employers that they needed to 
face the union as a collective entity. The union's power therefore underpinned a preference 
for multi-employer bargaining. Secondly, SACTWU's power was fundamental to gaining 
the agreement by employers to change to national bargaining. Thirdly, in a situation of 
multi-employer bargaining, the exercise of power by certain 'leading' employers within the 
employers' associations played a critical part in shaping employers choices about the level 
at which they would bargain. 
These key findings form the basis for developing a theoretical explanation of the role of 
employers in determining levels of bargaining, and they also make an important 
contribution to the development of a comprehensive theory of bargaining levels. The study 
finds that' leading' employers in the employers' associations played a crucial role in shaping 
and directing employers' perceptions of their interests. In addition, the power of the trade 
union had the effect of consolidating employers interests in a way that diminished the 
centrifugal tendencies that existed within the associations. An analysis of power, both 
within employers' associations and between employers and unions, must therefore be a 
central component of a theory of levels of bargaining that seeks to explain. multi-employer 
bargaining. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Trends in levels of bargaining 
The question of the level at which collective bargaining takes place has been raised with a 
compelling urgency by trade unions and employers in South Africa over the last two 
decades. The emergence of non-racial trade unions in the 1970s saw the dominant 
structure of bargaining, namely multi-employer bargaining in industrial councils, 
challenged by the enterprise bargaining strategy pursued by these unions. By the late 
1980s, however, the new unions had shifted their sights to more centralised bargaining 
arrangements, and the 1990s have seen the most important union federation, the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), demanding national, industry-wide bargaining 
in all sectors. This demand effectively means a restructuring of the industrial council 
system, which has in the course of the century developed primarily along local and 
regional lines. 
Employers have reacted in different ways to the changing umon demands regarding 
bargaining levels. Initially, many sought the protection of the multi-employer bargaining 
structures through which they had historically engaged with trade unions. These 
employers rejected demands to bargain at the enterprise level on the grounds that they 
would only bargain at an industrial council. However, other employers gave in to the 
demand and began to bargain at the enterprise or plant level, either exclusively, or in some 
cases, in addition to continued participation in bargaining via an employers' organisation at 
an industrial council. 
When, by the 1980~ the new unions began to apply for membership of industrial councils, 
there was a reversal by some employers. The participation of the new unions in industrial 
council bargaining was either resisted or, if that failed, firms left employers' organisations 
-- .. ~-.....,...--~~~ -
and sought to bargain at the enterprise level only. The latter strategy introduced instability 
' 
irffo 'lhe ~industrial -council syste~- -~~d caused the collapse of a number of important 
1 
councils. 1 Where employers continued to engage with unions at industrial councils there 
was often strong resistance to the restructuring of those councils. They saw little reason 
why regional or sub-sectoral bargaining structures that had historically served them well, 
should be reconstituted on national, industry-wide lines. 
By the 19~0s the issue of bargaining levels had therefore become one of the most 
contentious in the industrial relations arena. The battle-lines that had been dra'Wn 
effectively went to the heart of the collective bargaining system: the voluntary nature of 
industrial council participation was challenged by COSATU. In its place the unions 
--- --·---· - . - -
wanted statutory intervention that would compel employers to participate in a system of 
national, industry-wide bargaining structures. The political transition and prospects of a 
labour-friendly, ANC-led government that would move quickly to reform labour 
legislation, heightened tensions around the levels of bargaining issue. 
Internationally, the period since the early 1970s has also seen bargaining levels emerge as 
an important issue, particularly in the advanced industrialised countries. There are, 
however, two key differences between the experience in South Africa and that of many 
other countries. Indeed, there are important differences between the experiences of the 
,--· 
advanced industrialised countries as well. Fir~!!)',_ aj_though there are opposing trends in\ 
South Africa, the dominant trend since the mid-1980s has been towards greater 
---- ----------
centralisation of collective ~argaining. By contrast, the general trend in Europe, although) 
uneven, has been to decentralise bargaining to the enterprise or plant level.2 The United, 
States, which has a predominantly decentralised bargaining system, has shown further 
shifts in this direction with the decline of the remaining industry-wide bargaining 
arrangements and the disintegration of pattern bargaining in many sectors. The experience 
1 The most prominent example of this instability was the collapse of the national printing and 
newspaper council at the end of 1989, following the withdrawal of the major employer 
party.(Godfrey, 1992: 256-260) 
2 Note that Ferner and Hyman argue that the trend to decentralise bargaining has not been as 
pervasive as made out by other commentators. While decentralisation has occurred, they emphasise 
the unevenness of this process and the stability of structures in certain countries.(1992: 20-21; and, 
Hyman, 1994(a): 19) Treu also acknowledges the resistance of bargaining structures to change 
because of the effect of the institutional framework and the inertia that this creates.(1985: 61) 
2 
of Australia also points to a shift towards enterprise bargaining.(Treu, 1985: 50-52; and, 
Locke et al, 1995: 144) 
Secondly, the international trend to decentralise bargaining has been initiated primarily by 
employers. Trade unions, faced with declining membership, new management strategies, 
and, in some cases, unfriendly governments, have gone along with the change or have 
resisted only weakly.(Treu, 1985: 50; and, Ferner and Hyman, 1992: 20-21) In South 
Africa, on the other hand, the trade unions have provided the impetus for changes to levels 
of bargaining. The burgeoning growth of the unions that emerged after 1973 and their -7 
development into very powerful organisations, both economically and politically, has seen \ 
their demand for national centralised bargaining picking up a strong momentum. ) 
1.2 Explaining different levels of bargaining 
The different trends in recent years between South Africa and some of the advanced 
industrialised countries highlights the great diversity that exists between bargaining 
structures across countries, sectors, and firms. B¥gaining can take place, at the one 
extreme, between an employer and a particular work group within a plant, and, at the 
other extreme, bargaining arrangements have been established at the national, economy-''""',) ;i /' 
wid~ level by confederations of employers' organisations and trade unions. I~ between / 
these poles, bargaining takes place at plant level or enterprise level, or employers bargain \ 
'-.....-~_ =--
collectively via associations at local, regional or national levels for industries or industrial 
sub-sectors. 
What accounts for this diversity? And what accounts for changes in levels of bargaining 
and the sorts of broad trends to greater centralisation or decentralisation discussed above? 
A number of approaches have been adopted in seeking answers to these questions. These 
c-_ -
approaches range from case studies of the factors or determinants (e.g. union density) 
associated with different types of bargaining structures at firms and within sectors, to 
large-scale studies that have tested the association of these factors with different levels of 
bargaining across sectors.(Deaton and Beaumont, 1980; and, Hendricks and Kahn, 1982) 
/' 
) 
f I 
J 
3 
Historical and comparative studies have also been done to identify the relative importance 
of different factors (e.g. the legislative (ramework for collective bargaining) over time and 
across countries.(Sisson, 1987; and, Gospel, 1992) These studies allow for an 
examination of the way that the effects of industrialisation have been mediated by national 
institutions to result in bargaining structures being established at particular levels in 
countries. AL.a higher level of analysis, regulation theory proposes that changes to· 
collective bargaining institutions (which form part of the 'mode of regulation') are :, 
determined by changing 'regimes of accumulation'. 3 
These approaches all attempt to explain the causes of bargaining structures being 
established at different levels. A common feature of these studies is that they view the 
determination of bargaining structures ex post facto. In other words, the starting point is 
the existing level of bargaining and the preferences of the parties are attributed to them on 
the basis of these structural outcomes. These studies therefore do not directly address the 
actual process through which environmental factors and forces are interpreted and 
translated into perceptions of best interest; that is, how do actors interpret their 
environment, develop preferences that serve their perceived interests, and make decisions 
about the level at which they will bargain? 
The examination of this interface between structure and action is clearly an extremely 
complex problem. This dissertation does not presume to offer a solution, but the 
methodological approach that is adopted offers some insight on the process through which 
preferences are formed and choices are made on the issue of levels of bargaining. This 
approach is qualitative and relies on the subjective expressions of employers' thinking on 
the factors and forces that influence their preferences for a particular level of bargaining. 
The study is, furthermore, micro in focus. A sample of employers in a single sector and 
region is chosen for intensive investigation. This investigation takes place at two points in 
time, that is, 1991 and 1995. But, importantly, employers' perspectives are also gained on 
3 See Ferner and Hyman for a synopsis ofregulation theory.(1992: 18-19) 
4 
the events that took place in the intervening period, namely an agreement to change to 
national bargaining. The ~tudy is therefore a contemporaneous examination of how 
employers perceived their interests with regard to bargaining levels before and after a 
change took place to the structure of bargaining. In addition, their perceptions of the 
decision-making process in which employers collectively engaged when arriving at an 
agreement to bargain nationally, are also examined. This throws light on the process 
through which preferences were translated into choices when faced with a demand for 
national bargaining. 
Finally, the subjectiye focus of the study is balanced by an examination of the association 
o~:iive fa~~o~s,~i~h, ~he aggregate choices made by employers in 1991 and 
1995. The importance of underlying determinants, not recognised or expressed by 
respondents, can therefore be evaluated. Furthermore, this more quantitative approach 
allows for a comparison with the findings of the large-scale cross-sectoral studies referred 
'· ... 
to above. Identification of contradictions and commonalities enable more general points to 
be made about the findings of this case study. 
1.3 The longitudinal focus on employers in the Western Cape clothing industry 
The study focusses on the perceptions of employers in the Western Cape clothing 
industry. There are a number of reasons why this sector and region was chosen. Firstly, 
clothing employers in the Western Cape had for many years shown a firm commitment to 
bargaining through an employers' association at a regional industrial council. By 1991, 
however, certain threats to this bargaining arrangement were emerging. The most 
important of these was the demand by the South African Clothing and Textile Workers' 
Union (SACTWU) for the establishment of a national industrial council. A second threat 
was the dissatisfaction that was emerging amongst ' small' employers with regard to the 
existing multi-employer bargaining arrangement. Although there was a lack of clarity 
about what these 'small' employers were advocating, it seemed that many of them wanted 
greater deregulation of the labour market. These factors led to the first set of interviews 
being done with clothing employers in 1991. 
5 
The demand for the establishment of a national industrial council was vigorously opposed 
by the majority of clothing employers in the Western Cape until about mid-1992. At that 
point the clothing employers' associations throughout the country (including those in the 
Western Cape) agreed to negotiate in a national bargaining forum, and agreed in principle 
to the formation of a national industrial council by 1995. This change prompted a second 
examination of employers' perceptions with regard to their preferred level of bargaining. 
This took place in 1995. Increased attention was given in these interviews to the decision-
making process that had taken place in the employers' associations when the change to 
national bargaining was agreed upon . 
. !~e~f9c;µs_on-employers' preferences was an attempt to fill something of a gap that exists 
in research on bargaining levels in. South Africa. The traditional interest of South African 
industrial sociologists in the trade union movement has led to a much greater emphasis 
being placed on its motivations and strategies with regard to bargaining levels. To some 
extent this is justified by the key role that the new unions have played in initiating the 
levels of bargaining debate in the country, but the international literature points to the 
importance of employers' preferences with regard to this issue. It was therefore decided to 
focus on employers' perceptions and behaviour in order to shed some light on the factors 
that motivated their strategic choices when deciding on the level at which they wished to 
bargain. 
~~~ructure oft .. ~ dissertati~~) 
The methodological approach adopted for this dissertation, briefly outlined above, is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. It emphasises the distinction between this 
methodology, with its focus on the perspectives of social actors regarding their choices of 
the preferred level of bargaining, and most other explanations of bargaining levels. The 
problems with this methodology, and how these problems were addressed, are also 
discussed, as is the sample size and sam_ple_stratifieations. 
,-~~-.,.~-~-_.-_- .,._,~-- .~-----~' 
6 
The survey in Chapter Three of theoretical approaches to explaining bargaining levels 
builds on the methodological discussion in the prior chapter. Various approaches that have 
been made to explaining the diversity of levels of bargaining are discussed and the 
theoretical statements generated by these approaches are outlined. These approaches, 
however, oversimplify the process through which employers evaluate environmental 
factors and make decisions about the level at which they wish to bargain. The chapter 
draws on literature on employer strategies to complement some of the more deterministic 
explanations of differing bargaining levels that have been developed. However, it is argued 
that the concept of strategy is problematic and theoretically limited. Similarly, the cost-
benefit approach to decision-making advocated by rational choice theorists is shown to be 
flawed. 
It is argued in Chapter Three that employers have diverse interests and preferences, and 
their decision-making capacities and processes also differ considerably. Furthermore, 
decision-making is a p~litical pro~hat invoh~es_compr-emi·ses-between-£Q!!!~ing 
i~ts. The chapter concludes by focussing on the specific problem that these competing 
interests poses for an explanation of multi-employer bargaining. The role of employers' 
associations, as well as the role of strong trade unions, in producing collective interests 
amongst employers, is highlighted. Finally, it is suggested that the route to a more 
complete theory of bargaining levels could be via a different methodological approach, as 
is outlined in Chapter Two and adopted in this dissertation. 
Chapter Four deals with the environment within which employers in the Western Cape~~ '1 
<--..._ 
clothing industry have formed their perceptions on bargaining levels. This provides an 
essential background to the analysis of the interviews in the chapters that follow. The 
major contextual features that are discussed are the history and nature of the statutory 
system of collective bargaining in South Africa; the history of bargaining structures and 
industrial relations in the clothing industry; the development of SACTWU's policy on 
levels of bargaining; the organisations for clothing, knitting, and cut, make and trim 
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(CMT) employers in the Western Cape; and, the economic structure of the clothing 
industry. 
The body of the dissertation is provided by Chapters Five, Six and Seven, which deal with 
the analysis of the empirical data. The arrangement of these chapters is primarily 
chronological. Chapter Five is concerned with employers' perceptions regarding different 
levels of bargaining in 1991. Chapter Six deals with the perceptions of members of the 
employers' organisations regarding the decision-making process leading up to the 
agreement to bargain at the national level, and what they saw as the main reasons for this 
decision being reached. The focus of Chapter Seven is on employers' perceptions of 
different bargaining levels in 1995. In both Chapter Five and Seven there is also a 
quantitative analysis of the relationship between aggregate preferences and selected 
infrastructural and institutional factors. 
Chapter Eight concludes the dissertation. This chapter sums up the empirical findings of 
the case study and then engages those findings with the theoretical approaches outlined in 
Chapter Three. A six point framework for the development of a comprehensive theory of 
levels of bargaining is proposed. It is noted, however, that the focus of the case study only 
allows for an examination of some of the points in this framework, primarily those dealing 
with the role of employers in the establishment of the bargaining level. The discussion of 
theory concludes by advancing three important proposals fot the development of a 
theoretical explanation of the role of employers in determining levels of bargaining. These 
proposals, it is argued, also make a significant advance towards the development of a 
comprehensive theory oflevels of bargaining. 
The three proposals are as follows: firstly, that a theory of levels of bargaining must 
recognise a certain degree of contextual specificity in the determination of levels of 
bargaining, but that the theory should also take account of the commonality of 
determinants across sectors and countries. 
8 
Secondly, the theory must provide for an explanation of interpretation and decision-
making by employers that recognises diversity of interests, bounded rationality, non-
optimal satisficing decision-making, and the influence of wider social and political 
considerations. The theory must also recognise that decision-making by employers is a 
political process. 
Thirdly, the diversity of employers' interests poses the problem for theory of explaining the 
determination of multi-employer bargaining structures. The study finds that 'leading' 
employers in the associations played a crucial role in consolidating and shaping employers' 
perceptions of their interests. In addition, perceptions of the significant power of the trade 
uni.on acted to override the centrifugal tendencies that exist within the associations. An 
analysis of power, both within employers' associations and between employers and unions, 
must therefore be a central component of a theory of levels of bargaining that seeks to 
explain multi-employer bargaining. 
The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the advantages of the research 
methodology for examining the diversity of employers' perceptions of their interests and 
the role that the politics of collective decision-making plays in shaping employers' 
preferences. The methodology avoids the deterministic explanations of some existing 
theoretical statements and highlights the need to take account of the interface between 
structure and action in order to understand the determination of levels of bargaining. 
CHAPTER TWO 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Background to and overview of the research method 
This study started as a research project undertaken by the author for th~mfll_s~_!ial 
Jl.elat-i0ns--PmjeGt-(-IRP) at the University of Cape Town. The IRP was set up to examine 
the impact that the growth of the new trade unions into national organisations was having 
on bargaining structures and levels of bargaining. One of the aims of the IRP was to 
investigate the preferences of trade unions and employers for particular levels of 
bargaining and the reasons for these preferences. 
After an initial study of the whole industrial council system, the IRP shifted its focus to a 
single sector for a more detailed examination of employers' preferences with regard to 
different levels of bargaining. 4 Th~ .Western_ Cape clothing industry was chosen, to some 
extent because of convenience (the~ is based in-Cape Town and there is a large number 
of clothing firms in and around the city), but also because the demand by SACTWU for 
national bargaining had made the issue of bargaining levels an extremely contentious one 
amongst clothing employers in the region. 
The original studx w?sJo _b~ largely exploratory. Almost no research had been done in 
__..,.-- ~---~ -.-~~-~- """-· .0...-.--
South Africa on the reasons why employers chose to bargain at-a particular level-and why 
they resisted attempts by unions to bargain at an alternative level. 5 It ":'~s therefore 
decided to conduct structured interviews with a random stratified sample of clothing 
' 
employers in the Western Cape, to investigate the reasons for their preference for a 
particular level of bargaining. A literature search was done in order to obtain a list of 
4 The study of the industrial council system was published by the IRP as the Industrial Council 
Digest.(Godfrey, 1992) 
5 Some insight on this issue was gained from the collapse of the National Printing and Newspaper 
Industrial Council, although in that case the main focus of employers' opposition was bargaining 
with the Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union atthe national level rather then national 
bargaining as such. See, for example, 'Document: The bosses' strategy'.(South African Labour 
Bulletin, 1989) 
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r Ur ~~-.y~ " , ., d ,£' al,.,, 1~s '· .. "'1' · VJJu~r fA-b· I e,vu1 
\\I\' dA'' \,,,-~ (u) ,po [!\)IM>,:) er /" 
factors that had been identified 6l __ o~he~ studi~s as importa?t_~~: _the_ c~oice of the level of 
!Jargaining. This list was used in the design of the questionnaires that were administered to 
----~-·---
employers . 
.. ----· 
The list of factors that was drawn up could be divided into certain broad categories. For 
example, there were factors related to the market, administrative factors, and institutional 
factors. An objective of the study was to prioritise these categories in terms of their 
importance for employers when deciding about the level of bargaining. However, the 
~
que_gionnair:e_s did not_co~Qnd~hese-fact-eFs--enly--and-th_eLe~ 
co~ab~or them ~~~~a.5~()11.§. for_~hQQ§ing-~_p~rtic~~evel of 
bargaining. In fact, the questionnaires were on balance· more open-ended than closed on 
......_ - ---------- -~-~----
the issue of preferred bargaining leveL6 The interviews therefore tended to elicit mainly in-
.·~..__---------- - - ...... ~,...... ~~~- .,__...,....,.,..,,~--- -..,_.._ __ - ... ~-----~- ~-..,..--.-.. -- >- -·,_ - -- - -- --,..- ··~~ 
dept?, qu~~~tiye data, as ~el! ~~ _I?r<?viding certain_ quantitative information related to the 
~ampl_e -~~r_ci,tifications. 
Some three years after the completion of the above study, permission was obtained to use 
the data for this dissertation. In the intervening period, employers had done a complete 
turnaround (in 1991 the overwhelming majority of employers interviewed were strongly 
opposed to bargaining at any level other than regional) and had agreed to bargain with 
SACTWU at the national level. It was decided to go back to the same employers 
interviewed in 1991 and re-interview them regarding their reasons for agreeing to the shift 
to national bargaining and to find out what their current preferences were on the levels of 
bargaining issue. 
New questionnaires were drawn up in 1995; although these closely followed the 1991 
questionnaires, and these were administered to 35 of the 42 interviewee firms that had 
participated in the 1991 study (four manufacturers were no longer in business and three 
. were unwilling to be interviewed again). 7 As in 1991, the questionnaires were primarily 
6 See the 1991 questionnaires in Appendix B. 
7 See the 1995 questionnaires in Appendix C. 
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open-ended on the question of the reasons for choosing a particular level of bargaining, 
although t~ere were prompts to elicit comments on the importance of particular factors. 
The data obtained in the interviews was largely qualitative, but the design of the 
questionnaires did allow for certain quantitative measurements to be made. 
The combination of the 1991 and 199 5 interviews therefore constitutes a longitudinal case 
study of clothing employers' preferences for particular levels of bargaining (also known as 
a panel study because of the repetition of respondents in 1991 and 1995). The change in 
the level at which bargaining took place during this period allowed for an examination of 
the reasons for the change and the decision-making process leading up to the change. The 
effect of the change on employers' preferences was an additional variable for analysis in 
1995. 
2.2 Research methodology 
In both theJ99.l~an.d-the overall~study--an-"·exploratorrresearch--approach- was adopted 
~
because of the paucity of re_search on the topic. The broad_ objective was to exami!le the 
.. . . . ~ "----~---~~---·-····· 
way in which employer(Jho_ughLaho.ut the issue of bargairring levels and what they 
------~~----. -~-- . - .-- - =-""'--"·- -- ·- -· 
percejY.ed to-J>e the ilJlportanj reasons .. for favouring a particular level. The study was 
------ -·---~- ,,· ~----
therefore primarily qualitative; it was an in-depth examination of employers' perceptions 
with regard to which level of bargaining would best serve their interests. 8 An additional 
focus was on perceptions of the decision-making process that employers had engaged in 
during 1992 when they agreed to participate in national bargaining. 
The methodology differs from other approaches that have been used in explaining differing 
bargaining levels. As in much industrial relations research, the focus of previous studies 
has been on outcomes. The existing structures are examined and preferences and reasons 
8 In broad terms the research method used was an in-depth attitude survey. However, conceptually 
an attitude is usually seen as comprising cognitive, affective and behavioural components. It was 
felt that employers' preferences with regard to a level of bargaining has a narrower focus; it is 
primarily a cognitive evaluation, with a behavioural component. The term perceptions, rather than 
attitudes, was therefore felt to be a more appropriate description of their expressed thinking on this 
issue. 
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for preferences are attributed to the parties through correspondence between certain 
variables (e.g. the size of the firm) and the level at which bargaining has been 
structured.(See, for example, Deaton and Beaumont, 1980; and, Hendricks and Kahn, 
1982) The causal relationship between preferences and the establishment of bargaining 
structures at particular levels is therefore established ex post facto. Broad assumptions are 
made about the power of the parties in determining the level of bargaining and the process 
through which the parties interpreted factors and translated these into preferences and 
decisions. 
Alternatively, historical and comparative studies, which by their nature are ex post facto 
examinations of outcomes and the causes of those outcomes, have sought to explain 
changes and differences in levels of bargaining through an analysis of longer-term trends in 
industrialisation and industrial relations.(See, for example, Sisson, 1991; and, Gospel, 
1992) In ·these studies preferences are attributed to employers by retrospectively 
identifying 'enacted' or 'realised' strategies. These strategies are patterns of behaviour that 
emerge over time; they are strategic in that they are actions taken to serve employers' 
interests but are not necessarily part of an intended plan.(Mintzberg, 1989: 27-28; and, 
Gospel, 1992: 10) These studies give greater recognition to the balance of power 
between the parties and to the influence of broader technoeconomic, and political 
developments on preferences; but the process through which employers interpret 
environmental factors and make decisions about bargaining levels is not examined 
empirically. 
The approach used in this study is a contemporaneous examination of employers' 
subjective preferences for particular levels of bargaining, that is, the factors they expressed 
as important for choosing to bargain at a certain level. To some extent this approach is a 
study of outcomes, in that employers are influenced in their preferences by the level at 
which bargaining is currently taking place, i.e. at regional level in 1991 and national level 
in 1995. But the 1991 interviews were conducted when employers were facing a demand 
from the union for national bargaining. These interviews therefore provided an ex ante 
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perspective on employers' perceptions of a prospective change to the level of bargaining. 
The subsequent shift to national bargaining and the repeat interviews in 1995, allo~ed for 
an assessment of how . and why preferences changed, as well as an examination of the 
process through which employers went to agree to national bargaining. 
Attitudes have been described as "not mere meditative reflections on the world, but a way 
of planning our interaction with the world" and as "both a social product and an intrinsic 
part of social action" .(Eiser and Van der Pligt, 1988: ix-x) Attitudes therefore have a 
behavioural component that reflects intentions and decisions to act.(Eiser and Van der 
Pligt, 1988: 23) If one accepts this description, then the perceptions of employers can be 
seen as both their assessment of the most appropriate level of bargaining given their 
evaluation of the environment within which they are operating, and as expressions of 
existing or intended behaviour with regard to the issue of bargaining levels (or strategies in 
the process of being 'enacted'). Their perceptions are therefore both social products 
'determined' by environmental factors and forces, and proactive expressions of preferred 
courses of action given environmental constraints. 
The attitudinal nature of this study, and the fact that it was longitudinal, means that both 
of these aspects of employers' perceptions regarding the level of bargaining issue can be 
examined. Firstly, the way in which employers have interpreted and evaluated 
environmental factors in their assessment of the level of bargaining that would best serve 
their interests, is addressed in the analysis of the 1991 and 1995 interviews. Secondly, the 
nature of strategic choice on the part of employers can also be investigated, although only 
contemporaneously over a very short period of time. And perceptions of the decision-
making process leading up to the agreement to bargain at the national level allows for an 
examination of how strategic thinking developed practically. 
The research methodology therefore mainly uses the subjective expressions of actors as 
the source for explaining the determination of bargaining at a particular level. It has sought 
an alternative perspective to approaches which identify causality ex post facto or through 
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structural determination; in this case the preferences of actors themselves are examined to 
understand their role in mediating between structural factors and d~veloping proactive 
attitudes and behaviour (or strategies) to change their environment in a way that suits their 
interests. In short, the methodology adopted attempts to promote an evaluation of the role 
of actors in making and remaking social structure. 
2.3 Problems with the research methodology 
The focus on the subjective perceptions of actors does have drawbacks. Simon et al have 
noted that people cannot usually express verbally how they arrive at decisions, especially 
when there is a degree of unc~rtainty in their minds. In other words, the reasons people 
give for their choices might not reflect their real motives for making those choices.(Zey, 
1992(a): 3) What this means is that qualitative research regarding preferences and choice 
needs some form of reality check, through a consideration of the influence of certain 
objective factors on choices. 
This problem was addressed in the study by a quantitative component, which draws on the 
research done by Deaton and Beaumont in Britain (1980), and Hendricks and Kahn in the 
United States (1982). The advantage of including this component is that one is able to 
delve beneath the subjective reality of respondents and examine the role of infrastructural 
and institutional factors in determining preferences. The importance of these objective 
factors can then be examined despite the fact that they are often not recognis~d by 
employers when articulating their preferences for particular levels of bargaining. In some 
cases, the comparisons with the British and United States studies have to be treated with 
caution because they were cross-sectoral, whereas this study focusses on a single sector, 
but the variables used in those studies remain relevant. 
The aim of using both qualitative (or interpretive) and quantitative (or structural) 
approaches in this study is not to compare them and privilege one over the other. Rather, 
they should be seen to complement one another in providing a more comprehensive 
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understanding of the preferences of employers in the Western Cape clothing industry on 
the level of bargaining issue over a particular period of time. 
A second problem encountered with the research methodology was the introduction of 
new interviewees in 1995. It is widely recognised that panel studies suffer from the 
problem of contracting sample size. This occurred with the non-participation of seven 
respondent firms in 1995, but the impact was limited. More important was the problem of 
returning to the same firm to find that the person (owner or manager) responsible for 
industrial relations had changed. 
At ten of the firms that participated in the 1995 interviews, the person who had been 
interviewed in 1991 could not be interviewed again, either because they had left or 
because they no longer dealt with the industrial relations portfolio. The impact of these 
new interviewees was, however, not significant in the case of five of these firms. At these 
firms the respondents in both 1991 and 1995 took clearly identifiable enterprise positions 
on the issue. So, where there had been a change in the preferred level of bargaining this 
was the result of a change adopted within the firm rather than a new interviewee 
expressing his or her personal preference. 
At the remaining five firms the change in the interviewee did have relevance in that they 
clearly expressed their own perspectives on the issue. At one of these firms the result was 
the same in that the preferred level of bargaining did not change, but the reasons for this 
choice differed. New interviewees at the other four firms were probably the major factor 
behind the change in their preferred level of bargaining. 
This is an unavoidable problem in longitudinal studies of firms and must simply be factored 
in as a variable of change, which in reality it is. The fact of the matter is that the new 
interviewees held the industrial relations portfolio at these firms, and where they 
formulated policy relatively independently their new perspective will largely explain a 
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change in the preference of the firm. As a final check, where this variable was seen to be 
relevant its effects were highlighted in the analysis of the interviews. 
Finally, it should be noted that when approaching firms the interviewee was selected on 
the basis of his or her responsibility for the industrial relations portfolio. In a limited 
number of cases this was problematic because this was not necessarily the person who 
attended the employers' association meetings (for example, a factory manager responsible 
for industrial relations was interviewed but it emerged that only the owner or managing 
director attended the association's meetings). In certain instances this did not appear to be 
relevant as the manager could reflect the firm's position on the level of bargaining issue 
because it had been discussed with the owner or managing director. Where this was not 
the case, it was attempted to ascertain what the position of the firm was rather than the 
individual's own perceptions. 
2.4 The Samples 
The fieldwork for this dissertation was carried out in the Western Cape clothing and 
knitting industry over two periods: the first from August to October 1991 and the second 
from July to September 1995. The original aim was for a sample of approximately 10% of 
all clothing employers in the region. This was stratified according to the following criteria: 
size of firm (i.e. in terms of numbers of employees); sub-sector (i.e. clothing, knitting, and 
CMT); location (i.e. Cape Town and Atlantis); and, membership or non-membership of 
the employers' associations. A further stratification was to include 'leading' clothing 
employers in the region. 9 Within each of these stratifications employers were selected 
randomly, although the category of'leading' employers required some purposive selection. 
In the first research period 42 employers employing approximately 19 289 weekly-paid 
workers were interviewed. As at December 1991 there were 433 firms registered with the 
industrial council employing a total of 52 951 workers. The research sample therefore 
9 The category of 'leading' employers comprised members of the Executive Committee of the 
CCMA or CK.IA. Included were industrial council representatives and members of the 'core 
negotiating team' for the annual wage negotiations. 
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consisted of 9, 7% of the total number of firms registered with the council and these firms 
employed 36,4% of the total number of registered employees. It shoulcl be noted that 
some firms had subsidiaries that were registered separately with the industrial council and 
that in some cases the interviewee spoke on behalf of these subsidiaries with regard to the 
firm's preferred level of bargaining. If one takes account of these subsidiaries, the research 
sample increases to 12,9% of registered employers and 37,9% of registered employees. 
In the second research period 35 of the original 42 employers were again interviewed. 
These 35 employers employed approximately 18 907 weekly-paid workers. As at July 
1995 there were 430 firms registered with the industrial council employing a total of 
49 106 workers. The research sample in 1995 therefore consisted of 8, 1 % of the total 
number of firms registered with the council and these firms employed about 38,5% of the 
total number of registered employees. If one includes subsidiaries that were registered 
separately with the council but which were represented by the interviewee, the research 
sample increases to 10% of registered employers and 39% of registered employees. 
Finally, it should be noted that because of the contentious nature of the issue of bargaining 
levels (particularly in 1991 ), interviews were obtained with employers on the basis of 
confidentiality, that is, no employer or firm would be identified by name, and if quotes 
from the interviews were used the interviewee or his/her firm was not to be identified. It is 
therefore not possible to provide a list of the firms that made up the samples in 1991 and 
1995. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ROLE OF EMPLOYERS IN DETERMINING LEVELS OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING: A DISCUSSION OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
3.1 Introduction 
It should be stressed from the outset that there is as yet no fully developed theory of the 
establishment of bargaining structures at different levels. This chapter discusses some of 
the approaches that have been made and the theoretical statements that have been 
generated with respect to bargaining levels. Most of these approaches accord employers 
the predominant role in the determination of levels of bargaining but this is often an 
implicit assumption and little attention is given to how employers actually p·erform this 
role. These approaches therefore oversimplify the process through which employers 
evaluate environmental factors and make decisions about the level at which they wish to 
bargain. The concept of employers' strategies makes some advance in exposing employers' 
preferences and actions with regard to the level of bargaining, but the concept is shown to 
be problematic and theoretically limited. Similarly, the cost-benefit decision-making 
advocated by rational choice theorists is shown to be flawed. 
It is argued that employers have diverse interests and preferences, and their decision-
making capacities and processes also differ considerably. Furthermore, decision-making is 
a political process that does not necessarily follow a 'rational' method of evaluating 
alternatives. The chapter concludes by focussing on the specific problem that this 
argument poses for· an explanation of multi-employer bargaining, that is, how do 
employers act collectively when their interests are so diverse? It is suggested that a way of 
advancing the theorisation of bargaining levels is by adopting a methodological approach 
that examines employers' articulation of their interests, their perceptions of preferred 
course of action, and the debate and decision-making process that employers engage in 
when addressing the question of the level of bargaining. Such an approach advan~th~ 
·~ 
existing theoretical explanations of bargaining levels. 
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3.2 Studies of the determinants of different levels of bargaining 
One approach to explaining divergent levels of bargaining has its roots in the detailed 
enterprise and industry case studies carried out in the United States and Britain in the 
1950s and 1960s. These studies provided lists of factors that detennine the levels at which 
bargaining structures are situated. For example, Deaton and Beaumont refer to the studies 
by Shister, who found that particular levels of bargaining were underpinned by technical 
factors (i.e. cost structure of enterprises, size of firm, etc.); marketing factors (i.e. the 
structure of the product market, variations in demand, etc.); and factors such as 
administrative organisation and pressures in the union and managerial units; political 
organisation and pressures in the union; leadership in both union and management; the 
legal framework; and traditional or historical forces. Deaton and Beaumont also note that 
Weber compiled a similar list, which included market factors, the nature of the issues 
being bargained, representational factors, government politics, and power tactics in the 
bargaining process.(Deaton and Beaumont, 1980: 203) 
The lists of variables generated by these case studies have, more recently, provided the 
basis for large-scale, quantitative studies to test their significance in a systematic way 
across sectors. In a study of 970 manufacturing establishments in Britain, Deaton and 
Beaumont found that single employer bargaining was associated with larger enterprises, 
multi-plant firms, foreign ownership, the concentration of ownership within product 
markets, and specialist industrial relations management. Multi-employer bargaining was in 
turn associated with the regional concentration of firms, high trade union density, and 
multi-unionism. Proportionately high labour costs, the existence of incentive schemes, and 
the presence of powerful workgroups (e.g. skilled workers) did not correlate with either 
single or multi-employer bargaining.(Deaton and Beaumont, 1980:210-212) 
A study of 3 056 bargaining arrangements in manufacturing industries in the United States 
done by Hendricks and Kahn reached broadly similar findings. The results pointed to the 
importance of product and labour market considerations, and found that the high 
concentration of ownership within a market and large plant size were strongly associated 
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with single employer as opposed to multi-employer bargaining; umon rivalry was 
associated with more decentralised bargaining; and labour intensity was associated with 
greater levels of centralisation.(Hendricks and Kahn, 1982: 182, 185 and 194) 
The theoretical statements that have been inductively drawn from these empirical studies 
are, however, limited. For example, Deaton and Beaumont refer to Weber's contention 
that bargaining structure is determined by a cost-benefit decision by the parties, i.e. it is a 
choice between the various costs and benefits of alternative structures. The factors 
underlying this cost benefit approach are the maximisation of one's bargaining power, 
administrative convenience, and the need to protect oneself against competitive 
disadvantage. These three broad factors are in tum linked to a greater or lesser extent with 
the specific determinants identified by the empirical studies. (Deaton and Beaumont, 1980: 
203) The conclusions drawn by Kahn and Hendricks are similarly descriptive. They also 
argue that employers make a cost-benefit decision about alternative bargaining structures 
and sum up their study with the statement that "unions and management consider choices 
of bargaining structure in a systematic way that reflects the basic environment in which 
negotiations take place".(Hendricks and Kahn, 1982: 182) 
The enterprise and industry case studies, and the large-scale quantitative studies, have 
enhanced our knowledge of the range of variables that have some determining influence 
on bargaining structure, and partly explain the diversity of levels of bargaining found in 
practice. But these studies oversimplify the process through which employers and trade 
unions interpret these factors, make decisions and develop strategies regarding the level of 
bargaining, and engage with one another to arrive at an agreement on a particular 
bargaining structure. 
3.3 Comparative historical approaches to explaining different levels of bargaining 
Another approach to an explanation of the diversity of levels of bargaining has been 
provided by comparative historical studies, both within and across countries. (Sisson, 
1987; Sisson, 1991; and Gospel, 1992) This approach explicitly distances itself from 
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explanations that view bargaining structure as being deterministically linked to industrial 
structure or economic environment. Sisson notes, for example, t~at: 
... attempts to explain employer behaviour in terms of the characteristics of 
the material structure of infrastructure quickly break down as soon as they 
are subjected to scrutiny or when other countries are added to the 
equation.(1991: 263) 
These studies place particular importance on the nature of the bargaining structures that 
were established early in the industrialisation process. Sisson argues that bargaining 
structure is the outcome of "an historical compromise which reflects the pattern of 
industrialisation and the nature of the trade union challenge". He goes on to state that to 
"understand why the structure of collective bargaining emerged in the form it did, it is 
necessary to appreciate the relationship between employers and trade unions at the time 
the compromise was struck".(1991: 256 and 265) 
The comparative historical approach therefore explicitly recogmses power and the 
engagement between employers and trade unions in the establishment of bargaining 
structures. And, although Sisson accepts the consensus of most commentators that 
bargaining structures are implicitly, if not explicitly, determined largely by employers, he 
argues that: 
... multi-employer bargaining emerged because employers were confronted 
by the challenge of national trade unions organized along occupational or 
industrial lines who were anxious to protect their members against the 
'devastating and degrading effects of unregulated labour markets'. ( 1991 : 
265) 
These studies are important in three respects. Firstly, the comparison of the same sectors 
across countries allows for an evaluation of the importance of infrastructural factors for 
determining particular levels of bargaining. At the same time, it provides insights into the 
impact of other variables on bargaining levels, for example, the legislative frameworks for 
collective bargaining in each country. In other words, if bargaining is situated at different 
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levels in the· same sector in different countries, then there are other factors that have 
overridden the determining strength of indus_try structure. This allows for the development 
of historically-grounded theoretical statements that explain the similarities and 
contradictions between bargaining structures, and converging or diverging trends. 
Secondly, the historical perspective emphasises the process of establishing bargaining 
structures and the exercise of power in this process. This perspective therefore highlights a 
fundamentally important point, namely that bargaining structure is ultimately determined 
through negotiation and compromise between two parties with opposing interests. This 
simple fact tends to be overlooked or is und,rstated in the more deterministic writing on 
bargaining levels, probably because research has focussed on countries where trade unions 
were relatively weak and employers. have played the dominant role in the choice of the 
bargaining level. Employers have therefore been viewed as the primary 'conduits' through 
which structural determination of the level of bargaining takes place. However, where 
trade unions are strong their interests, and the exercise of their power and the strategies 
that they adopt, have a critical bearing on the level at which bargaining is established. In 
other words, a powerful trade union can strongly influence employers' choices regarding 
the level of bargaining and force them to concede bargaining at a particular level against 
their perceived best interests. 
Thirdly, comparative historical studies have focussed greater attention on the strategies 
adopted by actors with regard to preferred levels of bargaining. This focus gives greater 
weight to the role of actors in pursuing particular preferences or strategies rather than as 
responding functionally to objective structural factors. The strategic choices made by 
actors are seen as being relatively independent of structural factors, but work to a greater 
or lesser extent within the constraints imposed by those factors. Furthermore, those 
choices are also made as part of a power-play with an adversary that is pursuing opposing 
interests and strategies. This is an additional, and vitally important, factor that can explain 
the divergence of employers' preferences regarding a particular level of bargaining from. a 
functionalist logic imposed by structural factors. 
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Although it has been argued above that trade umons can play an important part m 
determining the level of bargaining, employers are generally recognised as having played 
the predominant role in this process.(Clegg, 1976: 10; Sisson, 1991:256; and, Gospel, 
1992: 71) The strategies that employers pursue regarding the level of bargaining have 
therefore been accorded particular attention in comparative historical studies. This brings 
the spotlight to bear on the concept of 'employer strategy', and it is on this that the next 
section will focus. 
3.4 The concept of employers' strategies 
The concept of 'employer strategy' is an important theoretical step in understanding the 
determination of bargaining levels. It focusses attention on employers' decision-making 
and behaviour with regard to collective bargaining, within the context of their overall 
business strategies. The integration of business and industrial relations strategies, which is 
increasingly taking place in practice and in theory, emphasises employers' choice with 
regard to their interpretation of their business environment and their decisions in the field 
of industrial relations. It therefore focusses on the interface between structure and action, 
that is, on purposive behaviour which shapes the environment as well as being influenced 
by it.(Sisson and Marginson, 1995: 92) 
Gospel uses the notion of strategy to propose that British employers had two basic 
strategic choices to make regarding the management of labour. Employers could either 
internalise their activities within the· boundaries of the firm or they could externalise them 
in the market. The latter strategy meant that the firm "hands dealings with a trade union 
over to an association of employers", that is, it engaged in multi-employer 
bargaining.(1992: 8) He goes on to explain the motivations for the latter strategy: 
The system suited employers in that it allowed them to maximise their 
collective strength through their associations, to counter the pressure for 
job control from skilled workers, and to reduce some of the uncertainty 
surrounding the fixing of wages and conditions. It also economised on the 
costs of investing in strong internal structures and hierarchies.(1992: 79) 
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Sisson notes another important strategic rum of employers when engaging m multi-
employer bargaining: 
. . . multi-employer bargaining made it possible for employers to neutralize 
the workplace from trade union activity: that is to say, to exclude the trade 
union from the workplace or, at the very least, to set limits to the role that 
it was allowed to play there.(1991: 265) 
Kinnie points to a further, more recent, aim of strategic behaviour by employers with 
regard to bargaining levels: 
Changes in management organisation and collective bargaining structure in 
the long run have encouraged moves in the direction of centralisation and 
decentralisation in order to keep managers who make strategic industrial 
relations decisions separate from union representatives seeking to negotiate 
collective agreements. Short term pressures emanating from the changes in 
market conditions have stimulated an increase in the control exercised by 
head office managers in order to cut costs and an expansion in the 
autonomy of plant managers to allow them to respond to local product and 
labour market conditions.(1985: 17) 
Employer strategy is, however, a problematic concept. Kinnie notes that "the term 
strategy is thought to impute intention to managerial action where none exists; to omit the 
problems involved with the formulation of strategy; and to assume that a strategy once 
formulated would be implemented".(1985: 18) So, while strategy implies a proactive plan, 
numerous studies point to employers as acting in an ad hoc and opportunistic manner with 
regard to labour management; they muddle through rather than developing a plan of 
action.(Gospel, 1992: 10-11) Can reactive, short-term decision-making be considered to 
be strategy? (Hyman, 1987: 34) Furthermore, while the concept of employer strategy 
exposes the interface between structure and action, or determination and choice, and 
emphasises the relative independence of employers regarding their decision-making, it 
does not say much about the form and substance of that decision-making. So, if employers 
have space to develop strategies with regard to bargaining structure, what factors do they 
25 
------ --------------------------------------
take into account and how do they process and prioritise information regarding 
alternatives before making a decisiop.? 
The problem of the planning and implementation of strategy has been addressed by 
Mintzberg, a •leading theorist on management strategies, through a redefinition of the 
concept of strategy. He distinguishes between 'intended' strategies and 'realised' or 
'enacted' strategies. Intended strategies are those which are developed purposively and 
expressed as formal plans, but which might not necessarily be implemented. Realised or 
enacted strategies are those that emerge out of a pattern of actions when viewed 
retrospectively. In terms of this definition, a series of actions taken by an employer 
without a prior strategic logic can acquire the character of a strategy over time. 
(Mintzberg, 1989: 27-28; and, Gospel, 1992: 10) 
Furthermore, Hyman notes that actions taken by employers that are not part of an 
intended strategy might provide the stepping stones for the development of strategies. 
Hyman refers to the management of industrial relations in Britain and argues that "changes 
introduced without clear strategic intent have established the preconditions for subsequent 
strategy". He cites the example of the decline of multi-employer bargaining and decreasing 
support for employers' organisations: "the new structure of bargaining at primarily 
company level, and the associated increase in staff resources in industrial relations, offer 
the basis for strategic initiative".(Hyman, 1987: 47) Strategies are therefore "both plans 
for the future and patterns from the past0 , and the join between the two can be blurred. 
(Mintzberg, 1989: 27) 
3.5 Decision-making by employers regarding the level of bargaining 
Where does this leave the explanation of the diversity of levels of bargaining? The 
economic environment and industrial structure influence or constrain choices, but leave 
scope for employers to develop strategies on bargaining levels in their contest with trade 
unions. However, the concept of strategy does not necessarily mean purposive, planned 
behaviour (and empirically employers are shown to seldom act in this way), and employer 
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strategies can often be identified only in an historical perspective that reveals patterns and 
consistencies in behaviour. This brings one back to the question: when employers make 
strategic decisions, what factors influence them and how do they process and weigh up 
these factors in order to arrive at their decision on the level at which they will bargain? In 
theoretical tenns: can the determination oflevels of bargaining be explained only on a case 
by case basis or is there a general logic that explains employers' behaviour with regard to 
this issue? 
With regard to the substance of the decision, that is, the factors that are weighed up by 
employers, the concept of strategy proposes a wider range of factors than economic 
environment and industrial structure. Gospel, for example, acknowledges the importance 
of "political and cultural influences" in explaining long-tenn patterns and differences 
between countries.(1983: 168) Furthennore, the concepts of power and control are given 
great weight, particularly with regard· to employers' interpretations of the actions and 
reactions of workers and trade unions. What the strategy theorists do not sheq much light 
on is the process of choice; their explanation of the relationship between structure and· 
strategy therefore remains a descriptive abstraction: 
. . . at both the level of the finn and the level of labour management, the 
relationship between strategy and structure is dynamic and interactive. 
Thus structure not only follows strategy ... but it also facilitates further 
strategic decisions.(Gospel, 1983: 168) 
Similarly, Hyman argues that "(S)trategic choice exists, not because of the absence or 
weakness of structural determinations, but because these determinations are themselves 
contradictory" .(1987: 30) While both of these theoretical statements point in the right 
direction, neither of them greatly advance the theorisation of the determination of 
bargaining at particular levels. 
The answer provided by the exponents of the more deterministic explanations of 
bargaining levels is that the decision by employers is based on an evaluation of the various 
costs and benefits of alternative structures. In other words, it is a systematic decision by 
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rational actors with complete information, responding functionally to external factors in 
order to maximise utility.(Deaton and Beaumont, 1980: 203; and, Hendricks and Kahn, 
1982: 182) 
However, there is a rich literature in social psychology and organisational sociology that 
strongly opposes the rational choice model of decision-making derived from neoclassical 
economics. Studies show that, firstly, all the alternatives are not known by decision-
makers; outcomes of known alternatives are not known; decision-makers do not have full, 
relevant information; information that is obtained is too complex to be easily processed; 
and, there is uncertainty with regard to defining alternatives, outcomes, and probabilities 
of outcomes.(Zey, 1992(a): 2) Furthermore, actors have been described as having a 
'bounded rationality' when making decisions about future course of action in a situation of 
uncertainty. This concept recognises the limitations in the information processing 
capabilities of individuals and organisations in decision-making. Actors also do not 
necessarily optimise their choices; rather they choose satisficing options, that is, they look 
for a course of action that meets a minimal set of requirements.(Zey, 1992(b): 19; and, 
Janis and Mann, 1977: 25) 
Secondly, rational choice theory sees rationality as the pursuit of economic goals, that is 
the maximisation of utility in the marketplace. But psychological studies show that actors 
have a variety of diverse motivations that do not necessarily accord with the maximisation 
of utility. Sociological studies point to the influence of social institutions, habit, and 
tradition on the preferences of individuals and the decisions they make. Furthermore, the 
implications for individuals of the exercise of power by collective organisations such as 
trade unions is given little attention in rational choice theory. 
Thirdly, decision-making by organisations has been shown to be a complex and conflictual 
political process. Zey argues that: 
Groups of people make organizational decisions and these groups have 
their own dynamics. Decisions are made through processes of negotiation, 
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compromise, and bargaining and coalition formation... Organizational 
decisions are political resultants. A wide array of organisational 
characteristics come into play in organisational decision making - hierarchy, 
specialisation, centralisation, communication networks, and environments. 
Organisations provide definable culture or value frames that influence 
decisions.(1992(b): 24) 
This argument accords with Ahlstrand's identification of a 'political approach' in writing 
on industrial relations strategy.(1990) This approach "rejects the rational model of 
problem-solving" and focusses instead "on how outcomes are achieved and on how 
various impediments affect such outcomes". In doing so, the 'political approach' 
"interprets organisations as political entities, with political goals, political decisions and 
political people". As a result, "industrial-relations strategies are seen as products of 
complex political processes".(Ahlstrand, 1990: 22) 
The conclusion that one can draw from the above points is that, given the 'limited' 
influence of the economic environment and industry structure, the piecemeal and 
pragmatic strategies developed by employers will be the consequence of diverse influences 
and decision-making processes. The result will be a wide range of preferences and choices. 
This is borne out empirically. Sisson and Marginson note that: 
. . . the variety of management's industrial relations practice seems to be 
almost infinite. Managements seem to differ not only in their approach to . 
trade unions but also in the ways in which they recruit, develop, motivate 
and reward employees.(1995: 97) 
The implication for theoretical explanations of the diversity of bargaining levels is that 
there is a wide range of factors and forces that influence employers, and they weigh these 
up differently according to their capacities and subjective perceptions of possible 
outcomes of alternative choices. Some of these factors, for example industrial structure or 
the legislative framework, will tend to constrain choices towards particular levels of 
bargaining, but there will remain considerable diversity and tension. To some extent, this 
diversity would explain a tendency towards enterprise bargaining, as it points to the lack 
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of commonality of employers' interests and therefore an inherent preference to bargain on 
one's own according to the circumstances and goals of the individual firm. This poses a 
particular problem for explaining multi-employer bargaining: How and why do employers 
combine to act collectively viz-a-viz unions given the differences that exist between their 
perceptions of their interests? 
3.6 Multi-employer bargaining: A problem for a theory of bargaining levels 
T olliday and Zeitlin have recently focussed attention on the question of collective action 
by employers. They argue that traditional neoclassical and Marxist approaches are over-
deterministic; both these approaches "concur in treating collective organisation, whether in 
relation to workers or the state, as a simple aggregation of employers' underlying 
interests".(1991: 18) These underlying interests are the same or similar because they are 
determined functionally by objective economic interests. Schmitter and Streed,, on the 
other hand, highlight the problems faced by employers engaging in collective action, when 
they argue that "employer interests are everywhere extremely heterogeneous and their 
solidarity inherently provisional and precarious".(Tolliday and Zeitlin, 1991: 20) 
Streeck argues that employers' associative behaviour is dependent on the intervention of 
powerful institutions, such as trade unions and the state, to consolidate interests, mould 
the substance of their collectivity, and "contain the strong centrifuged tendencies among 
their membership". 10 (Tolliday and Zeitlin, 1991: 20) Furthermore, Tolliday and Zeitlin 
note that the internal dynamics of employers' associations play a part in shaping collective 
interests amongst employers: 
. . . interests emerge from an interaction between social actors' prior 
interpretative framework and the specific situation in which they find 
themselves, a context which includes the discourses and practices of 
institutions such as employers' associations and trade unions as well as 
social and economic relationships. (1991:21-22) 
10 Interestingly, this accords with the view of Olson, a rational choice theorist, that members of 
groups will "not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force 
them to do so".(1971: 2) 
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Schmitter and Streeck adopt a similar line of reasoning when they argue that "organized 
group interests are not given but emerge as a result of a multi-faceted interaction between 
social and organizational structure".(Quoted in Tolliday and Zeitlin, 1991: 21) The 
implication of this line of reasoning is explained by T olliday and Zeitlin as follows: 
Employers' associations, like trade unions, are therefore obliged to 
construct solidarity among their members, building coalitions among 
potentially conflicting interests which are redefined by the process of 
collective organization itself Such associations are thus inherently political 
bodies whose policies are shaped by internal conflicts in which contingent 
factors such as organizational structure, ideology and leadership may play 
crucial roles, as well as by their relationship with external actors such as 
trade unions and the state.(1991: 22) 
Employers' associations should, it is argued by Schmitter and Streeck, and supported by 
T olliday and Zeitlin, no longer be viewed as "a simple aggregation of predetermined social 
and economic interests" or as the "passive recipients of preferences put forward" by their 
members, but rather as "producers of group interests".(1991: 20-21) This argument 
points the way forward for advancing a theory of levels of bargaining. Such a theory must 
take account of both the diversity of employers' interests and the generation of group 
interests when employers act collectively. 
3. 7 Conclusion 
The approach taken in this dissertation is that the route to a theoretical explanation of the 
role of employers in determining levels of bargaining, is to be found in both methodology 
and theory. This acknowledges the statement by Tolliday and Zeitlin that recent work on 
methodology indicates that "interests should be regarded as inherently ambiguous, 
context-dependent and potentially incoherent", and that "there is no self-evident reason 
to assume that social actors' own assessment of their interests should necessarily 
correspond - even in the long run - to an abstract definition put forward by an external 
observer".(1991: 21) 
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The starting point should therefore be on the explanations of interests put forward by 
employers themselves, on their perceptions of preferred courses of action, and on the 
debate and decision-making process that employers engage in, either intra-firm or 
collectively, when addressing the question of the level of bargaining. The longitudinal 
nature of the research conducted for this dissertation allows for an examination of 
expressions of these interests or preferences at two points in time, and also allows for an 
evaluation of the decisions actually taken in the light of those preferences, when the issue 
of a change to the level of bargaining was raised by a powerful trade union. 
In the following chapters it will be seen that many of the factors identified in the studies 
discussed above as important for determining particular levels of bargaining, will be 
expressed by employers in the Western Cape clothing industry. It is not intended to 
exhaustively cross-reference the categorisations of these expressions of interests with each 
of the above studies. Rather, the methodological approach adopted for this thesis places 
an emphasis on the diversity, nuances, and texture of employers' articulation of their 
interests with regard to a preferred level of bargaining. In doing so, the variety and 
complexity of the contextual influences on employers' choices is identified, and the role of 
the employers' associations, and particularly the part played by 'leading' employers within 
the associations, in shaping perceptions and decisions is highlighted. 
The empirical findings of this case study will be presented in detail in Chapters Five, Six 
and Seven. In the concluding chapter these findings will be analysed in the light of the 
discussion of theoretical approaches in this chapter. The interaction of the empirical 
findings with the theoretical discussion will be used to advance the theoretical explanation 
of the role of employers in determining the level of bargaining. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE HISTORICAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL CONTEXT 
To fully understand the perceptions of employers in the Western Cape clothing industry 
with regard to different levels of bargaining, it is necessary to outline briefly the major 
contextual features within which those perceptions have been formed. These features are, 
firstly, the history of the statutory system of collective bargaining in South Afiica and its 
impact on industrial relations and bargaining levels. This is followed by a focus on the 
development of the bargaining structure in the W estem Cape. The second contextual 
feature is the policy of the trade union on bargaining levels. Thirdly, the employers' 
associations in the region are discussed and their policies on levels of bargaining are 
outlined. The final feature is the economic structure of the clothing industry. 
4.1 The statutory system of collective bargaining 
The statutory system for collective bargaining in South Africa was introduced in the early 
part of this century. 11 The Industrial Conciliation Act (11 of 1924) focussed on providing a 
framework for the establishment of multi-employer bargaining structures called industrial 
councils. The guiding principle informing the Act was voluntarism. Neither employers nor 
trade unions were compelled to form an industrial council or participate in collective 
bargaining at an industrial council. The Act also did not stipulate a particular level of 
multi-employer bargaining. It was left to the exercise of power by employers and trade 
unions to determine whether industrial councils were established, and whether these would 
be local, regional or national, and which sectors or sub-sectors of an industry they would 
cover. There were no provisions in the statute dealing with bargaining at the enterprise 
level. 
There was one important departure from voluntarism in the Act. Collective agreements 
reached by the parties to councils could be extended by the Minister of Labour to 
11 A more detailed examination of the history of the statutory collective bargaining system and the 
levels of bargaining issue can be found in Godfrey (1990) and Du Toit et al (1996). 
33 
employers and employees falling within the jurisdiction of the council who were not 
members of the negotiating parties. Once an agreement had been extended to these non-
parties they were legally bound by its provisions. The extension of agreements bolstered 
the centralisation of bargaining in industrial councils by restricting the ability of non-party 
employers to undercut employers who were parties to councils. 
Besides introducing a framework for voluntary multi-employer bargaining, the 1924 
statute laid the foundation for a dual, racially-determined system of industrial relations in 
South Africa. This was achieved by excluding pass-bearing African workers from the 
statute's definition of" employee' and therefore from membership of registered trade unions 
and direct representation on industrial councils. The effect was to undermine trade union 
organisation by African workers and marginalise them from the primary industrial relations 
system. Unions for white, Coloured and Indian workers made significant gains in 
... -
collective bargaining on industrial councils at the expense of African workers, with the 
result that the racial division of labour in South African workplaces mirrored a very wide 
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. 
The benefits that accrued to unions for white, Coloured and Indian workers from .their 
participation in the industrial council system were, however, balanced by the 
bureaucratisation of officials and weakened shopfloor organisation as the reliance on 
industrial councils grew. The result was a fall in militancy amongst members and a sharp 
decline in industrial action. 
The Act achieved considerable success in encouragmg multi-employer bargaining in 
industrial councils at the expense of enterprise bargaining. By 1936 forty-six councils had 
been registered and in 1978 there were 100 councils. But, contrary to the intentions of the 
drafters of the statute, the vast majority of these councils were regional or local rather 
than national in scope. Low levels of trade union organisation, the distance between the 
major industrial centres, and differing economic conditions in regions were seen as the 
reasons for the limited number of national industrial councils that were established. 
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Nevertheless, industrial councils formed the institutional core of the industrial felations 
system in the country. 
The pre-eminence of industrial councils in the collective bargaining system was to be 
challenged for the first time after 1973 when trade unions for African workers re-
emerged.12 These new unions forged a strategy of strong shopfloor organisation and aimed 
at securing recognition agreements with individual employers that enshrined enterprise 
level collective bargaining rights. Key objectives of these unions were to negotiate 
improvements on the industrial council wage levels and to challenge the autocratic 
managerial practices that existed in South African workplaces. They pursued this strategy 
successfully and grew rapidly, despite strong opposition from employers and harassment 
by the state. 
In 1979 the state responded to the rapid growth of the new unions by reforming the 
Industrial Conciliation Act to allow African workers to join registered trade unions and 
participate directly in bargaining on industrial councils.13 The main objective was to 
incorporate and control the militant new unions in much the same way that the 1924 
statute had done to white, Coloured and Indian unions. But the new unions were 
conscious of this danger and after vigorous debate rejected participation in industrial 
councils, preferring to continue with their enterprise bargaining strategy.14 
In 1983, however, the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (one of the most important of the 
new unions) applied for membership of the giant iron and steel industrial council. 15 
· 
12 Massive, largely spontaneous strikes by African workers took place in 1973, mainly in and 
around Durban. These strikes heralded the rebirth of trade unionism for African workers and many 
new unions emerged in the next few years. These unions were generally non-racial but their initial 
focus was on unskilled African workers. 
13 Besides this important change, the 1979 reforms made very few changes to the framework for 
the establishment and functioning of councils. 
14 See the contributions by Fine et al and Morris to the South African Labour Bulletin (Vol. 7, No. 
1&2) and responses by Hirsch and Nicol, the General Workers' Union, and Haysom (Vol. 7, No. 
3) for the major positions in the registration debate. 
15 For an analysis of the change in policy by MAWU see Morris (1990). 
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Thereafter the emergent unions reassessed their initial opposition to centralised bargaining 
structures, particularly industrial councils. The rapid growth of these unions had placed an 
enormous strain on their resources and forced them into a more pragmatic position. But, 
more importantly, the new unions were becoming increasingly powerful at the industry 
level and they believed they could more effectively represent their members interests on 
industrial councils. The need to consolidate organisational gains and the goal of wage 
uniformity across enterprises were therefore key considerations in this policy shift. 
The establishment in 1985 of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) by 
many of the emergent unions and the implementation of its policy of one union per 
industry, gave further momentum to the push towards higher levels of centralisation of 
bargaining. Within a few years most of the member unions of COSATU were organised 
nationally and by the early 1990s the federation was demanding the formation of national, 
industry-wide industrial councils in all sectors. 
Employers' responses to the new unions varied. Initially most fought to keep the emergent 
unions out of their workplaces. Recognition was fiercely contested, often requiring 
recourse by the unions to the newly-established industrial court, and the older moderate 
unions were supported. However, many larger employers slowly began to adopt more 
sophisticated responses. Specialist industrial relations managers were employed in 
increasing numbers £Uid firms started to move quickly to formalise relationships with the 
new unions. But these developments have taken a long time to filter down to all firms, and 
industrial relations in South Africa remains extremely adversarial, as well as highly 
politicised. 
Employers' policies on the level of bargaining issue also showed diversity and development 
over time. Many employers resisted attempts by the emergent unions to bargain at the 
enterprise level by using the argument (after 1979) that they were parties to an industrial 
council and would engage in bargaining with the new unions only at the council. But once 
these unions changed their policy and began to get membership of industrial councils, 
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some employers became enthusiastic advocates of enterprise bargaining. In giving effect to 
this change, employers were aided by the voluntary nature of industrial counc~l bargaining. 
Some industrial councils collapsed as a result of the withdrawal by firms from employers' 
associations to bargain at the enterprise level. Conflict over the level of bargaining, 
particularly within the industrial council framework, became one of the key industrial 
relations issues in South Africa by the late 1980s 
4.1. l A focus on the clothing industry 
The development of the collective bargaining system in the clothing industry displayed 
certain similarities to the general trend identified above. Firstly, multi-employer collective 
bargaining arrangements were established at an early stage in the clothing industry. An 
industrial council was set up in the Transvaal in 1925, and this was followed by councils in 
the Western Cape and Natal in 1936. The Eastern Cape followed suite two years later and, 
finally, an industrial council for the Orange Free State and Northern Cape was established 
in 1961.(Barker, 1962:372-373; Nicol, 1984:94, 130 & 230-231; and, SALDRU, 
1990:19) 
Importantly, these industrial councils were from the outset structured along regional lines. 
Employers' associations and unions were also mainly regional in scope. Only one 
organisation, the Transvaal Garment Workers' Union (GWU), attempted to bridge these 
regional divisions. The GWU launched a number of campaigns during the 1930s, and 
again in the mid-1950s, to organise workers in Durban and Cape Town. The main 
motivation for these attempts was the elimination of the wage differences between the 
Transvaal and the lower-paying coastal regions. A related aim was the establishment of a 
national trade union. These initiatives were fiercely resisted by employers, particularly in 
the Western Cape, and the failure of the Transvaal GWU to achieve its aims further 
entrenched the regional focus of employers' associations and trade unions. 16 (Nicol, 
1984:223-233; and, Labour History Group, 1983) 
16 The Transvaal GWU was partially successful in that it did establish a branch in the Eastern 
Cape and was later (when it had become the Garment Workers' Union of South Africa) to organise 
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The threat of wage parity with the Transvaal provided the motivation for early attempts at 
organisation by clothing employers in the Western Cape, with a view to setting up an 
industrial council. At first the threat came from the newly-formed Wage Board. Clothing 
employers sought to pre-empt the application of wage determinations to the industry in 
the Western Cape by establishing an industrial council. 17 When this threat had receded the 
organising campaigns by the Transvaal GWU provided another motive for employers to 
form a regional industrial council.(Nicol, 1984:162-186 & 234-239) 
In 1930, the Secretary of the Cape Wholesale Clothing and Shirt Manufacturers' 
Association argued at a meeting that: 
... unless the Dept. [of Labour] could be satisfied that their union [i.e. in the 
Western Cape] adequately represented the employees in the industry, it 
would be de-registered in favour of the other organisation which had been 
fostered by the Transvaal. If this eventuated it would probably result in the 
formation of a national organisation of employees, to be followed by the 
formation of a National Industrial Council.18 
It was resolved at this meeting that: 
... it would be in their best interest to form a local Industrial Council and, if 
necessary, by means of a stop order system ... to assist the Trade Union to 
become representative of the workers in the Industry.19 
This resolution illustrates the context within which the industrial council in the Western 
Cape was eventually established. It was set up at the initiative of employers in order to 
workers in the Orange Free State and Northern Cape. It was, however, unable to unify the 
industrial councils or equalise the wages in these three regions. 
17 The formation of an industrial council was abandoned by employers when the Minister made it 
clear that he would not approve of an industrial council agreement with wages lower than the 
existing wage determination.(Nicol, 1984:234-239) 
18 Minutes of the Cape Wholesale Clothing and Shirt Manufacturers' Association dated 30.09.1930 
(quoted in Nicol, 1984 at p.239). 
19 Ibid. 
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maintain the lower wage levels that were a feature of the industry in the Western Cape, 20 
and trade union organisation was initiated and supported by employers in order to bolster 
the counciL21 The Garment Workers' Union of the Western Province was to be 
characterised by its subservience to employers, 22 its reliance on the industrial council, 
weak shopfloor organisation, and a bureaucratic, top-down style of trade unionism.23 It 
was this style of unionism that made it such a bitter opponent of the Transvaal GWU's 
attempts to set up a national trade union in the industry.(Nicol, 1984) 
The industrial council in the Western Cape was therefore established as a barrier to the 
organising campaigns of the more militant Transvaal union and the threat of wage parity 
that this represented, and it was to be used by clothing employers to maintain a firm 
control over the industrial relations environment in the region. Only in the late 1980s was 
this control, and the regional scope of the council, to be challenged again, when, for the 
first time in the history of the industry, workers of all races and regions were organised 
into a single national trade union. 
So, as in many sectors, collective bargaining in the clothing industry historically took place 
in regional industrial councils and enterprise level bargaining was non-existent. The more 
recent history of bargaining in the clothing industry is, however, somewhat different to 
most other sectors. Importantly, no new unions of any note were formed in the industry in 
the years immediately after 1973 and union demands for enterprise bargaining never 
challenged bargaining at the regional councils. 24 It was only in the latter half of the 1980s 
20 Regional wage differentials were to change over the years and by the 1980s the Western Cape 
was paying the highest wages, followed by Natal and then the Transvaal. 
21 The formation of the Garment Workers' Union of the Cape Province (later to be changed to the 
Western Province) followed a request by the Secretary of the Cape Wholesale Clothing and Shirt 
Manufacturers' Association to the Secretary of the Cape Federation of Labour Unions that he 
establish a union for clothing workers.(M.Nicol, 1984:130) 
22 This was readily acknowledged by some clothing employers in the interviews conducted for this 
dissertation. One respondent, in making reference to negotiations With the Western Province GWU, 
stated that "it was like we sit down at a tea party and we've got an agreement". 
23 See Bloch ( 1982), particularly with regard to the union in the 1970s. 
24 It should be noted that a well-established union for African workers, the National Union of 
Clothing Workers, existed in the industry prior to 1973. This union worked closely with the 
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that the new unions had any impact on the industry. This was, however, not because of the 
emergence of a new union but was the result of a series of mergers ~hich saw the 
National Union.of Textile Workers (NUTW) joining with the established unions in the 
clothing and textile industries to form a giant new union, 25 the South African Clothing and 
Textile Workers' Union. 26 
The merger process not only resulted in the formation of a national union for the first time 
in the history of the industry, but also introduced clothing employers to a far more 
aggressive industrial relations environment and a much harder bargaining adversary. 
Furthermore, SACTWU automatically became, via the merger process, the sole trade 
union party on all five regional industrial councils in the clothing industry. Within a fairly 
short space of time the clothing industry was thrust onto· the centre-stage of the demand 
by COSATU unions for national industrial councils. This demand was from the outset 
strongly opposed by employers in the industry. 
Garment Workers' Union of South Africa, which in practice represented the NUCW's members at 
industrial council negotiations in Gauteng (Transvaal), the Free State (Orange Free State), and 
Northern Cape. (Scheepers, 1974:127-129; and Godfrey, 1992:134) 
25 The trade unions involved in these mergers, which started in August 1985 and ended in 
September 1989, were the Garment Workers' Union of South Africa, the National Union of 
Clothing Workers of South Africa, the National Union of Garment Workers (SA), the Textile 
Workers' Industrial Union, the National Union of Textile Workers, the Garment Workers' 
Industrial Union (Natal) and the Garment Workers' Union of the Western Province. The first stages 
of the merger process saw the formation of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers' Union 
and the Garment and Allied Workers' Union. The process was finalised when these two unions 
merged to form SAC1WU. 
26 In 1991 SACTWU had 185 7 40 members and was registered nationally for the clothing, textile 
and leather sectors.(Von Holdt, 1991:16) It has a very strong presence in the clothing industry 
and, according to Ronald Bernickow, Western Cape Regional Organiser of SAC1WU, at the end 
of 1991 it represented about 90% of clothing workers nationally and almost I 00% of workers in 
the Western Cape. Bernickow also stated that the union had organised significant numbers of 
clothing workers in what were then the 'homelands'. He estimated that (at the end of 1991) it had 
signed up 15 000 to 20 000 of the approximately 40 000 clothing workers in those areas. 
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4.2 SACTWU's policy on levels of bargaining 
4.2.1 SACTWU and enterprise level bargaining 
SACTWU's policy on enterprise level bargaining is unambiguous. The many (often very 
small) firms in the clothing industry made bargaining at enterprise level impractical, if not 
impossible. Furthermore, the wage differences between firms that would result from 
enterprise bargaining would undemtlne worker unity. Ultimately, the strength of the union 
as collective bargaining force would decline. 27 
This commitment of the union to multi-employer bargaining has been recognised in its 
signing of the so-called Side Agreement with the employers' associations. This binds the 
union not to make demands over wages and other substantive conditions of employment 
at firms outside of the industrial council. The agreement was largely precipitated by a 
strike in 1988 at Rex Trueform (a major clothing manufacturer in the Western Cape) over 
a demand for an increase over and above the industrial council rates. The demand was, 
according to union, never intended as an attempt to initiate an enterprise bargaining 
regime outside of the industrial council. It was an action intended "to jump-start the 
transformation of the union" during the merger process and was therefore a "tactical, 
strategic issue" rather than one of principle. 28 
The management at Rex Trueform took the position that the issue could only be 
negotiated at the industrial council and that the union was not entitled to make such a 
demand to an individual firm outside of that forum. They were supported in their stand by 
the Cape Clothing Manufacturers' Association (CCMA), of which they were a member. 
The result was an agreement by the CCMA and the Cape Knitting Industry Association 
(CKIA) to grant an interim increase that would be extended to the entire industry. In 
return the union undertook to bargain wages and other substantive conditions at the 
industrial council only. This was formalised in the Side Agreement and the issue of 
27 Much of this section is based on interviews with Ronald Bernickow, SACTWU's Regional 
Organiser for the Western Cape, on 3 October 1991, 25 November 1991, and 9 September 1992. 
28 Interview with Ronald Bemickow. 
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enterprise bargaining with members of these employers' associations was effectively 
eliminated in the industry in the West em Cape. 29 
4.2.2 SACTWU's demand for a national industrial council 
During the merger process leading up to the formation of SACTWU, the problem of 
regional wage disparities, which had first arisen in the 1930s, again emerged as an issue. It 
was decided by the merging unions to pursue wage parity, but at that stage this objective 
was not linked to the demand for a national industrial council. After the formation of 
SACTWU, the new union strove to narrow regional wage differentials by coordinating 
collective bargaining at the five regional councils. Although strong pressure for parity was, 
according to the union, being exerted by the grassroots membership, progress in equalising 
wage levels across the regions was slow. The realisation of this aim turned the spotlight on 
the nature of the bargaining structures and became the initial motivation for the demand 
for a national industrial council. 
A second factor that was to have a major impact on SACTWU's thinking on the issue, was 
the location of a significant number of clothing manufacturers in the 'decentralised' areas. 
Most of these areas fell outside the jurisdiction of the regional industrial councils and 
wages were therefore not regulated by their agreements. This raised the question of the 
impact that substantially increased wages would have on jobs in the ·decentralised' areas. 
It became evident to the union that a narrowly conceived demand for national wage parity 
could be counter-productive to the long-term development of the industry, particularly 
those . firms already established in the ·decentralised' areas. The union believed that a 
national wage strategy was needed and that such a strategy could be developed most 
effectively at a national bargaining structure. Increasingly, therefore, the motivation for the 
29 It should be noted that the Side Agreement does not apply to non-members of the CCMA and 
CKIA. SACTWU could therefore negotiate wages and other substantive conditions of employment 
at such firms over and above the industrial council terms. In practice the union does not do so. 
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demand for a national industrial council shifted to the need "to address the industry at a 
national level on its own development and direction". 30 
SACTWUs motivation for national bargaining therefore developed from a demand for 
wage parity, to the development of a national wage strategy and involvement in industrial 
policy formulation. This shift in emphasis coincided with a drive by COSATU during the 
political transition to become involved in macroeconomic policy formulation. 31 SACTWU 
was particularly prominent in this initiative. Ebrahim Patel, the Assistant Secretary General 
of SACTWU, argued in the South African Labour Bulletin that the progressive trade 
unions were striving for industrial and economic democracy as well as political 
democracy. The trade unions therefore intended "to play a role in shaping future 
macroeconomic policy". National bargaining structures were, he argued, central to this 
process because they provide the bases for making interventions in policy formulation at 
the industry and macro levels.(Patel, 1990:53) 
The period was particularly opportune for making such interventions. The state was 
increasingly insecure and business was on the defensive as the political transition gained 
momentum. COSATU was quick to go onto the offensive and made an important impact 
on labour market policy through its involvement in the National Manpower Commission. 
It also drove the establishment of the National Economic Forum, a non-statutory tripartite 
body that was to negotiate policy on a range of macroeconomic issues. 
SACTWU laid the foundation for its involvement in industrial policy formulation when it 
adopted a resolution on industrial restructuring at its 1991 national congress. The 
immediate motivation for the resolution was the crisis facing the industries, continued 
rapid job losses, and the seeming inability of clothing and textile manufacturers to rise 
30 Interview with Howie Gabriels, previously the Western Cape Regional Secretary of SACTWU, 
on 10.12.1992. 
31 The reasons why the unions want to bargain centrally have been set out by Ebrahim Patel, the 
Assistant Secretary General of SACTWU, and by Jeremy Baskin of the National Labour & 
Economic Development Institute.(Patel, 1990: 50-51; and Baskin, 1994:7-8) 
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above their longstanding differences over tariff policy and formulate a long-term growth 
plan. 
A few months after the congress, Ebrahim Patel took this initiative a step further when he 
addressed the annual conference of the National Clothing Federation. In response to a 
question he stated that the union would be prepared to call an industry-wide strike if the 
government went ahead with a new tariff dispensation without the involvement of 
SACTWU. The threat was to result in the setting up of the so-called Hatty Committee, 
with the participation of the union, which was followed by the establishment of two 
tripartite bodies, the Panel and Task Group.(Maree and Godfrey, 1995:135-137) The 
latter bodies had the objective of formulating "a strategy with.achievable recommendations 
based on sound economic principles, for the restructuring required to develop clothing and 
textile industries that are viable and competitive".(NCF, 1992(a):29) 
This tripartite initiative was to run on a parallel course to the demand for a national 
industrial council, but for the union the two aims were interrelated. Ebrahim Patel analyses 
this relationship in the following way: 
There is a fallacy that says that through restructuring your collective 
bargaining you can get growth in your economy. That is nonsense - you 
can't have a growth strategy that is determined by collective bargaining. 
You need an industrial policy to get growth, but your collective bargaining 
is an element that can contribute or retard growth. So we must see all the 
time how do we enhance the economic growth elements of your collective 
bargaining agreements. 32 
The relationship between the two initiatives is now somewhat unclear. After the Panel and 
Task Group presented their report to the Minister of Finance on 28 March 1994, the 
implementation of a new industrial policy to restructure the clothing and textile industries 
was uneven and problematic. A progressive reduction in tariffs has been implemented, but 
few of the supply-side measures that were intended to balance the negative effects of 
32 Quoted in Maree and Godfrey at p .13 8. 
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lower tariff protection have been introduced. SACTWU has responded with campaigns to 
highlight the impact on the industries_of this policy imbalance, particularly the job losses . 
that have resulted. However, it is not clear how collective bargaining within the National 
Bargaining Forum, which was in place from mid-1993, is being linked to the crisis within 
the industries and the problems with industrial policy implementation. 
4.3 The employers' organisations and their policies on levels of bargaining 
In 1991, when the first set of interviews took place, there were two employers' 
associations on the industrial council in the Western Cape, namely the Cape Clothing 
Manufacturers' Association (CCMA) and the Cape Knitting Industry Association (CKIA). 
It is important to note that these associations operated in most respects as one body, 
holding general meetings and executive committee meetings jointly, and negotiating as one 
unit at the industrial council. At the end of 1990 they had a combined membership of 141 
firms (i.e. 33% of the employers registered with the industrial council), who together 
employed 72% of the workers at firms registered with the council.(Industrial Council for 
the Clothing Industry (Cape), 1990:6) 
A key function of these associations is to represent members at the industrial council, both 
in annual negotiations and on the various committees of the council. 33 They are therefore 
organisations for multi-employer bargaining and their commitment to such a level of 
bargaining is a key rationale for their existence. Furthermore, the organisational focus of 
both associations has historically been the Western Cape region and in 1991 their policy 
was to continue bargaining for this region only. Peter Cragg, the Director of the CCMA 
and CKIA, stated: 
We oppose a national industrial council at this time. There are regional 
differences, regional circumstances in the environment in which we operate 
and we wish to keep these ... That is a strong consensus position. 
33 Another key function is to represent members' interests on issues of a macroeconomic nature. 
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It should be noted that the CCMA is a member of the National Clothing Federation (now 
known as Clofed) but that this body performed only a monitoring and coordinating role 
with regard to labour affairs at the national level, for example studying new labour 
legislation and talcing positions on national stayaways. Peter Cragg stated in 1991 that the 
National Clothing Federation was not a negotiating body "that would engage the trade 
unions in any form or manner to debate issues". He went on to state that "the field of 
labour relations management takes place in the regions because of the industrial council 
set-up there and we have no need or desire to change that structure at this time". 
A third association, the Garment Manufacturers' Association (GMA), was not a member 
of the industrial council in 1991 but had made application for membership. The GMA was 
formed in about 1987 to represent cut, make and trim (CMT) operators in the Western 
Cape. 34 Its establishment arose from the dissatisfaction many CMT operators had with the 
way in which their interests were being represented (or allegedly not being represented) by 
the CCMA. A spokesperson for the GMA stated: 
It came about because we felt that the CCMA did not represent the CMT 
factories properly. There are approximately 450 registered employers in the 
industrial council and there are only about 124 CCMA members, which 
probably include the major ones, that is Rex Trueform, Ensign and the 
Seardel Group. And those few companies control the whole industry and 
what they think becomes law and we are obliged to go by this. So it has 
caused a lot of discontent over the years. Many of us don't feel that we had 
much say in our own destiny. 
The "discontent" felt CMT operators is rooted in the much higher proportion of labour 
costs to total costs that they face in their operations. Labour costs make up about thirty 
percent of the total cost of a garment in most clothing operations but, according to 
respondents at CMT firms, labour costs could be seventy percent in a cut, make and trim 
operation. They argue that wage increases therefore impact far more on their profit 
34 Cut, make and trim operators are to all intents and purposes labour-only sub-contractors. A 
clothing manufacturer will supply a CMT firm with fabric and the pattern, and the service 
provided by the CMT operator is to cut the fabric, make up the garment, and clean, iron and pack 
it. 
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margins than they do at large clothing manufacturers. 35 This difference translates into 
different interests in collective bargaining. 36 For example, the spokesperson for the GMA 
argued that "if there was strike action we can close our doors and seventy percent of our 
costs stop whereas only thirty percent of their costs stop". 
In addition, the CMT sector is intensely competitive and CMT firms are dependent on 
clothing manufacturers fot their business. They allege that this allows manufacturers to 
drive down prices for their services virtually to the break-even level. This entrenches the 
perception that CMT firms have opposing interests to clothing manufacturers. 
At the end of 1991 the GMA had 43 members, who employed a total of 3 029 workers at 
firms registered with the council. 37 Prior to its application for membership of the council in 
March 1991, the GMA had participated unofficially in the 1990 negotiations at the 
invitation of the parties. It was admitted to the industrial council as a member early in 
1992. 
Like the CCMA and CKIA, the GMA is an organisation that represents the collective 
interests of its members in negotiations with the trade union. The GMA is also a regional 
organisation and its position on national bargaining was similar to that of the CCMA and 
CKIA. A spokesperson for the GMA stated: 
When you talk about collective bargaining it worries me very much to have 
some national bargaining forum. The Western Cape is unique and you can't 
compare the clothing industry in the Western Cape to Natal or Transvaal. 
They are totally, totally different. The union is obviously after that because 
they go from strength to strength ... I think the GMA and the CCMA are 
very clear ... that a national industrial council will never work. I am sure this 
is the opinion of any owner of any business. 
35 Some clothing manufacturers contend that this is balanced by the fact CMT operators do not 
face the expense and the risk of developing new ranges. 
36 See Ulman (1974) at p.105 for a discussion of this point. 
37 Telephonic interview with D. Ackerman, then Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Council, on 
30.03.1992. 
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At the time that the first interviews were conducted in 1991, all three employers' 
associations in the industry in the Western Cape were therefore firmly in favour of 
continuing multi-employer bargaining at the regional industrial council. 
4.4 The economic structure of the clothing industry 
The remaining contextual feature that needs discussion is the economic structure of the 
clothing industry. This section will very briefly outline the size, location, technology, and 
competitive situation of the South African clothing industry. 
The South African clothing industry is the main producer of clothing and major clothing 
sector employer in sub-Saharan Africa.(De Coster, 1992:84) In 1991 there were about 
1 405 enterprises manufacturing clothing in the country, including about 200 located in the 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, Ciskei (the so-called TBVC states), Kwazulu and the 
other 'homelands'.(See the map below) These enterprises employed about 160 000 
workers, of which about 40 000 worked at firms in the TBVC states, Kwazulu and the 
other 'homelands'.38 (NCF, 1992(b):7-8) 
The industry is concentrated primarily in and around Cape Town in the Western Cape, in 
and around Durban and Pietermaritzburg in Kwazulu/Natal, and, to a lesser extent, in the 
Pretoria and Johannesburg area in Gauteng (previously Transvaal). Employers in these 
industrial centres are in the main covered by industrial council collective agreements, but 
there are manufacturers in surrounding areas that operate outside of the jurisdiction of the 
councils. There are also pockets of the industry in the Eastern Cape and the Free 
State/Northern Cape that are covered by industrial councils located in those regions. In all 
there are about 112 000 clothing workers covered by industrial councils in South 
Africa.(NCF, 1992(b):7 and 13) 
38 The 'homelands' (i.e. Lebowa, Gazankulu, QwaQwa, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, and Kwa-Zulu) 
were self-governing territories delineated for the disenfranchised African population; that is, they 
had the status of second-tier government structures. The Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, and 
Venda were similar regions but in terms of South African and international constitutional law they 
were independent states. The international community did not, however, recognise them as 
such.(South African Communication Service, 1994:123) 
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The industry is described by the National Clothing Federation as "the most labour 
intensive; the least capital intensive; one of the highest income creating; the lowest retl}rn 
on investments; the least inflationary and the most productive" of all the country's 
industries.(NCF, 1992(b ): 11) It is extremely competitive, with low barriers to entry, and 
is made up primarily of small firms (at least 60 percent of manufacturers employ 50 or 
fewer workers). But a large share of the industry's output comes from a handful of very 
big firms (forty percent of turnover is accounted for by just four percent of firms).(De 
Coster, 1992:89) 
The industry is locked between two oligopolistic sectors. On the supply side is the textile 
sector, which is accused by many clothing manufacturers of being overprotected, 
inefficient and uncompetitive. The fact that fabric makes up about 60 percent of the cost 
of a garment makes the performance of the textile sector a vital concern for the clothing 
industry. On the demand side is the retail sector, which is dominated by six very large 
retail groups (these retailers make up about 80 percent of the clothing industry's 
orders).(De Coster, 1992:84) This sector is accused by clothing ~ufacturers of rigidly 
imposing prices and of unilaterally deferring or cancelling orders. The vast power 
imbalance between the average clothing manufacturer and the big retail groups means that 
these practices are seldom if ever challenged. 
The clothing industry is characterised by a relatively low-tech production process. The 
limp quality of the fabric that forms the basis for the labour process has defied most 
attempts at technological innovation and the assembly of garments throughout the world 
continues to necessitate extensive manual positioning by a sewing machinist. 39 The sewing 
machine, which has remained unchanged in its essentials since the late 1800s, is still the 
foundation for this process. 40 The pre-assembly stage has, however, been marked by 
39 Sewing machinists make up about 60 percent of the labour force in the clothing 
industry.(SALDRU, 1987:10) 
40 The innovations that have taken place in sewing technology are increased stitching speeds and 
machine durability, the development of work aids such as needle positioners · and underbed 
trimmers, and dedicated machines for special tasks such as button-holing and button 
attachment.(Zeitlin and Totterdill, 1989:174) 
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considerable technological change, especially in the fields of computerised pattern grading, 
marking-in equipment and high speed cutters. The high cost of this equipment has limited 
its dispersion in the South African industry to the larger manufacturers.(De Coster, 
1992:98) 
The formal clothing industry in South Africa has a developed cost structure but faces the 
demand characteristics of a developing country.(De Coster, 1992:85) The limited size of 
the middle and upper end of the market is exacerbated by the extremely segmented and 
constantly changing nature of the clothing market. Differences in the size and shape of the 
human body, gender differences, seasonal variations and fashion changes further limit the 
ability of manufacturers to reap the economies of scale that high volumes would allow. 
The export of clothing was generally held to be undermined by the price and poor quality 
of fabric coming from the overprotected textile industry. However, few manufacturers 
produce for the lower end of the· market because of the high cost of fabric. (De Coster, 
1992:85) Some manufacturers partially overcame this problem by locating factories in 
low wage areas, but they face strong competition from very cheap imports from the Far 
East, illegal imports that are being smuggled into the country, and the large volume of 
second-hand clothing imports.(De Coster, 1992:94) Competition is also coming from the 
rapidly expanding informal sector in and around the major metropolitan areas. 
The export expansion that has taken place in recent years has failed to compensate for the 
massive increase in imports. 41 The result has been a decline in employment in the formal 
industry. Employment in the industrial council areas dropped sharply after 1985, made 
something of a recovery between 1988 to 1990 but started downwards again 
thereafter.(NCF, l 992(b ):272) 
Altman argues that the decline in employment cannot be attributed to high labour costs. 
She maintains that although South Africa is a high cost producer relative to other 
41 Previously the industry accounted for more than 80 percent of volume and 90 percent of value of 
domestic demand, but since 1989 the volume of imports has risen to over 40 percent of the 
domestic demand. (Altman, 1993 :vi) 
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countries, this is not related to the cost of labour but is rather the result of high standard 
minute costs and slow throughput because of inefficient factor organisation. The rise in 
wages over the last few years was off a low base and wages remain low relative to other 
middle-income countries.(Altman, 1993:i-iv) Altman argues that productivity could be 
dramatically improved with the introduction of new organisatfonal practices and human 
resource development.(1993:166-167) She also recommends that the industry should 
follow the route of developing "quick response relationships in the production of medium-
high market basic, seasonal and fashion items".(Altman, 1993:vi) 
Many clothing employers dispute the argument that labour productivity is not one of the 
root causes of their inability to compete with imports. They believe that wages have risen 
very rapidly over the last five years but that there has been virtually no improvement in 
labour productivity. And, while they might not dispute that they have to move into the 
higher" end of the market and produce more value-added garments on a quick response 
basis, they are concerned with how to make the transition. Finns producing in the sub-
sectors under most threat from cheap imports are particularly concerned about the sort of 
wage increases that will be negotiated in the interim and what will be done to improve 
productivity. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
El\'IPLOYERS' PERCEPTIONS OF BARGAINING LEVELS IN 1991 
5.1 Introduction and overview 
The first leg of the study of employers' perceptions of different levels of bargaining was 
based on 42 structured interviews with clothing and knitwear employers conducted from 
August to mid-December 1991.42 The sample of firms included members and non-
members of the employers' associations, firms from the major sub-sectors of the industry, 
a cross-section of firms according to size, firms from Greater Cape Town and Atlantis, 
and a number of the 'leading' employers in the employers' associations. 43 
Respondents were asked three questions: first, whether they supported or rejected 
centralised bargaining; second, whether they supported or rejected centralised bargaining 
at the regional level; and third, whether they supported or rejected centralised bargaining 
at the national level. They were also asked why they supported or rejected each level of 
bargaining. In addition to the respondents own reasons, a number of statements in support 
of and in opposition to bargaining at each level were read to the interviewees for their 
comment.44 
The study found that the vast majority of firms in the industry were supporters of 
centralised multi-employer bargaining (39 firms or 93%), as opposed to decentralised 
enterprise level bargaining (3 firms or 7%). Of those firms which supported multi-
employer bargaining, a significant majority supported bargaining at the regional level (32 
firms or 76%), as opposed to bargaining at the national level (3 firms or 7%).45 A small 
42 See Chapter Two for a discussion of the sampling method and sample size. 
43 See footnote 9 at page 17 for an explanation of the 'leading' employers category. 
44 In the analysis of respondents' reasons for supporting or rejecting each level of bargaining their 
own reasons were given greater weight than their prompted responses to the statements. 
45 If one introduces the subsidiaries covered by the interviews (see discussion of the research 
sample at pp. 17-18 in Chapter Two) into the research findings one finds a strong bias in favour of 
multi-employer bargaining at the regional level. In each case the 'holding company' of the 
subsidiaries was in favour of regional multi-employer bargaining. This effectively increases the 
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proportion were undecided between centralised bargaining at the regional or national level 
(4 firms or 10%). 
Table 1. Preferred level of bargaining 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
(Reg/Nat) 
42 32 3 3 4 
The support voiced for a particular level of bargaining (and rejection of the other levels) 
was, however, not of the same strength for each firm. These differences in strength of 
support are an indication of the range of factors that employers take into account when 
faced with the level of bargaining issue and the different weighting that they give to these 
factors in making their choice. The interviews also revealed that employers' knowledge 
and understanding of the issue of levels of bargaining varies greatly. For example, the 
reason why three of the four respondents were undecided in their support for regional or 
national centralised bargaining was largely because of their ignorance of the issue. 46 A 
number of the other interviewees displayed confused or contradictory thinking in their 
assessment of the pro's and con's of bargaining at different levels. Even the more 
knowledgeable employers had limits to their understanding of the issue, if only because 
they had no experience of enterprise and, in particular, national bargaining against which 
to weigh the arguments for and against negotiating at either of these levels. 
Respondents therefore gave different combinations of reasons for supporting bargaining at 
a particular level and rejecting it at others. In many cases these reasons were interrelated 
with one another, but usually in different ways by respondents. The study sought to 
investigate the determinants of these reasons for firms. Ideally such an exercise would 
support for multi-employer bargaining to 95% and for regional level bargaining to 82%. The 
discussion of the research findings will, however, focus only on the 42 respondent firms. 
46 Seep. 88 below for a more detailed discussion. 
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involve drawing a correspondence between certain variables, e.g. the size of the firm, and 
the attitudes displayed towards different levels of bargaining. However, the largely 
qualitative nature of the data obtained by the questionnaires and the complexity of 
employers' perceptions regarding the level of bargaining issue made it impossible to draw 
such a correspondence. It was therefore decided to group together the major reasons 
given by employers for favouring particular levels of bargaining and then to examine the 
role that selected variables played in support for different levels of bargaining. 
The section that follows is structured in the following way. The main sub-sections deal 
sequentially with the reasons for supporting regional bargaining, enterprise bargaining, and 
national bargaining, and the reasons for indecision by some respondents between support 
for regional or national bargaining. The first of these sub-sections is subdiVided into the 
major groupings of reasons for supporting regional bargaining. Each of the sub-divisions 
in this sub-section is further sub-divided into the reasons that respondents gave for 
supporting multi-employer bargaining as opposed to enterprise bargaining, and the reasons 
they gave for supporting regional rather than national multi-employer bargaining. The 
rationale for this further sub-division is that regional bargaining takes place at a level 
between enterprise bargaining and national bargaining, and perceptions of this level of 
bargaining reflect the advantages of regional bargaining as against each of the other two 
levels. In the case of either enterprise or national bargaining, preferences tended to be 
juxtaposed against only one level of bargaining, namely the existing regional multi-
employer bargaining structure. 
The next section in the chapter deals with the relationship between certain variables and 
support for each level of bargaining. 
~~2 Reasons for supporting regional bargaining 
The reasons cited by most respondents for supporting regional bargaining were the 
convenience of conducting collective bargaining through an employers' organisation, 
coupled with democratic control of that organisation~ competitive and indµstrial relations 
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considerations arising from the nature of the labour and product markets; the power of 
SACTWU; a lack of trust of SACTWU; and the advantages attached to centralised benefit 
funds for workers. Each of these reasons is discussed below. 
5 .2.1 Convenience and democratic control 
5 .2.1.1 Enterprise versus multi-employer bargaining 
A very important consideration for many employers in their support of multi-employer 
bargaining was convenience, i.e. most respondents believed that they did not have the time 
and skills to handle decentralised negotiations. Many firms argued that it would "just take 
up too much time for everybody" and they would "need qualified people to do it". It was 
therefore to their advantage that an employers' organisation negotiated with the trade 
umon. 
The convenience of multi-employer bargaining at the regional level is related to the size 
and cost structure of most clothing firms: very few are big enough to warrant employing 
an industrial relations manager and their existing management would not be capable of 
negotiating the major terms of employment directly with the trade union: 
The main factor is that we don't have the time and the effort and the on-
the-spot expertise, because we can't afford it. 
In addition, a number of firms that did have a manager with adequate industrial relations 
experience stated that the time and expense of enterprise level negotiations make it a 
prohibitive exercise. Enterprise bargaining "would take up a tremendous amount of 
management time", which they could ill afford. A leading employer argued that if they had 
to bargain at the enterprise they: 
would have to start getting in legal advisers because we would be dealing 
with skilled, professional people and by the time we are through we've got 
a great cost when we could have done it through the CCMA for 'x' amount 
a year. 
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Even where firms did have an industrial relations manager they were very wary of the 
prospect of enterprise level negotiations: 
We have got an IR manager but it would put a lot of extra burden on 
everybody if we had in-plant negotiations ... We would have to beef up our 
IR department, we would need a better negotiator, it would basically be 
full-time. I think we could handle it but it would be difficult. 
There were additional benefits attached to multi-employer bargaining. An industrial 
relations manager at one of the larger firms saw an advantage of centralised negotiations 
as the leeway it gave them to concentrate on industrial relations at their firm: 
Centralised bargaining is easier in that it frees me. I don't have to negotiate 
at that level [i.e. the centralised level] unless I get involved in the CKIA. 
This gives me more time to negotiate the smaller issues at plant level. 
Many employers recognised that their reliance on the employers' association to negotiate 
substantive conditions of employment was not merely a question of convenience; it was 
also because the CCMA and CKIA jointly possessed a formidable team that gave 
employers strength in the negotiations. They stressed that "the CCMA and CK.IA are in a 
better position to know the trends in the industry and have a more competent, professional 
team than each firm could put forward". It is a combination of expertise, in that "the 
bargaining on major issues is done by a group of people so you have access to a range of 
skills", and a more coordinated understanding of the industry and what it can afford. So 
employers recognised that the negotiating team assembled by the employers' organisations 
could enhance the power of employers in a centralised bargaining structure. 
One major dissatisfaction was voiced with regard to multi-employer bargaining through 
the CCMA and CKIA, which for some respondents partially offset the benefits discussed 
above. This was the perceived dominance of the employers' associations by certain large 
firms and the powerlessness felt by some members in the decision-making process within 
the associations. This was also the reason why some non-members of the CCMA and 
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CK.IA were dissatisfied with multi-employer bargaining. The perception was particularly 
prevalent amongst the CMT firms: 
It is a situation where it doesn't matter what I say, decisions are taken and I 
am not big enough to be heard... And the people who are negotiating are 
the non-CMT guys. 
A small employer who was a member of the CCMA stated: 
It's dominated by the bigger people, which is why this other association 
[i.e. the GMA] has developed. A lot of people got disgruntled because the 
CCMA weren't looking after the small man. 
This perception was not restricted to the small employers. A respondent at a medium-
sized firm, also a member of the CCMA, stated: 
Because we are so small we just have to do what they decide... It's 
controlled by Seardel and Rex Trueform so we don't really have a say. 
But many members of the CCMA or CK.IA believed that they did have a say in decision-
making within the associations. This did not however mean that they all rejected the 
allegation of dominance by a few big firms. While they had a say, their problem was that 
they weren't listened to. Some were philosophical about this and accepted that it was an 
inevitable consequence of collective decision-making, whereas others acknowledged that 
their limited voice was largely their own fault because of their lack of participation in 
debates within the associations. 
So employers often balanced divergent or opposing factors in arriving at a positive 
assessment of the convenience of multi-employer bargaining. A respondent who was 
particularly critical of aspects of the way in which the associations functioned was 
therefore still able to conclude: 
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With centralised bargaining at least I can leave it to my colleagues. If they 
go for a twenty percent increase or fifteen percent I can only fight and say 
'Yes' or 'No' or whatever, but that's all ... I don't need to be roped into it. 
The allegation of dominance by a few large firms points to the complexity of collective 
decision-making by employers and needs to be examined in more depth. The fact of the 
matter is that each member of the CCMA or CKIA has one vote, whether they have six or 
600 employees. The handful of big firms that allegedly dominate decision-making within 
the associations should therefore, on the face of it, be easily outvoted on any issue by the 
rest of the members. It appears that this does not happen and that there are other factors 
which explain the perceived dominance by larger firms. An important player in the CCMA 
stated: 
At the end of the day it's a general meeting of the CCMA that gives one the 
mandate and each company has one vote of equal value ... Rex Trueform, 
which is a company employing four to five thousand people, has the same 
vote as a guy employing twenty people. The bigger groups, the bigger 
companies, tend to be more vocal at these meetings and tend to occupy 
positions of leadership. And they are the ones who talk and debate and 
have most of the facts at the tips of their fingers. And the smaller guys are 
basically there and saying: "Look, you are our elected leaders and if that's 
what you say then that's fine", sort of thing. I'm over-simplifying - there are 
heated debates at times and the guys try to sell mandates to the negotiating 
committee... but usually the big companies have a sense of where it is 
going and what the industry is able to do. 
It therefore appears that not only do many firms not have the capacity to negotiate at 
enterprise level, they also don't have the capacity to participate effectively in the 
employers' organisation. Larger firms, which have the management infrastructure and 
skills, are able to devote mqre time to participation and have a much greater impact on the 
debates in the associations. These firms therefore become leaders: their representatives are 
elected to the Executive Committee and thereafter they play a disproportionate role in the 
decision-making process. 
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Some members believed that without these leaders the associations would hardly function. 
Dominance by some firms was a corollary of the differing capacities that employers had to 
participate in the associations. A member of the Executive Committee of the CCMA 
stated: 
The problem is that it is so difficult to get such a diverse employer body to 
agree on any one thing - the mandating process is a terrible process. It it 
weren't for the Executive Committee the association would not run. If you 
were to have a general meeting to discuss every issue of importance, and 
there are a hell of a lot, it would become unmanageable. And then you only 
have perhaps ten percent of employers attending meetings and the other 
ninety percent complain about the decisions taken at the general meeting. 
So there are pros and cons ... 
A second member of the Executive Committee argued that the continuous involvement by 
certain employers in the Executive Committee was the key to the functioning of 
associations: 
It's the MD's themselves and Chairmen of companies themselves spending 
time and sitting there. For the last two or three years there are guys who 
have been spending... hours. So that is why it is working. If that was not 
the case then it would not have been a success ... because the guys are there 
and they can make immediate decisions and that is the only reason why it is 
working. 
The Executive Committees of the CCMA and CKIA therefore jointly emerge as the key 
locus of decision-making within the associations. 
5 .2.1.2 Regional versus national multi-employer bargaining 
When it came to deciding between regional and national bargaining the majority of 
employers were strongly of the opinion that the convenience accruing to them from multi-
employer bargaining would disappear ifbargaining shifted to the national level. Put simply, 
the geographical dispersion of the clothing industry raised the possibility of serious 
logistical and organisational problems for employers if they were to engage in national 
bargaining. 
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There were a number of related strands to this perception. Firstly, it was argued that 
organising nationally was going to be extremely difficult .because of differences between 
· the regions. A leading employer stated: 
It's bad enough doing a regional organising thing but to get three different 
provinces, different people, to get a mandate - and the longer these things 
take the more chaos and unrest caused and the more costly - that's the key, 
you won't get a mandate. 
Regional interests and differences would therefore block the mandating process between 
the regions for national negotiations. A leading employer argued: 
Already we struggle like hell just to get a mandate from the regional 
employers to go into the regional negotiations - it becomes almost an 
impossibility to try and extend that and further impersonalise it to the 
national level. I can just see problems. 
A related problem would be the process of reporting back during negotiations and getting 
further mandates. It was argued that this would be a prohibitive undertaking in terms of 
both time and expense. As a consequence, negotiations could be drawn out and that would. 
destabilise industrial relations. A leading member of the CCMA argued: 
Where do you even begin to get the guys together in a general meeting. To 
actually fly hundreds of people to a hall in Durban one year, and the 
Transvaal or Cape Town the next year. And you are then under the time 
constraints of one day to get your mandate together. What if you can't? 
That is the first thing - the practical, operational, logistical issues. Now 
people will say to me that the Engineering Industrial Council is also a huge 
council with thousands of employers. But look at the abortion that they 
have - they just have settlement on one agreement and they commence 
negotiations for the next. Their agreement is hardly published, it runs eight 
months in interregnum... Is it actually worth it? You are going to have 
disputes by default because of logistical problems, you are going to have 
delays, its going to be a laborious process... and there are hundreds of 
employees out there who are totally oblivious to these problems and who 
simply see that its now three months into the new year and they still haven't 
got their wage increase, and then you start getting work stoppages, etc. 
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A final aspect was the implication that national bargaining would have for participation by 
members in the mandating process. Participation in decision-making in the associations 
had been identified as problematic at the regional level and both small and very large firms 
had a concern that it would be far more difficult for many employers to participate 
effectively if negotiations shifted to the national level. One large employer stated: 
Here we elect ten representatives on the industrial council, we give them 
our full confidence, we give them mandates, we liaise with them, and they 
can't go beyond their mandate without coming back to us. There is a close 
working relationship with them. Now if you are involved nationally you are 
distant from it. 
The dominance by very large firms and the exclusion of sm~l firms from decision making 
I 
would, in the opinion of many respondents, become a much bigger problem: 
It would certainly be a lot more difficult and if it had a meeting in 
Johannesburg one month there would be very few Cape firms attending, 
certainly not the small guys. Your Executive would probably go up and 
they will probably have a free'er rein to make decisions and that will cause 
tensions. 
This was a concern felt by small and large employers. The industrial relations manager at 
one of the largest firms in the region argued that it would "be more difficult to 
accommodate the small guys in a bigger forum". He went on to state: 
What is going to happen is that you will negotiate on a national basis and 
people will sit there and will start making decisions and people must just 
accept whatever they negotiate. Because they can't really be an intimate 
part of the process. And deals will be made that will cut peoples' throats. 
Now you can sit here and in a reasonably short time call a general meeting 
and you can tell people and you can try to accommodate them. But on a 
national basis that is not possible. 
A second employer agreed that far greater participation could take place at the regional 
level. National bargaining would exclude participation by all but the "big groups": 
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If it is done on a national level you will... have a very small number of 
people in each region getting together and having to talk for the members 
of that region. Whereas what happens now is that a high number of 
manufacturers find that they all have their say. And I feel that it's 
representative this way. If it was done on a national level it would tend to 
become representative only of the big groups... Obviously some are 
stronger and have more muscle [at regional level] but at least everybody 
gets their frustration off their backs. 
Employers were therefore concerned that only a few firms would have the resources to 
participate fully at the national level and that these firms would not represent the interests 
of all members in negotiations. The perceived dominance by certain large firms at regional 
level would therefore be exacerbated and employers believed that they would have much 
less control over their own destiny if they were in a national bargaining structure. It came 
down to a question of participation, representation and accountability within the 
employers' associations. 
5.2.2 The nature of the labour and product markets 
5 .2.2. I Enterprise versus multi-employer bargaining 
The nature of the labour and product markets was an important consideration for many 
employers in their support for multi-employer bargaining. Respondents argued that the 
labour market would become chaotic if firms were competing largely on the basis of 
wages, while a few noted the negative impact that such competition had on the product 
market. This is a reflection of the labour intensive nature of the production process in the 
clothing industry, the high labour turnover, the many small firms in the industry, low 
barriers to entry, and intense competition in the product market. Employers believed that if 
there was no centralised wage regulation "it would be a nightmare" and "unthinkable", and 
would lead to "complete chaos". 
Some employers emphasised the effect that enterprise. level bargaining would have on the 
labour market, and pointed to the existing labour mobility in the industry: 
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It ensures consistency. We have people who tend to move around a lot - in 
the clothing industry labour turnover is fairly high - so it is a means of 
retaining your labour because everyone is paying more or less the same 
wages. 
The consequence of decentralised bargaining would, according to one employer, be "a 
very unstable labour force ... an unhappy labour force, everybody would be looking around 
to see what the next one was earning", 
There was also recognition that centralised wage regulation eliminated low-wage 
competition. This perception was mainly evident amongst members of the CCMA and 
CK.IA: 
Taking into account that a reasonably big chunk of your operating costs is 
your wage bill and if you can level the playing field on your wage 
component amongst your competitors then that as a general rule would 
lead to a more stable environment. 
This could be particularly effective against the many small firms in the industry: 
The other reasons why people support it is - for the bigger guys - because 
there are a lot of smaller guys who, because they are not part of it [i.e. are 
non-members], could manufacture at a very low cost and could have 
salaries very fow or much lower than the other salaries. 
The above quote indicates a key aspect of labour market regulation by industrial councils, 
namely, the extension of agreements to non-parties. As one employer argued: 
A non-party is a competitor, a non-party is a freeloader and he can employ 
non-union labour... But he is a competitor and on what basis should they 
come in for a different deal? 
The majority of employers were in favour of the extension of minimum wages to level out 
competition on labour costs. But the rationale for negotiating minimum wages was, 
according to some members of the CCMA and CK.IA Executive Committees, equity rather 
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than the elimination of competitors. When negotiating wages they tried to "reach a middle 
point or fair point" for the industry and extension of these wages to non-parties gave "a far 
fairer spread across the industry". Furthermore, many respondents believed that labour 
costs per unit of output were almost the same throughout the industry in the region and 
argued that competition should be based on being more efficient and productive than the 
next firm. 
The spokesperson for the GMA contended, however, that CMT firms had different unit 
labour costs: 
Being a CMT organisation we are very labour-cost intensive. Seventy 
percent of our costs are wages as opposed to ordinary manufacturers. So 
you can imagine that granting a thirty percent wage increase just about puts 
us out of business, whereas the major CCMA members ... for example, for 
Rex Trueform to grant one day's extra holiday with their overhead 
structure is something that they will fight tooth and nail to avoid, whereas 
they will just hand out another RI0,00 per week increase. So things affect 
us both totally differently. 
This lay at the heart of their perception that they had different interests to clothing 
manufacturers and explains much of their dissatisfaction with the CCMA. 
A number of employers pointed to another dimension of the extension of collective 
agreements besides labour market stability, namely that it also led to greater industrial 
relations stability. Without such regulation "you could get into a situation where some 
companies are paying a lot higher and others are not and this could lead to a lot of 
conflict". Another respondent argued that without a centralised forum in an industry with 
so many small employers there "is absolutely no way that you will get uniformity of 
conditions or anything from an industrial relations perspective". 
Multi-employer bargaining did not, however, only provide a floor of wages and 
employment conditions. Pressure was exerted not to raise wages too high above the 
minimum levels. A employer, who had a few years before started paying above the 
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minimum rates, states that they were "hauled into a CCMA meeting" to explain the 
"absolute chaos" that their wage policy had caused in the labour market. Another 
employer went so far as to argue forcefully that minimum wages should be removed in 
times of high unemployment but that maximum wage levels should be imposed when 
labour was scarce. He contended that unrestricted market forces pushed up wages in the 
latter situation and disrupted the labour market. Many employers sought a compromise in 
paying the minimum rates or slightly above and using productivity incentive schemes to 
reward workers that performed well. 
Certain employers also noted the effect on the product market of low wage competition. 
One pointed to an existing situation: 
There are little cottage industries starting which screw up the market 
because they supply for one season and then go out of business, so the 
purchasing of our customers becomes erratic because they spend one 
season with the little companies and then come rushing back. 
In an industry as labour intensive and competitive as the clothing industry, firms that did 
not pay the minimum rates can have a direct impact on sales by those firms registered with 
the industrial council. A respondent noted: 
In the Western Cape I would say at least five percent of the production is 
going informal. But it is finding its way back into the formal industry too. 
The Foschinis and Truworths of this world are getting merchandise that is 
made in the middle of the night in Mitch ells Plain. I know that for a fact. 
Generally, however, employers focussed on the labour market rather than the product 
market in stating their support for multi-employer bargaining. 
5.2.2.2 Regional versus national multi-employer bargaining 
When employers had to decide between regional and national bargaining a complex of 
divergent attitudes emerged regarding the nature of the labour and product markets. The 
interviews revealed that most respondents believed that the Western Cape had unique 
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features and the region would be undermined if bargaining had to be conducted at a 
national level. These perceived features inspired a strong regional consciousness which 
permeated many respondents' attitudes to the level of bargaining issue. A prominent 
employer stated: 
The West em Cape is a particular area, our factories are all the branded 
ones, we're in the export markets more than the others, we have Coloured 
labour [and] they have Black and Indian labour. The feeling is that the 
Cape has got its special interests ... To get us on a national basis just 
wouldn't work, there are still regional differences that would persist. 
The view that there were "regional differences" was a pervasive and strong one. Probably 
the most important of these differences for clothing employers was the nature of the 
labour market. Firstly, all the respondents drew the majority of their labour from 
residential areas around their factories. Some labour was also drawn from outlying areas 
such as Paarl, Wellington, Stellenbosch and Atlantis (and firms in Atlantis drew some 
labour from the Peninsula). Only one employer indicated that a small number of his 
workers were from the Transkei and Ci,skei. The labour market was therefore 
overwhelmingly local and, on the face of it, a certain logic existed as to why bargaining 
should be regional. 
Some employers, however, pointed out that because the trade union had almost equalised 
wage levels between the major regions one could no longer speak of a regional labour 
market. 47 But there was considerable divergence of opinion around this point. Firstly, it 
47 In 1991 the industrial council wage rates in the Western Cape were the highest in the country, 
although this was marginal in the case of the major regions, i.e. Natal and the Transvaal. The 
prescribed minimum weekly wage rates for sewing machinists, who make up about 60 percent of 
the workforce, were as follows: 
Western Cape 
Western Cape (Country Areas) 
Natal 
Transvaal 
Eastern Province 
OFS and N.Cape (Kimberley and Bloemfontein) 
(Kroonstad) 
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R184.50 
R180.00 
R182.50 
Rl70.00* 
Rl47.73 
Rl21.00 
Rll6.85 
was noted by some respondents that although wage parity had almost been achieved 
between the major regions there were still differences in total labour costs, e.g. 
contributions to the benefit funds. There were also other aspects of the regional collective 
agreements that differed. 48 Dealing with these differences at a national bargaining forum 
would be complicated. 
Secondly, there was a strong perception that the racial composition of the labour force in 
the Western Cape - it is made up primarily of Coloured workers, as opposed to the other 
regions which are made up mainly of African and Indian workers - gave the labour market 
a distinct regional character. A employer voiced this view succinctly: 
We support regional level bargaining. The labour force in the region is 
fairly homogeneous and that is why it works. Its a relic of the days when 
the Cape was a Coloured labour preference area. 49 
It was a view that was repeated by a number of respondents: 
We differ very much from Natal and from Transvaal. The labour force is 
very different, their attitudes are extremely different. I don't know if I 
would be able to be a manager in those sorts of areas. Jn the Cape you have 
a totally different culture... In the Cape the Cape Coloured was 
traditionally a seamstress and there is a heritage of seamstresses. The 
African has become a seamstress only through government policy and our 
border industries. 
(Parys, Frankfort and Vredefort) R106.20 
*Transvaal worked a 40-hour week, compared to 42,5 hours in the Western Cape and Natal, so 
their hourly rate was only a few cents below that of the latter two regions. 
48 An example was the shorter working week in the Transvaal. 
49 The Coloured labour preference policy was introduced by the National Party government in 
1954. It required that preference be given to the employment of Coloured labour in the Western 
Cape. In addition, entry by Africans into the area and their employment there was more strictly 
controlled than under normal influx control laws, and training facilities for African workers were 
not provided in the region.(Cooper et al, 1985:51 and 347) The policy was abolished in 1984 but 
its consequences live on. In 1995 the firms in the sample employed a very small minority of 
African workers. 
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A third employer stated that "we have a major Coloured labour force in the Western Cape, 
whereas in the Transvaal it's predominantly African and Natal predominantly Indian". He 
went on to argue that the "different cultures, problems and perceptions" favoured regional 
bargaining. 
The racial stereotyping of the regional workforces led to respondents identifying a variety 
of drawbacks of national bargaining. Some employers believed that the regional 
workforces had differing levels of productivity and standards of quality, which made 
national bargaining impossible: 
We support it [i.e. regional bargaining] because in Durban its a different 
ballgame. Even in Worcester. You could never survive with a factory out 
there on our wages. There it's all African labour and the productivity is 
terrible - they don't have the training or background. 
A second employer stated: 
Their methods in Natal and the methods here are completely different and 
the labour is completely different there... its a different standard of 
workmanship. We are more quality conscious ... Each province must have 
its own industrial council. 
An example advanced by another employer highlighted what he saw as the industrial 
relations implications of the differences in the regional workforces: 
In Natal with Indian workers if you don't work overtime they virtually go 
on strike, but in the Western Cape it's problematic working overtime 
because once they have earned their weekly required amount they don't 
bother to come to work on the 5th day ... Totally different work attitudes, 
cultural differences. 
The racial stereotyping was, however, not displayed by all employers in voicing their 
support for regional bargaining. Indeed, a few spoke out strongly against the perception 
that racial groups had differing productive capabilities: 
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I know that in the old days certain people said that the Xhosa is more 
efficient, etc., but I think that is nonsense. Sure there are some cultural 
differences but I think that productivity is management's responsibility. 
The more progressive view that productivity and quality was a management problem and 
should be resolved by training, was shared by a number of respondents: 
We have to ensure we all get our staff to the same sort of level. There is no 
point in saying a Zulu is a better worker than a Xhosa. That doesn't hold 
any water anywhere. Its management's responsibility in terms of training. 
A second, but related, aspect of the perceived "regional differences" were the difficulties 
that these would cause in national negotiations when they were translated into conflicting 
sets of regional interests: 
In every province there is a different set of people you are dealing with and 
there are often different problems, and it's hard enough negotiating at a 
regional level and then to involve four different provinces at a national level 
with different personalities ... We have our particular interests in the Cape. 
Although some employers tended to be vague about what these differences consisted of, 
others were more specific. One respondent used the example of Eastern Cape to highlight 
differing economic interests and problems: 
Particularly in the case of the Eastern Cape where you have much harder 
economic circumstances than other parts of the country. The realities are 
very different. Where jobs are as scarce as they are there you can hardly 
bargain at the same level... When we negotiate regionally at least we know 
what we are dealing with. 
Other differences mentioned were the cost of living in the regions, transport, "higher 
overheads", the "standard of living" in the regions, and 1'social circumstances". 
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There was also a perception that industrial relations in the Western Cape were better than 
in other regions and this would be undermined if they were drawn into a national 
bargaining structure. A leading employer stated: 
I am also concerned, and not just myself but many employers are, about the 
irrationality that they sometimes see in the Natal bargaining situation, and 
that that irrationality will flood over into the Western Cape ... They've got a 
hell of a problem in Natal from a disciplinary point of view... which is 
something that we don't experience in the Western Cape. And there is a 
fear amongst employers that if you go to a national industrial council a lot 
of that is going to spill over to the Western Cape. 
A second respondent provided a different perspective on this point: 
In the Western Cape we've built up a pretty good relationship and have 
built up that relationship over the past 30 to 40 years. And the union 
structures and organisers in the Western Cape have been in place for a long 
time. I understand that in Natal and Transvaal it is not so sophisticated and 
there is not as much control as there is in the Western Cape. That would be 
my main fear of going into a national industrial council - dropping to the 
lowest common denominator. 
A third respondent asked, "why should the Cape be lumbered with a Natal problem or a 
Transvaal problem or a big national problem", if they had no interest in the issue in 
dispute. 
The bottom line for the majority of employers was that differing regional interests and 
problems could best be accommodated through regional bargaining where the negotiators 
were "closer to the coal face" and knew "the individual firms, the individual problems of 
different areas and types of manufacture". Bargaining at the national level would become 
extremely complicated given these differences and the Western Cape could be drawn into 
disputes that either arose in other regions or involved other regions but which were of no 
concern to local employers. 
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There was, however, one point in favour of national bargaining that even the strongest 
supporters of regional bargaining were prepared to concede. The vast majority of 
employers acknowledged that they were competing in a national (or international) product 
market. For many of them who believed that the Western Cape had the highest labour 
costs, this was an important advantage of national bargaining, i.e. a national agreement 
would raise the labour costs of competitors in the other regions up to their level. One of 
the most vehement opponents of national bargaining stated: 
I would be receptive to that argument. .. It is, in fact, the only point that I'd 
be receptive to, it's the only compelling argument for me. 
But for most respondents this advantage was outweighed by the labour market 
considerations and the logistical and organisational factors discussed above. There were a 
number of other reasons why the advantage of a national agreement was discounted by 
employers. Firstly, as mentioned above, wages had virtually been equalised between the 
major regions in recent years and there was recognition that the union was working at 
eliminating remaining differences. A respondent noted: 
If you look at the major centres ... the difference in our wage levels will be 
wiped out by the end of this year, so def acto we are there. 
Secondly, a number of respondents noted that SACTWU was pattern bargaining the 
regions and to all intents and purposes national agreements were being reached: 
In the last few years it has been practically the same. When the Cape starts 
negotiating Natal follows and what is happening is that the union is liaising 
and we are ending up with the same thing. So the union is acting as a 
national thing so we are ending up with a national wage on a regional basis. 
Thirdly, it was believed that the union's method of getting uniformity between the 
agreements in national negotiations would be to take the best terms from each region: 
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The reason why I oppose national bargaining is that there are differences in 
conditions of employment amongst the various centres and if you move to 
national bargaining you'll just get a ratcheting up of the best conditions of 
employment in each of the areas. So it's going to be expensive for each of 
the regions. 
Some employers therefore disputed the contention that the Western Cape had uniformly 
the best conditions of employment artd a national agreement would benefit the region by 
levelling labour costs throughout the country. 
These counter-arguments, however, applied only to the major regions. Wages in the 
Eastern Cape and Free State lagged well behind those in the Western Cape, Transvaal and 
Natal. More importantly, the TBVC states and other 'decentralised' areas did not fall 
under any industrial council agreements and, in addition to the low wage advantage, 
manufacturers in some of these areas obtained certain benefits to operate there. 
Competition from these areas was a serious concern for some respondents: 
From that point of view I would accept national bargaining in that I 
compete with Natal manufacturers ... Their manufacturing costs are far 
lower than mine because they use 'development' and 'homeland' areas ... 
and that is a major problem for me. 
The prospect of national bargaining including these areas was a strong reason for the 
support of three employers for national bargaining. 
A few employers noted that the TBVC states were a different matter. Being independent 
states at the time, if only in the eyes of the South African government, a national wage 
agreement· would not cover clothing factories situated there. So, even if Western Cape 
manufacturers were being undercut by firms in these areas, national bargaining would be 
"irrelevant unless Ciskei and Transkei were covered". Furthermore, as one respondent 
argued, the decentralised areas could be covered by regional agreements: 
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You can extend the scope of the Natal agreement to cover Botshabelo and 
K wa Zulu and whatever else. So you can achieve that objective through a 
regional structure. 
In addition, not all Western Cape manufacturers were in direct competition with firms in 
the TBVC states or the 'decentralised' areas. In one case it was because the respondent 
produced garments for a particular niche market. He stated that "it hasn't caused us any 
problems - we have no competitors in those areas". In another case the manufacturer 
produced exclusively for a major retailer that did not source garments from those areas. 
Some respondents indicated that the low cost of garments produced in those areas was 
balanced or outweighed by their low quality. One stated that "the product that is coming 
out is so poor that we can still compete". Another explained: 
We have been undercut by them... but they undercut me with inferior 
merchandise. They do everything wrong but they are cheap ... It's a market 
of their own... With inefficiency and low productivity they're a threat and 
they're not a threat. 
A final factor that undermined the argument for a national agreement to restrict 
undercutting by low-wage regions was the recognition by many employers that low wages 
in those areas usually went with low productivity, and if higher wage levels were to be 
suddenly imposed on firms operating there they would close down and many jobs would 
be lost: 
In principle I am not against national bargaining, especially if they bring in 
the 'homelands' and they have to standardise wages and conditions. It 
would obviously be to our benefit. But obviously it would lead to the 
closure of numerous companies in those areas. 
Some employers were therefore willing to forego any advantage they could gain from the 
application of a national agreement to these areas in the interest of the development of the 
industry there: 
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You will become more competitive but you will put many other people out 
of business. It will cause many people to lose jobs. If you think for your 
own company that's a good argument but if you think more generally for 
the country and for our future then I think it's not a good argument. 
Furthermore, it was noted by a major employer that it was not certain that SACTWU's 
policy was to bring about wage uniformity throughout the country: 
My impression is that the union is open and alive to the reality of an 
urban/rural differentiation. Now to what extent they will accept the current 
geographic boundaries of decentralised areas ... is a different matter. But on 
that issue there is going to be a firm insistence on some differentiation ... 
and my impression is that the union is alive to that and open to talking 
about it. 
The end result was that while many employers highlighted the national product market as 
an advantage of national bargaining, its importance was diluted by a mix of perceptions 
· regarding the uniformity of existing conditions of employment, the intentions of the trade 
union, differing productivity levels, and the development needs of certain areas. Their 
perception was that regional bargaining was closer to and could be more responsive to the 
circumstances of each region. 
5.2.3 Thepowero/SACTWU 
5.2.3.1 Enterprise versus multi-employer bargaining 
The perceived imbalance of power between SACTWU and individual employers was 
another important reason for supporting multi-employer bargaining. This was a factor for 
almost every respondent and was generally expressed in terms of the union's bargaining 
power. One of the small CMT operators stated that: 
On your own you would have no chance against the union. At the moment 
they are up-ing wages and wages are our biggest bill, and if you can't keep 
the wage increases reasonable then you will just go out of business. You've 
got a bit of clout this way. 
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One of the largest employers used similar terms: 
To face the unions today you've got to have strength and muscle, and you 
won't get that by having all little individual identities. It you want to 
negotiate with the union as a company they will steamroll you. 
Given the very competitive nature of the clothing industry, employers believed they would · 
be entirely at the mercy of the union and "the weaker managements would be put out of 
business very quickly". 
An indication of the importance of the power disparity was the fear by some employers 
that decentralised bargaining would lead to leapfrog bargaining by the union.50 There 
were, however, differing opinions on this issue. Some employers believed that this 
possibility, remote though it was at that point in time, was a good reason for supporting 
multi-employer bargaining. Others argued that the union would adopt a strategy of trying 
to pattern bargaining the industry, i.e. they would attempt to bring all firms up to the 
settlement level reached at a few of the major firms. Still others believed that the union 
would not succeed with pattern bargaining, as smaller firms would not be able to pay what 
the most profitable firms could pay. The union would have to bargain according to each 
firm's ability to pay. But whichever strategy the union adopted or were forced to adopt, 
the many small firms in the industry and the difficulty the union would face at negotiating 
at each of these firms, meant that decentralised bargaining would probably focus on the 
larger firms. This led to a fear by some of these employers that they would be 'targeted' by 
the union in enterprise level negotiations. 
A second indicator of the role that power played in employers' thinking on the levels of 
bargaining question, was the perception that centralised negotiations removed the 
adversarial focus of workers from the firm's own shopfloor. This reduced tensions and 
militancy in the workplace. A respondent argued that multi-employer bargaining was "less 
50 Leapfrog bargaining occurs when a union uses the settlement at one enterprise as the starting 
point for negotiations at the next enterprise. This constantly pushes up wages and other 
employment conditions as the union moves from firm to firm through the industry. 
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personalised, it is less open to direct antagonism, it's a body over there ... it's an industry 
thing, a broader thing". Another employer stated that: 
If negotiations are carried out on your own shopfloor your workers tend to 
get very uptight and tend to get involved with every aspect of it... and it 
causes major disruptions all the way along. 
This view is probably a heritage of years of centralised bargaining with the Garment 
Workers' Union, which had built little or no shopfloor organisation and suppressed rather 
than infused worker militancy. The changes wrought by SACTWU were noted by some 
respondents. They argued that the ability of centralised negotiations to restrict shopfloor 
militancy had become less important in recent years, "because even if you have centralised 
bargaining, while it is going on there is still activity in my plant and until it has been 
finalised there is always an undercurrent". Another employer acknowledged this 
development but still believed that centralised bargaining limited adversarialism in his 
factory: 
Sure during negotiations the company gets hit by work stoppages, etc. 
because that's the way they level power. But I think that it removes some 
of the aggression when they see that its not just us but that all the bosses 
think alike. 
Two firms, both of which had full-time industrial relations managers, did not entirely 
accept the argument that a benefit of multi-employer bargaining was that it removed 
antagonism from the workplace. They argued that they had developed very good relations 
with shop stewards and workers at the enterprise and that these were sometimes 
jeopardised by the more conservative line taken by employers at the association: 
It's problematic where industrial relations issues come up that we are clear 
about. We have a far more open view than the rest of manufacturers and 
that's a very difficult situation because you have to defend a position you 
don't really agree with for the sake of the industry. 
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So even if antagonism was removed to the centralised level, some employers believed that 
membership of the employers' association tied them into that antagonistic relationship, 
whether they agreed with the line being taken on particular issues or not. 
5.2.3.2 Regional versus national multi-employer bargaining 
While the power of the trade union was still important for respondents when they had to 
decide between regional and national level bargaining, there was greater diversity in their 
opinions on this point. A small minority of employers stated that they supported regional 
bargaining because the employers' organisations were more powerful than SACTWU at 
this level. Far more believed that "the power equation was equal" at the regional level, and 
a number of employers argued that this would probably be the case at a national level. It 
was therefore not a factor in their rejection of national bargaining. There were, however, 
considerably more who thought that the trade union would possibly or definitely be more 
powerful at the national level. This was largely based on a perception that employers 
would not be able to achieve the unity and cohesiveness that SACTWU could achieve in 
national negotiations. A member of the joint CCMA and CKIA negotiating team stated 
that: 
The union would be at an advantage because they would have a centralised 
negotiating team, but the manufacturers' team would have to be made up 
from all the regions. 
Another member of the negotiating team stated: 
You give the union a bigger power base ... and you don't want to give your 
opposition a bigger power base whilst you know that it will diminish your 
power base. Because there is no ways that you will get 800 manufacturers 
to stand together. 
So for a significant number of employers the anticipated imbalance of power was a factor 
in rejecting national bargaining. This perception was closely related to the difficulties that 
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many employers believed that they would face in organising nationally and trying to get 
national mandates for negotiations. This has been dealt with in some detail above. 
5.2.4 Relations with SACJWU and the trust factor 
Attitudes towards the trade union tended to vary considerably, but for many employers 
this did not have much importance when choosing between different levels of bargaining. 
However, this is not to say that perceptions of the union had no relevance for decision-
making about this issue. 'Leading' employers gauged attitudes to the union within their 
constituency in their assessment of the viability of engaging in national bargaining, and 
some of them concluded that the bargaining relationship between the parties had not yet 
reached a sufficient level of 'maturity' (on both the union and the employer side). This 
relationship would have to improve considerably before something as complex and 
potentially problematic as national bargaining could be considered: 
Let's get our relationship at a sufficient level of maturity and stability, let's 
develop a common vocabulary on the essentials that we have jointly 
identified as being the principal factors that guide, inform and direct our 
relationship. And from there we build towards a widening and broadening 
of our collective bargaining relationship. We have enough problems 
carrying this constituency and bargaining unit from one year to another in 
its current structure and we believe we may lose the whole thing if we try 
to run before we can crawl. 
The interviews confirmed the lack of confidence that some of the 'leading' employers had 
in their constituency. Many smaller employers expressed a strong antagonism towards the 
union (although such an attitude was not restricted to the smaller employers). This can 
largely be explained by the changes that the union had undergone in recent years and the 
impact that this had had on the nature of industrial relations in the industry. Smaller 
employers simply did not understand the new industrial relations arena into which they had 
been thrust and were very uncomfortable with what they saw as SACTWU's "militancy". 
Their unitary frame of reference was under siege and their response was appropriately 
defensive. SACTWU, they argued, had turned their workers against them and seemed to 
have no other aim but to indiscriminately "bash" management. A CMT operator stated: 
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We have good relations with our workers at plant-level but the union's 
main aim seems to be to create bad relations. They don't like it if workers 
like their bosses. · 
They argued that this antagonistic attitude came from the trade union at a time when the 
industry was in dire straits and everybody should be working together to save it. It 
therefore seemed to a number of the smaller employers that the union was out to destroy 
the industry. They could not see any other logic in SACTWU's actions. One employer 
stated: 
Until we can get a common sense view from the union that they 
acknowledge the position of the manufacturers and the hardships we suffer, 
as much as the hardships of their members; until we get that 
acknowledgement as to where we are and where we are going, how can we 
treat them with comfort? We have to be wary, we don't know what move 
they will pull next ~ to the extent that I would say that most clothing 
manufacturers would prefer not to have a union near their factories. And I 
would say 50% of workers don't want to be unionised either. 
They believed the union was creating a crisis in the industry and driving out employers, 
which would result in workers losing their jobs: 
We don't see much of the union but they are so aggressive. They should 
stop that and just work at doing something for the industry. We should be 
working together because if we go then they go. It's not this 'them or us' 
which they are always pushing... they could either carry on with demands 
and eventually price the industry out of the market or they could come to 
their senses and be more reasonable and think about saving jobs. 
As mentioned above, most respondents did not link these attitudes directly to their choice 
of a particular level of bargaining. Their main effect was on the perceptions of 'leading' 
members of the CCMA and CK.IA with regard to their constituency. But it can be argued 
that these attitudes created a more uncompromising stance from employers towards the 
union and its goals, including its goal to shift bargaining to the national level. 
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It should be noted, however, that a number of small and medium employers had far more 
positive attitudes towards SACTWU. One stated that "the union has done a fantastic job 
in taking an industry which paid the lowest wage rates to a more liveable level... and we 
are much more aware of wage rates, standards of living and staff requirements". Another 
argued that what was required was "a change in attitude from a lot of employers - its not 
only the union - employers must change their entire attitude". 
Firms with industrial relations managers, in particular, could be located securely within a 
pluralist frame of reference and had a more sophisticated understanding of the role of the 
union. One of these managers explained their industrial relations policy as follows: 
Our philosophy is that we recognise there will be some sort of conflict but 
we are prepared to work within that conflict and negotiate, and we are 
prepared to negotiate absolutely everything... I have built up a very good 
relationship with the shop stewards and the union here which, in general, 
the CCMA doesn't have. 
Respondents also tended to differ as to which level of the union (i.e. either workers, shop 
stewards or the union officials) they identified when articulating their perceptions. Very 
small employers had little contact with union officials and focussed on the workforce 
itself; other respondents concentrated on their relations with shop stewards at the firm in 
forming their attitudes to the union; and some employers, particularly members of the 
Executive Committee of the CCMA and CKIA, were more concerned with the union 
leadership. For example, one respondent argued: 
The union has reneged on so many issues. As soon as we agree on stability 
they then target certain companies. It's not the workers it's the union 
behind it. 
Another respondent placed the blame on workers: 
They [i.e. the union] don't stick to their word 100% but I don't believe 
they're dishonest... The biggest problem they have is disciplining their 
members. 
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A second, and very significant, aspect of attitudes to the trade union, was a lack of trust of 
SACTWU. This was also concentrated mainly amongst the 'leading' employers in the 
sample and was an important consideration in their opposition to national bargaining. 
The reason why this perception was concentrated mainly amongst 'leading' employers was 
that they were either directly involved in centralised negotiations with the trade union or 
were in close touch with these negotiations. Their allegation of the union's 
untrustworthiness arose largely from their experience of negotiations. Importantly, they 
related this perception directly to the issue of bargaining levels, more specifically to 
opposition to national bargaining. 
Most 'leading' employers alleged that SACTWU could not be trusted. They contended 
that unless this could be overcome and trust developed between the parties at a regional 
level, there was little prospect of employers agreeing to participate in national bargaining. 
A member of the employers' negotiating team stated: 
I think that there is such a gap in as much as trust is concerned between the 
average employer and the union leadership that I can't see anything positive 
happening in the next three to four years. I think the thing might start 
turning in three years time and we may see something tangible develop 
from there. 
A key aspect of this lack of trust was the illegal indt.Jstrial action that allegedly took place 
repeatedly during negotiations, which respondents were convinced was orchestrated by 
SACTWU. 51 A 'leading' employer stated: 
There is a lack of trust amongst a lot of manufacturers [because of] the 
action during industrial council negotiations. The union said that shop 
stewards took the action on their own initiative but we reject this. It was 
focussed on Rex Trueform and Meritex [and] we decided to break off 
negotiations until it was sorted out. The union said it was because workers 
51 This allegation was emphatically denied by Wayne van der Rheede of SACTWU. He stated that 
the union did not instigate illegal industrial action, and when such action did take place the policy 
of the union was to immediately try to end it. 
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were unhappy and were showing displeasure at the intransigence of 
employers, but we felt it was just game playing. The majority of employers 
feel that the union is not to be trusted - actions speak louder than words. 
A number of the respondents made similar allegations and emphasised that employers had 
evidence that the union was behind the illegal industrial· action. But the complaint was not 
restricted to action during the negotiations. They alleged that many agreements had been 
broken by the union: 
Many times things are discussed and agreed but then it doesn't happen that 
way... This is important for us in our reaction to the call for a national 
industrial council... The relationship hasn't matured sufficiently... the 
union's 'bona tides' are not accepted and they have given [us] reasons for 
this. 
For these employers it was the leadership of the union that was to blame for the broken 
undertakings and agreements. If this stratum of the union could not be trusted then they 
did not believe there was a basis for establishing a national bargaining forum. 
Some respondents, however, disagreed with the allegation that the union could not be 
trusted. One argued that it arose from a lack of understanding of the way the 'new' trade 
unions operate: 
I don't fully agree with the allegation... that you can't trust the union. The 
union has changed from being a 'sweetheart' union and they have had to 
show their teeth. What has happened is that the antagonistic manufacturers 
have simply got their antagonistic style back at themselves from the union. 
Also a lot of manufacturers don't understand the games that organisers and 
shop stewards need to play. If you understand the game, for example work 
stoppages during negotiations, then there is no need for distrust. 
Despite the fact that the lack of trust tended to be concentrated only amongst some 
respondents (and that others disagreed with this assessment of the union), the fact that 
they were by and large the 'leading' employers meant that this was an important factor in 
the resistance of the CCMA and CKIA to national bargaining. 
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5.2.5 Benefit.fund~· 
5.2.5.1 Enterpris~ versus multi-employer bargaining 
One frequently cited advantage of multi-employer bargaining is that it allows for the 
establishment of centralised benefit funds (e.g. medical aid funds and provident or pension 
funds). As is the case with many industrial councils, the clothing council in the Western 
Cape has established and administers two such funds (i.e. a Sick Fund and a Provident 
Fund). This was another reason for many employers supporting multi-employer 
bargaining, although it was less important than those dealt with above. Respondents 
believed that their firms could not match the cost and benefits of the industrial council's 
funds. And, as one respondent pointed out, having a centralised fund meant that workers 
moving from firm to firm in the industry could remain members of the same fund. 
The size and cost structure of most clothing firms, as well as administrative convenience, 
were factors underlying this perception:· 
Have it at a centralised level. I don't think any single company could give 
much benefit to its workers on the basis of a Sick Fund or anything like 
that ifit was trying to do it individually. 
Some of the larger firms did indicate that they would be able to provide such funds but 
acknowledged that it could "be done even better on an industry basis". More importantly, 
a number of these respondents noted that it was in the interests of the entire labour force 
and the industry to support these funds because a "lot of small firms couldn't afford" to set 
up their own funds. 
There were, however, a number of problems with these funds in the view of employers. 
Firstly, many respondents expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the operation of the sick 
pay provisions of the Sick Fund and the impact this had on absenteeism and therefore on 
productivity. In particular, section 26(5)(b) of the Main Agreement, which provided that 
an employee shall qualify for sick pay only if absent from work for three or more 
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consecutive working days with a medical certificate, was singled out for criticism. It was 
alleged that this clause acted as an incentive for workers to stay off for longer than 
necessary and that the panel of doctors appointed by the Fund colluded with workers in . 
making this possible. 
Respondents did not, however, directly link their concern with this problem to multi-
employer bargaining, of which it was clearly an off-shoot. Furthermore, employers' 
dissatisfaction was somewhat appeased by the fact that an agreement had been reached to 
drop this clause and substitute section 13 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(No.3of1983) as from 1 July 1992.52 
A second problem identified by a number of employers was the extremely low retirement 
benefits paid out by the Provident Fund, which one 'leading' employer described as 
"criminal". These employers were concerned that the contribution levels be re-examined, 
as well as the administration of the Fund, in order that benefits could be substantially 
improved. 
5.2.5.2 Regional versus national multi-employer bargaining 
Employers tended to focus on the Provident Fund when. faced with the issue of the 
advantage of having national benefit funds, and they were split down the middle on this 
question. In many cases respondents did not have the facts to make a firm decision either 
way. One answered that she "would need to see the figures first" and another that he 
"can't say yes or no", whereas others surmised that it was "a possibility" that national 
funds would be better, or that this would "not necessarily be the case". 
Other respondents believed more strongly that the merging of the existing regional funds 
would make them much more powerful "because the pool would be bigger", and this 
would allow for an improvement in benefits. An equal number of respondents disagreed 
and argued that "the size of the funds are such that you are not going to get any material 
52 The medical aid side of the Sick Fund was unaffected by this change. 
84 
benefits from improved economies of scale than what you are enjoying at the moment". 
National funds could, they believed, also prove to be more difficult to administer. 
5.3 Reasons for supporting enterprise bargaining 
No common theme emerged in the reasons given by the three employers that supported 
enterprise bargaining. The reasons reflected the individuality of the views of the 
respondents. The only similarity was that none of the three opposed bargaining with the 
trade union as such. 
The first employer's mam reason for supporting enterprise bargaining was a strong 
rejection of any form of regulation by a centralised body. He was not a member of the 
CK.IA because he saw himself as "an entrepreneur" and refused "to be directed by 
incompetent civil servants". He viewed the industrial council as "a communistic 
organisation" and only allowed council officials on the premises because he was "legally 
obliged to do so". He argued that if each company bargained on its own there would be 
"more employment opportunities", but his attitude to the issue was ideological rather than 
based on pragmatic economic or social considerations: 
The second employer rejected multi-employer bargaining because "every factory has its 
own set of procedures, traditions, etc. - its. own team - and bargaining should reflect this 
individuality and should be done at plant level". This attitude was very closely linked to a 
management style that the interviewee believed he had developed at the firm, which 
influenced his approach to industrial relations. The firm had "an industrial relations 
network and not an industrial relations manager", and the interviewee saw himself as 
simply the "coordinator of the network". The "network" was made up of himself (i.e. the 
managing director), the production and factory managers, the personnel officer, and the 
shop stewards. This 'team' had established a "set of procedures" and "traditions" at the 
firm that worked well. Most importantly, it had created a better industrial relations 
environment than that being created at the centralised level: 
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You find that often industrial actions affect other factories here, e.g. the 
workers at Ensign might come out and march, etc. But none of our 
workers will join them and this is because we are a different team at this 
firm. That is why I believe that the union should bargain with individual 
companies. 
This employer stated that the "system or network is based on my personal experience and 
philosophy, in that I believe the answer is simply to put people first and this is the basis for 
my style of management". He stated that he would "never join the CCMA" because they 
"didn't understand workers and didn't know how to deal with a female labour force", and 
he rejected what he saw as their "hardline approach". He clearly felt that he had 
established a rapport with his workforce that was both stable and productive, and that this 
was threatened by the more antagonistic relationship that existed between the union and 
employers at the centralised level. 
The remaining employer was somewhat anomalous in that the firm was a member of the 
CKIA. He saw both advantages and disadvantages in centralised bargaining but on balance 
came out in favour of enterprise bargaining. The main reason was his prior experience of 
decentralised bargaining with the NUTW in the textile industry. He therefore felt confident 
that the firm could handle negotiations directly with the trade union. A second important 
reason was that the firm was situated in a particularly competitive sub-sector of the market 
and this required that their staff "had to be motivated" and that the firm "get the maximum 
efficiency out of them". The linking of productivity improvements to wage increases was 
therefore critical for their continued competitiveness. Enterprise bargaining would allow 
them to "build in certain productivity steps to increase productivity", which was not 
possible at the industrial council. 
The respondent did however recogruse that multi-employer bargaining was firmly 
entrenched in the clothing industry in the Western Cape and was aware of some of its 
benefits. He noted, in particular, that the industrial council Sick Fund and Provident Fund 
would be difficult to replace with enterprise level schemes. This was probably the main 
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reason why the firm remained a member of the CKIA although preferring enterprise 
bargaining. 
5.4 Reasons for supporting national bargaining 
The three respondents who supported national bargaining each gave as their main reason 
the fact that the other regions in the country were faced with lower wage structures and 
this was giving them a competitive edge in the product market. Of great concern was the 
undercutting they experienced from firms operating in the 'decentralised' areas and the 
TBVC states, which were not covered by collective agreements. They optimistically 
believed that a national agreement would have the added advantage of also covering these 
areas, although, as was noted above, this would not be the case for the TBVC states. 
It is interesting to note that all three supporters of national bargaining were CMT 
operators. One would generally expect that CMT firms would favour regional bargaining 
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because they compete for suppliers in local or regional markets, but this was not the case. 
Competition was coming not only from other regions in South Africa but also from 
neighbouring countries. One of these respondents, who produced mainly denim garments, 
pointed out: 
People are getting denim products made up in Lesotho and in the 
'homelands'. It pays them to send [fabric] up to Lesotho, get [garments] 
made-up there, brought back to Cape Town and finished here, and its still 
cheaper than having the complete garment done in Cape Town. So guys 
from Cape Town are sending work to Lesotho, Botshabelo, etc. 
These respondents tended to discount factors that were seen as important by employers 
favouring regional bargaining. For example, one acknowledged that the union would 
"definitely be more powerful" at the national level but this was outweighed by the fact that 
"workers will earn equal pay" as a result of national bargaining. Another did not believe 
that firms' ability to participate in negotiations would be greatly affected by a shift to 
national bargaining. He queried how much say one had in any case at the regional level 
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and argued that at both regional and national level employers "elect representatives and 
they speak on behalf of them so it wouldn't make much difference". 
5.5 The undecided respondents 
Four employers were unable to choose between regional and national bargaining. Three of 
these employers acknowledged that there were good arguments for and against national 
bargaining but in each case they were unable to make a definite decision on the issue. The 
common factor was a combination of ignorance and indifference. One stated that he hadn't 
"thought about it and couldn't say whether it's a good thing or not without going into it". 
Another argued that the industrial council was a body over which one had no control or 
influence and it therefore made no difference whether it was situated at the regional or 
national level. 
The remaining firm was rather unique in that it was part of a retail group and employed 
only a handful of machinists to produce samples. The manufacture of garments for the 
group was done entirely by independent CMT operators. Industrial relations were handled 
by the industrial relations manager at the retail group's headquarters and he indicated that 
it would make no difference to them if there was regional or national bargaining. His only 
concern was that he didn't want to be involved in enterprise level bargaining for such a 
small bargaining unit. 
5.6 Determinants of employers' preferences 
A large majority of employers favoured regional multi-employer bargaining but had 
different reasons for supporting that level, weighted their reasons differently and combined 
them in different ways. The above section grouped together the main reasons and 
indicated the contradictions, divergences and nuances of employer opinion within these 
broad categories, as well as showing the varying knowledge and understanding that 
employers had of the range of factors that had a bearing on the level of bargaining issue. 
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Another approach to analysing employers' preferences regarding this issue is to tum from 
the subjective attitudes of employers and to examine the role that objec~ive factors play in 
the formation or determination of preferences. This approach is quantitative and seeks to 
establish a correspondence between certain variables and the level at which employers 
would like bargaining to be structured. If a positive relationship exists, preferences for the 
level of bargaining are attributed to employers on the grounds of those variables. In other 
words, the variables are seen to determine employers' preferences for a particular level of 
bargaining. 
This approach was used in the large-scale, cross-sectoral quantitative studies done by 
Deaton and Beaumont in Britain (1980), and Hendricks and Kahn in the United States 
(1982). The findings of those studies regarding the relationship that exists between certain 
variables and levels of bargaining will be compared to the preferences voiced by 
respondents in this study. The variables that will be examined are the size of firms, 
whether firms are single or multi-plant, the employment of specialist industrial relations 
managers, sub-sectoral factors, the extent of the product market, the geographical location 
of firms, trade union density, membership of and participation in the employers' 
associations, the extension of agreements, and the existence of productivity incentive 
schemes. 
The advantage of this approach has been discussed in Chapter Two above. It should be 
noted, however, that the approach does have the drawback of not being able to take 
account of less tangible factors such as "historical determination" and "'style' of 
management".(Deaton and Beaumont, 1980: 203-204) It also throws no light on the 
political process of decision-making within firms and employers' associations that 
translates preferences into policy on the level of bargaining. The qualitative data obtained 
in the interviews does balance this shortcoming to a large extent and results in a more 
rounded understanding of employers' preferences on the level of bargaining issue. 
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5.6.1 Size of firm 
The studies done by Deaton and Beaumont, and Hendricks and Kahn, identified the size of 
firms as a determinant of preferences for particular levels of bargaining. More specifically, 
larger firms are associated with enterprise bargaining.(Deaton and Beaumont, 1980:207-
210; and, Hendricks and Kahn, 1982: 191) However, an examination of the breakdown of 
preferences for different levels of bargaining by size of firm in this study does not show 
any marked differences to the overall preferences in Table 1. The lack of a relationship 
between size of firm and preferences is confirmed by a chi square test which reveals no 
significance at the 0,01 level (x2 = 10,59). Respondents across the size spectrum 
acknowledged the advantages of multi-employer bargaining and preferred this to take 
place at the regional level. 
Table 2. Size of firm 
Preferred level of bargaining 
No. of employees Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
(Reg/Nat) 
1-50 8 5 1 0 2 
51-100 3 3 0 0 0 
101-250 9 5 1 2 1 
251-500 13 10 1 1 1 
501+ 9 9 0 0 0 
Total 42 32 3 3 4 
Some of the figures in Table 2 deserve further comment. Firstly, the table confirms that for 
even the smallest firms the convenience of multi-employer bargaining tends to outweigh 
the perceived disadvantages of big firm dominance in the associations. Furthermore, in 
light of the fear many smaller employers had that a shift to national bargaining would 
result in even greater dominance by a few very big firms, it is somewhat surprising that 
three of the eight firms with less than 51 employees were either in favour of national 
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bargaining or were undecided between regional and national bargaining. To some extent 
the number of undecided small firms reflects their ignorance of the issue, but the 
acceptance of national bargaining by some small firms is also an indication of the greater 
weight that they gave to the increasing competition they were facing from the Transkei, 
Ciskei and other low-wage areas which they believed would be eradicated by national 
bargaining. 
Secondly, although two of the three firms which favoured enterprise bargaining are in the 
101-250 category, size appears to have played little or no part in these firms' preferences. 
In both cases other factors were more important in detennining the respondents' attitudes 
on this issue. 
Finally, the support by all nine of the largest group of firms for regional centralised 
bargaining is significant for two reasons. It, firstly, contradicts the thesis that larger firms 
will favour bargaining on their own. Secondly, it tends to undermine the argument that 
only the very big firms will be able to participate in national bargaining and could therefore 
pursue their own interests more effectively in bargaining at that level. While this might 
well be the case, it is anomalous that the large firms in the sample attached no importance 
to this potential advantage that national bargaining held out for them. 
5.6.2 Single or multi-plant.firms 
The number of plants that a firm has is another factor that has been shown to have an 
effect on preferences for particular levels of bargaining. Deaton and Beaumont found that 
multi-plant firms tend to favour enterprise or plant level bargaining.(1980: 208-210) 
Table 3 shows, however, that whether firms were single or multi-plant had no influence on 
their preferences for particular levels of bargaining. This is confirmed by a chi square test 
which reveals no significance at the 0,01 level (x2 = 3,1). 
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Table 3. Single or multi-plant firms 
Preferred level of bargaining 
No. of plants Total finns Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
(Reg/Nat) 
Single plant 30 21 3 3 3 
Multi-plant 12 11 0 0 1 
Total 42 32 3 3 4 
Underlining the contradiction of the Deaton and Beaumont findings is the fact that not one 
multi-plant finn in the sample was in favour of enterprise bargaining. 
5.6.3. Industrial relations management 
The study by Deaton and Beaumont found that the employment of full-time industrial 
relations managers was associated with enterprise bargaining.(1980: 208-210} The results 
of this study do not, however, support those findings. 
Table 4. Industrial relations management 
Preferred level of bargaining 
IR management Total finns Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
(Reg/Nat) 
IR manager 7 6 0 0 1 
No IR mgr. 35 26 3 3 3 
Total 42 32 3 3 4 
A chi square test reveals that there is no relationship at the 0,01 level (x2 = 1,44) between 
the employment of an industrial relations manager and the preference of a firm for a 
particular level of bargaining. The interviews show, furthermore, that all seven firms in the 
sample employing industrial relations managers were members of the CCMA or CKIA and 
three of the industrial relations managers were playing a leading role in the associations. 
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It should be noted that the employment of industrial relations managers at firms is closely 
linked to the size of firms (there is a very close correspondence between the firms with 
over 501 employees in Table 2 and firms with these managers). Industrial relations 
managers were therefore generally against national bargaining for the same reasons that 
the big firms were opposed to bargaining at that level. They placed great importance on 
potential logistical and organisational problems as a reason for their opposition to national 
bargaining and were as concerned as most other respondents about the negative impact 
that national bargaining could have on the ability of smaller firms to participate in the 
mandating and negotiating process. 
5.6.4 Sub-sector 
The different technologies, capital/labour ratios, and product market conditions facing 
sectors or sub-sectors are seen as important determinants of different levels of 
bargaining.(Deaton and Beaumont, 1980: 207-210; and Hendricks and Kahn, 1982: 189) 
This is borne out by the data in Table 5. A chi square test reveals a significant relationship 
between sub-sectors of the clothing industry and levels of bargaining preferences at the 
0,01 level (x2 = 21,9). 
Table 5. Sub-sector 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Sub-sector Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
(Reg/Nat) 
Clothing 27 22 0 1 4 
Knitting 6 4 0 2 0 
CMT 9 6 3 0 0 
Total 42 32 3 3 4 
All the firms favouring national bargaining were CMT firms and this constituted one-third 
of the CMT firms in the sample. The labour intensive nature of these firms and the fact 
that some were competing nationally and in the lower end of the market, made them 
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particularly susceptible to low-wage competition from other regions. 53 This explains the 
disproportionate number in favour of national bargaining. 
The knitting sub-sector also shows a marked difference from the clothing sector in that 
one-third of the firms were in favour of enterprise bargaining (although caution should be 
taken because of the size of the sample). Neither of these two respondents raised differing 
technologies and capital/labour ratios in their reasons for supporting enterprise bargaining, 
but one did identify particularly difficult sub-sectoral market conditions as a factor. Other 
knitters did, however, express dissatisfaction with the position of the CK.IA as the smaller 
party in the joint CCMA and CK.IA negotiating team. Although this was voiced in terms 
of the power relationship between the two groups, it was rooted in the more capital 
intensive nature of the knitting industry and the effect this had on the organisation of 
work. 
One knitter, who supported multi-employer bargaining, criticised the existing arrangement 
"because it tends to be biased towards the clothing manufacturers, and knitting 
manufacturers tend to get absorbed into bargaining that doesn't suit them". He gave as an 
example the issue of shift allowances that had arisen during negotiations a couple of years 
before. This issue was still on the table and for the clothing representatives it was a very 
easy trade-off to make because there is no shiftwork in the clothing industry. To the 
knitters it was an issue of importance and would have a marked effect on their wage bill. 
But the major negotiators were clothing representatives and the end result was that "the 
knitters were bulldozed into that concession", which has left "a bitter taste in the mouths 
of knitters". This dissatisfaction did not, however, outweighed the benefits of multi-
employer bargaining. 
53 This is discussed in more detail at p. 87 above. 
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5.6.5 Product market area 
Neither the Deaton and Beaumont study nor the Hendricks and_Kahn study dealt directly 
with the relationship between the area of the product market and level of bargaining. Bean 
argues, however, that an important impetus for organisation by employers is the need to 
regulate the labour cost component in product market competition, particularly in the case 
of labour intensive industries. As product markets widen there is pressure for bargaining 
to shift from the regional to the national level to eliminate competition from low-wage 
areas.(Bean, 1985: 75-76; and, Gospel, 1992: 187) On the other hand, Deaton and 
Beaumont, and Sisson, recognise that local labour market conditions can motivate 
employers to bargain at the regional rather than national level.(1980: 207; and, 1987: 81) 
Most clothing manufacturers in the W estem Cape believed that they were competing in a 
national product market and acknowledged that this was a powerful argument for national 
bargaining. But Table 6 indicates that this argument is usually outweighed by 
considerations in favour of regional bargaining when employers make a choice (27 of the 
36 firms that competed in a national product market were in (avour of regional 
bargaining). This is supported by many of the interviews discussed above. 
Table 6. Product market area 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Product market area Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
(Reg/Nat) 
National 36 27 2 3 4 
Regional 6 5 I 0 0 
Total 42 32 3 3 4 
A chi square test confirms the failure of the 'national product market' argument to 
substantially influence employers' preferences. No significance was found at the 0,01 level 
(x2 = 2,22). This confirms that the geographical concentration of firms and regional labour 
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market differences could undermine the establishment of a national bargaining 
structure.(Deaton and Beaumont, 1980: 207) 
5.6.6 Location 
The location of firms is another factor that has a bearing on levels of bargaining. The 
regional concentration of firms is associated with multi-employer bargaining and, as noted 
above, labour market variations between regions can lead to pressures for differing 
bargaining arrangements. (Deaton and Beaumont, 1980: 207-210; Hendricks and Kahn, 
1982: 191) 
In the Western Cape there are two major locations for clothing firms, namely, Greater 
Cape Town and Atlantis. A chi square test reveals that location is a significant influence at 
the 0,01 level on preferences for particular levels of bargaining (x2 = 18,66). More 
specifically, two out of the three firms located in Atlantis supported enterprise bargaining. 
This appears particularly important in light of the fact that Atlantis had been created as a 
'decentralised' area. 
Table 7. Location of firm 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Location Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
(Reg/Nat) 
Cape Town 39 31 3 1 4 
Atlantis 3 1 0 2 0 
Total 42 32 3 3 4 
Caution must, however, be exercised when examining this finding because of the small 
sample of firms in Atlantis. Furthermore, although two of the three firms in Atlantis 
supported enterprise bargaining, only one of these respondents made specific reference to 
this factor when he argued that the •decentralisation' benefits were outweighed by the 
disadvantages of the region and that the industrial council agreement should not be 
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extended to Atlantis. This was, however, not the main reason for his rejection of multi-
employer bargaining. 
The significance of the data in Table 7 is further diluted if one takes into account the four 
subsidiary firms in Atlantis that were covered by interviews carried out at the holding 
company in Cape Town. All of these subsidiaries were 'supporters' of the existing multi-
employer bargaining structure by reason of the holding companies' support for it. The fact 
that at least eight of the 14 clothing and knitting firms located in Atlantis were subsidiaries 
of firms based in Cape Town, probably accounts for the muted opposition by Atlantis 
firms to their inclusion in the regional bargaining structure. 
5.6.7 Trade union density 
Trade union density is often used as a proxy for union power and in the Deaton and 
Beaumont study high union density was associated with multi-employer bargaining.(1980, 
209-210) This is confinned by the preferences expressed by employers interviewed in this 
study. 
Table 8. Trade union density54 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Union density Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
(Reg/Nat) 
75-100% 40 32 2 2 4 
0-49% 2 0 I 1 0 
Total 42 32 3 3 4 
Forty of the 42 firms in the sample had a union density of over 75% and almost all of these 
firms were in favour of multi-employer bargaining at either the regional or national level or 
were undecided between these two levels. 55 Although this is only slightly above the overall 
54 There were no firms in the 50-74% range. 
55 This confinns the high union density cited by Ronald Bernickow, SACTWU's Regional 
Organiser for the Western Cape (see footnote 26 at p. 40). 
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preferences in Table 1, it is important to note that of the two firms with less than 50% 
union membership one favoured enterprise bargaining. 
It is also interesting to note that eight of the ten firms that were not members of any of the 
employers' associations were in favour of multi-employer bargaining. So the very high 
union density throughout the Western Cape industry presents individual employers with a 
huge adversary that requires a suitable counterweight and this is provided by an 
employers' association, whether they are members or not. The pervasiveness of the 
opinion that individual employers could not face the union on their own corresponds with 
the high level of union density across the sample. 
5.6.8 Employers' association membership and participation 
There are two aspects of membership of the emplorers' associations that can be examined 
for their effect on respondents' attitudes to the level of bargaining issue. The first is 
membership of an association per se. As one would expect, Table 9 shows that 
membership of the CCMA or CKIA corresponds with a high level of support for regional 
multi-employer bargaining, as opposed to the greater mix of preferences of non-members. 
This relationship is confirmed by a chi square test which reveals significance at the 0,02 
level (x2 = 16,69), but not at the 0,01 level. 
Table 9. Membership of employers' associations 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Association Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
(Reg/Nat) 
CCMAorCKIA 31 26 I 1 3 
GMA I 0 0 0 1 
Non-members 10 6 2 2 0 
Total 42 32 ~ 3 3 4 
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It should be noted that membership of the CCMA or CKIA did not guarantee support for 
regional bargaining. One respondent expressed a preference for enterprise bargaining 
while another was in favour of national bargaining and three were undecided between 
regional and national bargaining. 
The second aspect of membership of the employers' associations is the extent to which 
respondents actually participated in the decision-making process within the association. In 
this case attendance of meetings has been used to gauge the level of participation while 
membership of the Executive Committee is treated as a separate category that denotes 
maximum participation. 
Table 10. Level of participation in the CCMA and CKIA56 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Level of participation Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
(Reg/Nat) 
Minimal 5 3 0 0 2 
N.B. meetings 6 4 1 1 0 
Most meetings 8 7 0 0 1 
Executive 11 11 0 0 0 
Total 30 25 1 1 3 
A chi square test of the data in Table 10 reveals no significance at the 0,01 level (x2 = 
3,05), but one can see that where participation is minimal or limited there is some spread 
of opinion on the issue, whereas greater involvement corresponds closely with support for 
regional bargaining. 
Importantly, the members of the Executive Committee were all supporters of regional 
bargaining. This tends to confirm the role of the Executive Committee as the key locus of 
56 One respondent did not answer this question. 
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decision-making in the CCMA and CKIA and as a strong influence on the preferences of 
the rest of the membership on this issue. 
5 .6.9 Extension of agreements 
The statutory framework for collective bargaining is widely recognised as an important 
factor in determining levels of bargaining. An aspect of this framework that arguably plays 
a vital role in supporting multi-employer bargaining in South Africa is the mechanism 
' 
whereby industrial council agreements can be made binding on non-members of the 
negotiating parties. 
Table 11. Support for extension of agreements57 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Extension Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
of a reement at 
In favour 24 19 2 ,0 3 
Against 8 4 1 2" I 
Undecided or 
conditional 9 8 0 1. 0 
Total 41 31 3 3, 4 
Although the majority of respondents were firmly in favour of multi-employer bargaining 
because of the stability that this gave to the labour market in die region, support for the 
extension of agreements, which is crucial to such stability, was less than one would 
expect. A majority were in favour of the extension of agreements but a large minority 
were either against or were equivocal about extension. This finding is interesting in itself, 
but becomes even more interesting when one examines the composition of this minority. 
Nine of the seventeen respondents that were against or were equivocal about extension 
were members of the employers' associations (including two 'leading' members). 
57 One respondent did not answer this question. 
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The main argument against the extension of agreements was a principled one, i.e. firms 
should in principle not be bound by an agreement that they had played no part in 
negotiating. Undecided em lo ers tended to either be i norant of the issue of extension or 
woulcl-not--Gomtni~es~~e_there were "pro'~_con~he 
conditions_stipula~p~s ~~aLthere-.shGuld--be-cc;msultatioII-with 
nort-pagies, tha! Jh~ ,pfilj:i~s. ITlust be suffici~!_!tly rel?..~esent-atiy_e,_ an~aLthe-exttmsion 
---~ - ... - . - , .. -- ·---~--
must be-fair. Respondents differed as to whether these conditions were in fact being met in 
the case of the extension of the existing industrial council agreement. 
One possible explanation for the relatively low support for the extension of the agreement 
is that m~gloy_e_rs_are_so_fi:r:mly-entrenched_w..it.hin the.J.n§!LtutionaL.fr.amew.ork_that 
----the~e ~mwax:e_oLitsjmp_Qrtance~for_the .. stability_of.the_b.ru:gainiug sJWS!.l:lre. Many years 
. .-;<-· 
of high trade union density, an industrial council, an industry-wide closed shop, and the 
extension of the council's agreement confront many employers in the industry as a given. 
They have little comprehension of the strength or weakness of alternative statutory 
frameworks and the practical advantages (or disadvantages) of the existing framework are 
therefore easily ignored or overlooked in favour of principled positions:___ 
This explanation is borne out by the attitudes of many employers to their membership of 
the employers' associations. Many members of the CCMA or CK.IA were somewhat 
perplexed when asked why they were members. Often the explanation was simply that the 
firm had always been a member and this had never been questioned, or they joined because 
they thought they had to, or they didn't know why they had joined and still remained 
members. Furthermore, the link between membership of the associations and support for 
multi-employer bargaining was seldom made by members. 
5.6.10 Productivity incentive schemes 
Deaton and Beaumont make reference to the argument by Flanders that where 
productivity incentive schemes or payment by results systems are in place, multi-employer 
bargaining cannot be conducted. Employers with these schemes should therefore favour 
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enterprise bargaining. Deaton and Beaumont found, however, that there was no 
association between incentive schemes and either enterprise or multi-employer 
bargaining.(1980: 206-212) 
Almost half of the firms in the sample had incentive schemes covenng some or all 
workers, either on an individual or group basis, and the influence of these schemes on 
preferences is examined in Table 12. 
Table 12. Productivity incentive schemes58 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Productivity Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
incentive scheme (Reg/Nat) 
No scheme 23 17 2 I 3 
Some or all workers 18 14 I 2 1 
Total 41 31 3 3 4 
A chi square test reveals that there is no significance at the 0,01 level (x2 = 0,41). This 
means that the existence of these schemes did not have an influence on preferences for 
enterprise bargaining and supports the finding of Deaton and Beaumont. This finding is 
interesting because labour productivity emerged as one of the most important concerns of 
employers in the industry. High absenteeism, indifferent employee attitudes to work, the 
lack of a competency or skills-based grading system, and substantial wage increases in 
recent years, were factors frequently cited by employers for what they perceived as a 
productivity crisis in the industry. 
Industry-wide minimum wages were seen by some respondents as the root of this 
problem: 
58 One respondent did not answer this question. 
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The problem with the minimum wage structure is that it removes a large 
part of your ability to pay merit. .. At the rate wages have been increasing it 
has caught up with productivity levels... So the bad operators are already 
earning too much, so it to a large extent removes your ability to pay the 
good operators above. 
Despite this dissatisfaction most employers did not see enterprise bargaining, where wage 
increases can more easily be linked to productivity increases, as a viable altemative.59 In 
fact, a number simply supplemented the industrial council minimum wages with additional 
productivity incentives to reward more productive workers. Table 12 shows that this 
practice had not caused a significant swing in favour of enterprise bargaining. One 
explanation of this is that these incentives are not usually negotiated with the union. They 
are either introduced unilaterally or after consultations with workers and shop stewards. 
5. 7 Conclusion 
In 1991 the overwhelming majority of Western Cape clothing employers supported the 
continuation of multi-employer bargaining at the regional level. The major reasons for 
employers favouring regional multi-employer bargaining were convenience and democratic 
control, labour and product market considerations, the power of SACTWU, distrust of the 
union, and the benefit funds administered by the industrial council. But these 
categorisations of the reasons for supporting this level of bargaining should not obscure 
the diversity of employers' perceptions with regard to this issue. It must be emphasised 
that the respondents gave different combinations of reasons for favouring this level of 
bargaining and prioritised their reasons differently. There was, furthermore, considerable 
confusion and contradiction in the way that many respondents thought about this issue. 
This reflects the complexity of the issue as well as the limited understanding that many 
employers had of the pro's and con's of alternative levels of bargaining. 
The examination of the association of infrastructural and institutional variables with 
• 
aggregate preferences for different levels of bargaining, confirmed some of the findings of 
59 Note that one of the employers who was in favour of enterprise bargaining cited as a reason that 
it would allow wage increases to be linked to productivity improvements. 
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large-scale quantitative studies but contradicted many others. The size of firms, for 
example, was an important determinant of support by many smaller firms for multi-
employer bargaining but was not associated with support by the larger firms for enterprise 
bargaining. The major reason for the divergence of preferences from the logic imposed by 
infrastructural determinants emerges in the interviews. Employers' perceptions with regard 
to this issue are context-specific and deeply influenced by the history and dynamics of the 
regional bargaining structure that had existed since the 1930s. Furthermore, their 
perceived interests as employers are coloured and distorted by the social values that they 
acquire as members of the wider society. 
A further important influence on employers' perceptions was their participation in the 
employers' associations. Not only do the interviews show that the associations play a 
significant role in shaping preferences, they also show that decision-making about the level 
of bargaining is ultimately a political process in which the differential power and access to 
resources of employers plays a fundamental role. The strong associational tradition in the 
industry in the Western Cape appears to contain much of the dissatisfaction that the 
politics of decision-making in the associations gives rise to. In addition, many employers 
are reliant on the associations to give them strategic direction in the field of industrial 
relations, even if they do not always believe that this is in the best interests of their firm. 
The next chapter focusses in greater detail on the collective decision-making process 
within the employers' associations when it examines the response of members of the 
CCMA and CKIA to SACTWU's demand for national bargaining. This chapter emphasises 
a simple point: multi-employer bargaining of necessity means collective action by 
employers and multi-employer decision-making. The dynamics of this process is therefore 
a key factor in understanding employers' perceptions of alternative levels of bargaining. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS LEADING TO NATIONAL BARGAINING 
6.1 Introduction 
The majority of employers in the sample (including all the members of the Executive 
Committees of the CCMA and CKIA and 84% of other members) supported regional 
bargaining. As one would expect, this was the position of the employers' associations in 
1991.60 However, a number of key employers did acknowledge that national bargaining 
was probably unavoidable, although they argued that it would take three to five years 
before employers would agree to participate in such negotiations. One of the strongest 
opponents stated that "in five years time we will have a national industrial council but. .. it's 
in our interests to fight it all along the way". Another argued that "the thing might start 
turning in three years time and we may see something tangible develop from there". 
During the course of the annual negotiations in mid-1992 (within one year of the above 
interviews being conducted), the employers' associations in the Western Cape agreed in 
principle to take part in national negotiations in 1993. Participation was, according to 
employers, to be on a trial basis and agreement to the formation of a national industrial 
council would be subject to an evaluation of the experience of national bargaining. After 
the 1993 negotiations the employers' associations agreed in principle to the formation of a 
national industrial council by 199 5. 
6.2 The decision-making process within the CCMA and CKIA 
Why was there such a comprehensive turnaround on the part of employers in the Western 
Cape? Members of the CCMA or CKIA were asked in 1995 what their reasons had been 
for agreeing to national bargaining in 1992.61 In addition to the respondents own reasons, 
a number of factors that could have contributed to members changing their attitudes were 
60 See above at pp. 45-48. 
61 Because there were only two members of the GMA in the sample in 1995, this section will focus 
primarily on the perceptions of members of the CCMA and CKIA and the decision-making process 
within these organisations. 
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put to the interviewees for their comment. Respondents were also asked to comment on 
the decision-making process within the associations around this issue. However, before 
dealing with this process it is necessary to discuss the broader politics of decision-making 
in the CCMA and CKIA. 
6.2. l The politics of decision-making in the CCMA and CKIA 
The 1991 interviews with employers pointed to certain tensions within the associations. 
The focus of those tension was the Executive Committee, which was seen as the vehicle 
through which big firms dominated the associations. At the same time, the members of the 
Executive appeared to be able to reconcile the tensions through their greater knowledge of. 
issues and more active involvement in the affairs of the associations. The CCMA and 
CKIA did not therefore simply represent the aggregation of individual member's opinions, 
but had an important role in moulding those opinions. This explains how the tremendous 
diversity of members' opinions is pulled together into a coherent policy. 
This is, however, not to say that collective decision-making was an unproblematic process. 
The interviews reveal that it was fraught with contradictions and centrifugal tendencies. 
The following quote indicates some of the fault-lines in the CCMA and CKIA: 
We have difficulty here in the Cape trying to get consensus amongst 
employers ... it's a circus. You've got a wide variety of opinions - you've got 
the small guys and you've got the big guys, and the small guys think that 
the interests of the big guys are different to theirs. You've got your old 
school thinking and your new school thinking. You've got your knitwear 
and clothing with totally different opinions, and the clothing guys think that 
the knitwear guys shouldn't be part of the association. Then you've got 
differences between the guys who export and the guys that don't export, 
and you've got tremendous tensions between them. 
The difficulty of decision-making was not only the result of differing interests amongst the 
employers, for example between small and big firms. It also arose from the way in which 
employers participated in the organisations. Many clothing and knitting employers in the 
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West em Cape appear to demand a vigorous and combative form of participatory 
_democracy. A member of the Executive Committee stated: 
The reality of the employer constituency as opposed to the employee 
constituency is the simple fact that the employer constituency consists of a 
lot of chiefs and very few indians, and the employee constituency is quite 
the opposite. You've got owners of businesses, you've got l\ID's of 
businesses ... and they want to have their say. And they are people with firm 
views. Whether they are right or wrong, emotional, ill-informed, or 
whatever, is not the point, they have firm views. When they are at their 
businesses, what they say or decide as a rule goes, and hence they are not 
people that are made for compromises. And if some other guy stands up 
and holds a different view, he sees it as a direct insult or assault on him ... 
So it is far more difficult to get consensus on mandates within the 
employers' structures than within the trade union's structures. And on top 
of that, within the employers' structures you don't have the same 
convergence of interests and overlap of interests as you have with workers. 
This respondent went on to argue: 
Employers' organisations are more democratic than trade unions for the 
simple reason that each employer that comes to a general meeting of an 
employers' association is the captain of his own ship and he is used to his 
opinion carrying the day. And he is certainly not used to someone else 
telling him how and in what manner and the amount he must pay a sizeable 
chunk of his operating profit. And here he is sitting at a meeting where 
guys that have nothing to do with his business are telling him this. The 
debate is very intense and it is very difficult to get consensus, and the 
moment you have got consensus it is very rigid and sensitive to 
disturbances. 
Consensus, rather than voting, was nevertheless the way in which almost all decisions of 
the CCMA and CKIA were reached. But what explains this ability to reach consensus 
given the diversity of interests and the nature of participation by members? A partial 
explanation is that, despite the above quotes, there are a large number of relatively passive 
members who observe debates rather than participate in them, and who readily follow the 
recommendations of the Executive Committee. As one such respondent noted: 
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Ten percent of the people there do ninety percent of the talking and it's 
always the same guys, but we allow them to dominate. 
So the vigorous debate tends to be concentrated amongst a smaller group of the 'leading' 
members. What then explains the consensus achieved amongst these members? Again, it 
seems that the position of the Executive Committee as the key locus of decision-making 
for the associations and the responsibility that its members feel towards the industry as a 
whole, is a key factor. An Executive Committee member stated: 
When you sit in the Executive Committee meeting you must look after the 
best interest of the industry but not your own. 
Combined with this is the strength of the associational tradition amongst members. 
Ultimately, members see the way that the majority of 'leaders' are moving and feel 
compelled to follow in the interests of the association as a whole, even if this is done 
somewhat reluctantly. 
The CCMA and CKIA has in recent years taken steps to address the perception of 
dominance by a handful of firms and increase participation by all members in the 
organisation. In 1991 some 'leading' members referred to caucuses that had existed some 
years before within the Executive Committee (the so-called "dagbestuurskomitee" and the 
"special interest group"). These had comprised the "big players" and had reportedly 
caused considerable dissatisfaction amongst members. Both had been disbanded. In a 
further move away from such politics the associations had sought to improve 
communication and members' involvement by setting up local committees in a number of 
areas in the Western Cape. 
Furthermore, in the period between 1991 and 1995 the Executive Committee had been 
expanded informally to increase participation by firms. A number of respondents had seen 
this as part of a process of getting rid of the "old guard" and infusing "new blood0 into the 
Executive. A 'leading' member argued strongly that the associations functioned extremely 
democratically: 
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Every member has a voice and there is consensus or a vote, and even if you 
are a vociferous minority they won't move without checking you out. So 
there is no rubber stamping going on ... There has to be transparency in our 
association. 
But these changes, and the consensus that is reached on most issues, had not eradicated 
the perceptions of some members of dominance and consequent feelings of dissatisfaction. 
Such tensions are, however, evident in most organisation and can be seen as a necessary 
evil of collective decision-making. One 'leading' member · argued that in the case of 
collective decision-making by employers these tensions are exacerbated: 
The moment the guys have been forced into a consensus view it's as if they 
are all bitter about it and they have now had to give in. Because when he 
goes back to his plant he rules supreme and nobody tells him what to do. 
6.2.2 The decision-making process on national bargaining 
The process leading from the initial decision rejecting national bargaining to the decision 
to agree to the demand was a good example of the way in which the CCMA and CKIA 
functions. The demand was first raised by SACTWU not long after its fonnation in 1989. 
This was the starting point to the debate within the CCMA and CKIA over the issue, a 
debate that was to continue for about two years. A 'leading' member pointed to the role 
that key individuals had in influencing members' attitudes at the outset: 
And you also have strong individuals and people that are persuasive, 
intelligent and infonned, and they get up and they can swing the meeting, 
particularly that forty to fifty percent of your smaller manufacturers ... And 
once they developed the mindset initially when SACTWU came with that 
demand ... that's when the shutters came down. The first person that in a 
sense got up and spoke on the matter swung the meeting to a large extent 
on the basis of what is in it for us as opposed to the union... And that is 
where the difficulty started, and the rigidity set and the angst, and this 
complete caricature developed in peoples minds that centralised bargaining 
is a demon that should be resisted in all circumstances. 
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The union did not drop the demand in the face of employers' opposition and continued to 
raise_ it at annual negotiations in the regions, but it did not at that stage pursue it 
vigorously. Instead, it concentrated on trying to get greater uniformity in wages and 
conditions of employment between the regions within the existing industrial councils. 
SACTWU also called for the formation of a national consultative body, known as the 
National Forum (NF). 
At the time of the 1991 interviews the issue of participation in the NF was being hotly 
debated within the CCMA and CKIA. The associations' initial response had been to refuse 
to become a party to the NF. A 'leading' member gave the following reason: 
Because it had reason to believe that it was a tactic employed by the union 
to lure the industry into a national council - that at the National Forum 
there would in time develop a de facto situation which would make a 
demand for a national council very difficult to oppose on merit and on 
rational argument. Because it was in the wake of the industry saying no to 
a national council that the approach was made for a National Forum. So 
the employers, certainly in the Western Cape, were very suspicious of the 
motives of the union. 
Again it seems that key individuals played a major role in this response. A member stated: 
There were some very powerful speakers who were against the National 
Forum. I don't really know why they were against it... Members seem to 
have been mainly swayed by certain speakers. 
The employers' associations in the other regions agreed to participate in the NF but were 
reluctant to continue with the initial discussions without the participation of the CCMA 
and CKIA. A delegation from those regions addressed the CCMA and CKIA on the issue 
and the matter was again debated by the associations. A vote was taken and the majority 
decision was to participate in the NF subject to the following conditions: 
* The NF should not be used for collective bargaining; 
* It must not be used by the union as a vehicle to pursue its demand for a national 
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industrial council; 
* Discussions cannot lead to demands which could result in industrial action, mediation, 
arbitration or litigation; and, 
* The employers' associations reserved their right to withdraw from the NF. 
By the same token, the union reserved its right to continue to pursue its demand for 
national bargaining at the regional industrial councils. 
The NF started discussions on issues such as employment creation, training, productivity, 
and tariffs, but was soon overtaken and made redundant by the tripartite process initiated 
by the Hatty Committee. 62 Despite its short life the NF does appear to have had an affect 
on employers' perceptions. It focussed employers' minds on the national level and brought 
to their attention some of the benefits of meeting with the union at that level. 
It was about the time of the debate over participation in the NF that members of the ·core 
negotiating team' of the CCMA and CK.IA met for a day to discuss the demand for 
national bargaining. The outcome of this meeting was a decision to resist the demand for 
as long as possible. If, however, it came to a showdown with the union over the issue the 
associations would give in. A 'leading' player argued that the consensus at the meeting 
was that national bargaining "was inevitable", primarily because they believed the industry 
would not take a strike on the issue. Having reached such a conclusion, it was felt that it 
would be far better to negotiate participation in a national bargaining structure than be 
forced into one through industrial action. 
According to this respondent two of the strongest and most influential opponents of 
national bargaining were members of the 'core negotiating team' and participated in that 
meeting. He states that: 
62 The formation of the Hatty Committee and the tripartite process the followed it is discussed in 
more detail at pp. 44-45 above. 
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Two people that were extremely hostile were in a sense won over to the 
fact: Well actually it's inevitable. We don't like it but let's make the best of a 
situation that, quite frankly, if we could avoid it we would but we can't. So 
they then talk to the other four of their team of extremely hostile 
opponents, win them over and the thing becomes more palatable over time. 
This change "slowly started percolating through the employer constituency", but the 
bottom line remained that the demand would be resisted until the union pushed it to a 
showdown. 
The showdown came sooner rather than later. Prior to the 1992 negotiations SACTWU 
gave notice to the CCMA and CKIA that the demand for national bargaining was of 
primary importance and that the union were prepared to declare a dispute over it unless 
agreement could be reached at the negotiations. During the negotiations agreement was 
reached on all issues, including the wage increase, except the demand for the establishment 
of a national industrial council within a two year framework. At that point the union 
informed the employers' negotiating team that the entire agreement hinged on the 
satisfactory resolution of the outstanding issue. In other words, there was no settlement 
unless agreement could be reached on national bargaining. 
The result was that the employers' negotiating team agreed in principle to participate in 
national negotiations in 1993 on a trial basis, on the understanding that this was an 
unmandated position that would need to be taken back to the general body of the 
membership of the CCMA and CKIA for ratification. The negotiating team then reported 
back to the Executive Committees of the CCMA and CKIA, where the matter was 
debated and the decision made by the negotiating team was endorsed. A general meeting 
was then called at which the Executive Committee presented the package to the 
membership together with its recommendation that it be accepted. The matter was debated 
by the general membership and the agreement was ratified by the majority of members in a 
vote. 63 
63 The vast majority of the members in the sample, most of whom had favoured regional 
bargaining, voted for the change to national bargaining. 
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A member of the negotiating team described the process as follows: 
Our reading of our constituency is that lets concede the principle... And 
what we do is we go to our constituency and we say to them: "Guys, there 
is the whole deal. You can have that deal right now with the union's 
signature on it if you concede the principle". And that I think swings the 
whole thing. People don't sit and debate it in a vacuum ... it's real, there's a 
deal and it's actually very appetising. And they actually think what the hell 
are we arguing about. So it focusses the mind. 
Although the change was ultimately endorsed at a general meeting of the CCMA and 
CK.IA, this was the culmination of on-going debate within the associations, particularly at 
the Executive level, since the demand was first made. According to some members this 
debate had whittled away at the opposition to national bargaining. One member estimated 
that the initial 80/20 support for regional bargaining had by the final meeting reached an 
even 50/50 split. A key member acknowledged the importance of this process when he 
stated: 
I don't think there was one event that was the watershed... I think it was a 
general progression of logic, of opinion, of merit of argument. .. 
Ultimately, however, it did come down to a final meeting to decide the issue. The meeting 
was, according to the above respondent, appropriately intense: 
And it was furious debate and acrimonious and the whole story: "And I 
told you so", "and we should never have done this", etc. etc. There were 
bad feelings... So it wasn't a nice meeting. It was a major, major issue for 
the industry. 
It is not surprising, given the nature of participation in the CCMA and CK.IA, that 
perspectives on the process and the final meeting differ. An important factor explaining 
these differences is the positions held by the respondents in the CCMA and CK.IA, 
although even amongst 'equals' there were divergent opinions as to what were the key 
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moments in the process. A major player, and a strong opponent of national bargaining, 
situated the key moment within the debate at the Executive Committee: 
When Seardel decided they would go with the flow, that's when it 
happened, that's really when it happened. Yes, the core negotiating team 
got together and we discussed it and made a recommendation, but that was 
the thing that in my view swu~g it [and] told me I was fighting a losing 
battle. 
Despite his opposition, this respondent stated that "once the associations agreed to go that 
way I had to support it". Another opponent of national bargaining, who was also a 
member of the Executive Committee, highlighted the strength of the associational bond on 
individual firms: 
We had a mandate and we had our reservations. We put that on the table 
but the association is of such a nature that if the majority is against you 
then you must go with the majority view. 
A member in the same position argued that they "were quite prepared to go along with the 
majority decision" because that was "the whole strength of the CKIA and the CCMA". 
There are, however, also pragmatic considerations which account for compliance with 
majority decisions. An employer noted: 
We're a closed shop. Ifwe want to remain in the CCMA we must abide by 
the majority decision. For me to go petition the industrial council and be 
rejected, and then petition the Minister and then take my chances is too 
much of a waste of time and money ... I went along for practical reasons 
because the alternative was too much of a nuisance. 
The strong associational tradition and these institutional factors account for the fact that, 
although "a lot were against, some ofthe major employers were against", once the tide of 
opinion began to tum most members fell into line with the majority position. 
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But the sequence of decision-making on this issue (and, it seems, more generally within 
the CCMA and CKIA) was that the Executive Committee decided first and then made a 
recommendation to the rest of the membership. Furthermore, the issue seems to have been 
debated more often and more thoroughly at the Executive Committee. A member of the 
Executive stated: 
There was more debate at Executive level than at general membership level 
and by the time it had got to the general body the Executive had already 
debated and made a decision. And I don't recall that much intensive 
discussion in the general body. 
For many of the 'ordinary' members the decision about the issue therefore appeared as 
something of afait accompli. One such member stated: 
Once again it's a case of going to the meeting and the decision has almost 
been made by the five tops... Johann Baard and Peter Cragg are sitting 
there and there are eighty of us in the audience, and they would ask this 
question and the Rex Trueforms and Seardel Groups stand up and say let's 
go for it and everybody goes for it. 64 They might not agree with it but they 
will go for it ... You must remember we are taking advice from the CCMA. 
As far as we are concerned that is what we are paying them for, so they 
should be coming back to us and saying: "This is the way we should go". 
And we must respect them for that. And I think in a case like this we would 
have taken their advice and would have said this is the right way to go so 
let's go for it. 
Another member supported this assessment when he argued: 
Inevitably that's what happens in any organisation. The Executive decide on 
something and that's where it happens and that's what happens. But as far 
as I recall there was quite heated debate at the Executive level about it. The 
general body just rubber stamps really what happens in the Executive. 
He went on to state that he couldn't think of "many occasions when an Executive 
Committee proposal was overturned at a general meeting". This was echoed by another 
64 Johann Baard is the Chairman of the CCMA and Peter Cragg is the Executive Director of the 
CCMA and CI<IA. 
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respondent when he stated that "once the Executive Committee decides to go one way it 
becomes very difficult for the body to go against it". 
Despite these reservations, the vast majority of members in the sample agreed that the 
issue had been adequately debated. Many respondents pointed to numerous meetings over 
a considerable period of time at which it had been discussed. Furthermore, no matter how 
strongly the Executive Committee puts its recommendations, the general body does 
technically have the power to come to another decision. 
The perception of dominance by the Executive Committee, or by major players in that 
Committee, did nevertheless create dissatisfaction among some members about the 
decision to change to national bargaining. A 'leading' member of the CCMA stated: 
All the employers in the industry are not over the moon about this. There 
are still people who are saying: "I'll go along with it but I want it to be 
recorded that I will tell you in five years time that you will see the error of 
your ways". But they were persuaded to go along with this on the basis of 
what is happening out there. 
It is to the factors that were raised in the debates within the various strata of the CCMA 
and CKIA, and which "persuaded" members "of what is happening out there", that the 
next section turns. It must be emphasised, however, that these factors were debated within 
the context of the process outlined above and should not be seen in isolation from the 
pressures created by that process. 
6.3 Reasons for the change to national bargaining 
There were a number of reasons given for the change to national bargaining but two 
emerged as particularly important. The first reason was that national bargaining would 
lead to a national agreement that would level wages and conditions of employment 
throughout the country, thereby stopping undercutting by other regions. The importance 
of this factor has been discussed in some detail in Chapter Five and it is not necessary to 
deal with it further here. 
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The second important reason was the perception amongst many members of the CCMA 
and CK.IA that national bargaining "was inevitable". This rather vaguely expressed 
perception had a number of facets, although not all respondents expressed each of these 
when citing their reasons. The first was that SACTWU was set on securing national 
bargaining, would continue to push for this and, if necessary, call a strike over this 
demand. The effect of the constant pressure from the trade union had been noted by 
employers in 1991. One 'leading' employer, who opposed national bargaining, had stated: 
It is going to be a centralised national bargaining structure. That is what the 
union wants and that is what is going to happen. I think that it is inevitable. 
There was, however, an interesting divergence of opinion on the part played by the threat 
of a strike. A number of the 'leading' employers were generally far more pragmatic about 
the implications of this threat. A key member of the CCMA and stated: 
The bottom line was that we concluded it was inevitable. Whether we liked 
it or whether we didn't like it, it was inevitable because we concluded the 
industry would not take a strike on the issue. Whether the union would or 
would not pull off the strike was not the point~ it was not a breakpoint to 
the industry to the extent we would take a strike. Because if it was we 
would have told the union: "Up yours!" ... and have a showdown with 
them. 
Another respondent argued that a major reason was that "the clothing industry are not 
capable of taking a stand - they are irresolute" and when pushed will "always cave". 
But other 'leading' members and many of the 'ordinary' members rejected the threat of a 
strike as a factor in their decision-making on the issue. In discounting this factor one 
stated that he did not believe "rati_onal, mature employers are ever influenced by thr~ats -
they are more influenced by realities". Two 'ordinary' members gave a possible 
explanation as to why these different perceptions of the threat of a strike could have 
arisen. One stated: 
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No. Because when the union says national strike they don't mean the entire 
industry will go out on strike. What they do is that they will selectively 
target certain plants - it would be Seardel plants, Rex Trueform plants, 
those type of plants. They would achieve very little if they targeted a plant 
like ours. 
For some members, therefore, the threat of a strike was far more remote than for others 
and this probably accounted for the majority of members placing relatively little 
importance on this factor. But it is also arguable that the distance of some members from 
the realities of negotiations and direct contact with the power of SACTWU, allows for an 
element of self-deception in their response to the threat of a strike. In support of this 
contention is the perception of a 'leading' member (above) that the linking of the demand 
for national bargaining to the settlement package at the 1992 negotiations was a key factor 
in focussing members' minds on the issue and gaining their agreement. 
A second facet of the perception of inevitability was the argument that, if national 
bargaining did appear to be unavoidable employers should accept the principle and engage 
with the union over the structure as early as possible. The alternative, as they saw it, was 
to fight to the bitter end and get forced into a structure that had been established without 
their involvement. This perception was held mainly by some 'leading' members. One of 
them noted: 
What was said was: You rather be in and control the devil you know than 
be far removed from it and they can do what they like and those things then 
just get forced on you. So that's why I say we were in a way forced into it 
and went along with it eventually so we knew we would be there and 
voicing our opinions at that point. 
A third facet was the "tacit agreement from the other regions" to SACTWU's demand for 
national bargaining. A 'leading' member stated: 
I think most of the people realised that it was inevitable, if for no other 
reason than that the Cape was the only region that ended up saying we are 
against it. The other areas, Natal as an example, threatened that if the Cape 
is going to stand in the way of a deal they are not going to wait in Natal for 
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the Cape to sort out their problem. They in Natal are going to concede the 
principle. So we knew that Natal... had a mandate to concede the 
principle ... and similarly in most of the other regions, primarily Transvaal 
and the Eastern Cape. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the reasons why employers in the other 
regions gave in to the demand more easily, but their "tacit agreement" left the Western 
Cape out on a limb, a position that some members felt was untenable given the 
determination with which SACTWU were pursuing national bargaining. 
Another factor that influenced a number of members, and which also contributed to a 
sense of inevitability for some, was the process of political change that the country was 
going through. The perception of some employers was that the ANC would almost 
certainly win the future election and that its link with COSATU would result in greater 
pressure for national bargaining in all sectors. One 'leading' member stated: 
The major arguments were that we were in a transitional period and that 
the new government, which didn't exist then, would have a strong alliance 
with COSATU and they thought centralised bargaining would be one of 
the major things. Centralised bargaining was seen as one of the things they 
would drive. 
It is interesting to note that other 'leading' employers argued strongly that the broader 
political developments had no influence on members. One denied that this had ever been a 
factor in the debates, and another stated: 
Not at all. .. We already had a workable centralised bargaining mechanism 
in place and at that time COSATU were aiming mainly at those sectors 
which had no centralised bargaining. So I didn't think this industry in this 
area was a target of COSATU at the time. 
A further factor, again not agreed upon by all members, was the belief that national 
bargaining could maximise for both employers and the union "the ability of the industry to 
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be a master of its own destiny across the total spectrum of issues that are important to it". 
A key member stated: 
If central government is going to do it they are going to do it without any 
particular acknowledgement of or consideration for your particular 
industry, the pace at which you want to do it, the cost, the implications, 
etc. So the broad idea that we can maximise the autonomy of the two key 
stakeholders, labour and management, to be masters of this industry's 
destiny, became a very attractive and I think compelling argument in favour 
of swinging them. 
A national bargaining structure would therefore provide a forum for developing labour 
market as well as bipartite industrial policy, which the government would have difficulty 
opposing or altering. This perception was to some extent linked to the prospect of an 
ANC government and uncertainty as to the policies it would promote. 
A final factor for many members was the role of the decision-making process within the 
CCMA and CKIA, particularly the part played by, first, the 'core negotiating team', and 
secondly, the Executive Committee. Some of these perceptions of members have been 
dealt with above. It merely remains to emphasise that the recommendation of the 
Executive Committee was an important factor for a number of members when making up 
their own minds. Even Executive Committee members were influenced by the 
recommendation of the 'core negotiating team'. One member noted that "the leaders of the 
negotiating team made everybody believe that it was inevitable". 
The importance of the CCMA and CKIA in .moulding employers' attitudes is underlined by 
limited discussion and decision-making that took place at the enterprise on this issue. Out 
of 23 respondents, just under half had never discussed the issue of national bargaining at 
the enterprise or had only discussed the issue informally. Just over half had discussed the 
matter with the managing director or as part of a more formal process. However, the 
majority of the representatives to the CCMA or CKIA were not bound by a mandate from 
the enterprise when they attended the meeting that decided this issue. The final decision 
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was therefore left to be made by that representative on the basis of the debate at the 
associations. Even. where a clear position had been adopted at the enterprise, it was 
generally accepted that the representative would go with the majority at the CCIVIA and 
CKIA if this trend opposed the mandate adopted at the enterprise. 
The conclusion that can be drawn is that it is at the meetings of the associations that 
decisions are made by the majority of members. The contention by a key player in the 
CCMA that by the time of the final meeting on the question of national bargaining there 
was "a large floating vote", tends to be borne out by the above findings. In the case of 
most firms the decision was left to be made at that meeting, taking account of the debate 
and the recommendation of the Executive Committee. Even if one accepts the assessment 
(above) that there was a 50/50 split on the issue by the time the final meeting was held, it 
seems clear that it was the on-going debate that had led to this situation and secured the 
"big" majority at that meeting. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The determination of the level of bargaining involves questions of substance and process. 
The former questions are often difficult for employers to answer because it is hard to 
quantify the costs and benefits of an alternative level of bargaining in advance. Unless 
employers have had experience of bargaining at that level the issue is rife with 
imponderables. One employer noted in 1991 : 
So in the industry there is an element of fear of the unknown. But I think 
it's more a question of rational assessment of how the hell is it going to 
work in practical terms and what are the benefits relative to what we have 
at the moment. Is it actually worth it? 
Many employers are, however, quite ignorant of the issue and struggle to make such a 
"rational assessment". A key respondent reflected on the initial response to the demand for 
national bargaining: 
121 
You know in the past it was the fear of the unknown: Why do all the big 
conglomerates resist centralised bargaining? Are they all wrong? Why does 
Barlow Rand resist centralised bargaining? ... And that was the self-serving, 
narrow, silly kind of approach. There was no objective, dispassionate, truly 
balanced analysis of the issues, but rather a search for data and excuses that 
could strengthen their animosity to the idea. 
The logical option in such a situation is to stick with the level of bargaining that you 
know, particularly if it has worked well for many years. Employers in this situation clearly 
need a compelling reason in the form of concrete benefits or real threats as to why they 
should agree to take a leap into the unknown and agree to bargain at another level. 
Initially, neither SACTWU nor the employers themselves were able to come up with such 
a reason. 
The process tended to assume greater importance in this situation. The exercise of power, 
both within the associations and by the trade union, was a crucial aspect of this process. 
The changing balance of power in the wider society was also of importance. These 
pressures concretised the debate within the associations and together resulted in a 
compelling reason, namely that there wasn't a realistic alternative and national bargaining 
was unavoidable. The bottom line was that constant pressure from a very powerful union 
highlighted the costs of resisting national bargaining. 
Both substance and process therefore played a part in the decision to bargain at the 
national level, but power emerges as the predominant factor. However, bargaining at a 
particular level has the effect of fleshing out substantive considerations with the benefit of 
experience, which can confirm or alter employers' perceptions of the most appropriate 
bargaining level. The interviews carried out in 1995 examine those perceptions and 
changes that took place. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
EMPLOYERS' PERCEPTIONS OF BARGAINll~G LEVELS IN 1995 
7.1 Introduction 
The 1995 leg of the study of employers' perceptions of different levels of bargaining was 
based on structured interviews with 35 of the 42 clothing and knitwear employers that had 
been interviewed in 1991. Four of the original firms had closed down in the intervening 
period and three were no longer willing to participate in the research. The sample covered 
the same stratifications. as it had in 1991, although there were slight changes in the 
numbers because of the reduced number of firms in the 1995 sample and because of other 
changes that had taken place. 
Respondents were asked to choose their preferred level of bargaining, as well as state their 
reasons for this preference. In addition to the respondents own reasons, a number of 
statements (by and large the same as 1991) in support of bargaining at that level were read 
to the interviewees for their comment. They were also asked whether there were any 
specific negative or positive factors associated with the other levels of bargaining. 65 
The study found that employers' preferences had undergone some important changes by 
1995. There was a marked fall in support for regional bargaining (although it remained the 
most popular level of bargaining), and increased support for national bargaining and 
enterprise bargaining. 
65 As with the analysis of the 1991 data, greater weight was given to the respondents' own reasons 
for supporting a particular level of bargaining than to their prompted responses. 
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Table 13. Preferred level of bargaining: 1991 and 1995 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Year Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
or other 
1991 42 76% 7% 7% 10% 
1995 35 43% 26% 23% 9% 
% change -33 +19 +16 -1 
Table 13 indicates the fall in support for regional bargaining (-33%) from 1991 to 1995, 
and the increase-in support for national (+19%) and enterprise bargaining (+16%). 
As with the support voiced for a particular level of bargaining in 1991, the above 
preferences were not of the same strength for each firm. Again, this was an indication of 
the range of factors that employers took account of in making their choices and the 
different weighting that they gave to these factors. However, a new and very important 
influence on employers' perceptions emerged in the 1995 interviews, namely the 
respondents' experience of national bargaining. This experience varied considerably. Non-
members of the associations, for example, had little or no contact with the mechanics of 
the change and national bargaining had therefore made little difference to them. Members 
of the 'core negotiating team' were, on the other hand, intimately. engaged with those 
mechanics, which fundamentally informed their perspectives of national bargaining. So, as 
with the 1991 findings, there were varying levels of understanding of the issue. 
Another variable that needs to be borne in mind was the unavoidable introduction of new 
interviewees in the sample. This problem is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two, but it 
is necessary to repeat that ten of the 1995 interviewees were new. The impact of these 
new interviewees was not significant in the case of five of these firms, but at the remaining 
five firms the change in the interviewee did have some effect. This is an unavoidable 
problem in longitudinal studies of firms and is dealt with here as a variable of change. 
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Where this variable is seen as relevant its effects will be highlighted in the discussion 
below. 
The same procedure for analysing employers' preferences was followed as in Chapter Five. 
The major reasons for favouring particular levels of bargaining are grouped together and 
discussed. This section is structured in much the same way as the corresponding section in 
Chapter Five. The reasons for supporting each level of bargaining are dealt with 
sequentially, with the sub-section that deals with the reasons for favouring regional 
bargaining being further sub-divided into the reasons for supporting multi-employer 
bargaining as opposed to enterprise bargaining and the reasons for supporting regional 
rather then national bargaining. In addition, changes in the reasons given by respondents 
are also discussed. 
The next section in the chapter deals with the relationship between selected variables and 
preferences for each level of bargaining. This section also examines the relationship 
between these variables and aggregate changes in preferences. 
7.2 Reasons for supporting regional bargaining 
Two of the major reasons for supporting regional bargaining in 1991, namely convenience 
and labour market considerations, remained largely unchanged. Perspectives on the issue 
of power had, however, changed significantly, and there had been certain changes in 
attitudes to the union. Finally, the importance of benefit funds as a factor behind support 
for multi-employer bargaining declined substantially. These reasons and the changes are 
discussed below. 66 
One broad change needs mention at this point. The experience of three years of national 
bargaining tended to focus respondents attention on the regional versus national 
66 It should be emphasised that the preference for regional bargaining did not point to a likelihood 
of employers undermining or resisting national bargaining. Generally, respondents acknowledged 
that in the circumstances there was no alternative to national bargaining and were committed to the 
agreement to bargain at that level. 
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bargaining comparison rather than the enterprise versus multi-employer bargaining 
comparison. The discussion that follows will by and large reflect that shift in focus but will 
not ignore the enterprise level alternative. 
7 .2.1 The nature of the labour and product markets 
7.2.1.1 Enterprise versus multi-employer bargaining 
Respondents generally accepted the importance of multi-employer bargaining for 
stabilising the labour market and expressed themselves in very similar terms to those that 
they had used in 1991. So, for example, a CMT operator stated that if bargaining was 
"firm by firm we would go mad; if Rex Trueform gave Rl0,00 more we would have no 
staff''. 
There were also those who supported multi-employer bargaining but were dissatisfied with 
certain effects that it had on the labour market. One· argued that multi-employer bargaining 
had "an averaging out effect" that pushed up the wages of less skilled workers and 
restricted his ability to pay more to highly skilled workers, who he wanted to attract. 
These disadvantages were, however, outweighed by the benefits of multi-employer 
bargaining. 
There was one important development that had impacted on employers' perceptions. A 
number of respondents made mention of the growth of the informal clothing sector within 
the jurisdiction of the industrial council in the Western Cape.67 However, their responses 
to this development differed. One employer viewed it negatively, clearly seeing it as 
something of a threat. He believed (incorrectly) that the huge suburb of Mitchells Plain 
was no longer covered by the industrial council and queried the implications: 
67 A study done in 1994 quoted the chairperson of the CCMA as estimating that 40% of clothing 
(in volume terms) manufactured within the jurisdiction of the industrial council was being 
produced by unregistered (informal) clothing firms.(Theron, 1994: 11) The spokesperson for the 
GMA claimed, when interviewed in 1995, that there were 16 000 sewing machines being operated 
in the informal sector in Mitchells Plain. 
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And now Mitchells Plain is not covered. Are there not going to be 
sweatshops there? And what hours will they work? Will they get the wages 
they are supposed to get? 
On the other hand, two respondents saw this development in a more positive light. One of 
them argued: 
As the small enterprise segment of the industry becomes increasingly 
important, and the previously disadvantaged become owners of businesses, 
they need to be less regulated and not more. There is a huge informal 
clothing industry in Mitchells Plain operating in garages and to regulate 
them means reducing jobs. So de facto there are small enterprises operating 
in a totally unregulated environment and to want to regulate them... is not 
appropriate for this country now. 
These respondents echoed the deregulationist strand in the current debate over 
employment creation, the small enterprise sector and labour regulations. What is 
interesting to note is that they did not see the burgeoning informal section as a threat to 
labour market stability or multi-employer bargaining. On the contrary, they believed that 
the industrial council should be excluding these firms in order to foster their viability. 
7 .2.1.2 Regional versus national multi-employer bargaining 
The perception that each region had a distinct labour market and its own economic 
circumstances was still very prevalent in 1995. Experience of the way in which these 
differences impacted on bargaining in a national forum had tended to strengthen the 
preference many of these respondents had for regional bargaining. So the problems that 
employers identified as having emerged at national negotiations had strengthened these 
attitudes. 
With regard to the racial composition of the labour force, an employer stated: 
In the Western Cape you have a higher Coloured community, and it might 
sound like old history but it is different cultural groups. We are finding it 
even in our plant. You bring different strains of cultures in and it actually 
causes major problems from an industrial relations point of view. 
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One of the new interviewees repeated the racial stereotyping that had been expressed in 
many of the 1991 interviews: 
There are different people living in different areas and having worked in 
Zululand and all over I can see that it's just not feasible... Even in the 
Zululand area compared to Durban there are two different schools of 
thought. In Northern Zululand you have mostly Zulus and their thinking 
and how they work and how they live is totally different to in Durban 
where you have mainly Indian ladies on a different dexterity level and 
intelligence level. You can't compare, they are different people. You even 
need a different method of manufacture. 
But it was not just a question of the composition of the labour force. A number of 
respondents believed that there was a broader set of circumstances and problems that were 
unique to each region. One stated that "every region has its own problems and people 
living in regions have different needs". Another respondent argued, with the hindsight of 
three years of experience of national negotiations: 
There are differences in the style of management and the way the 
associations deal with problems, there are differences in the labour force, 
differences in the economic situation ... [and] the union officials you deal 
with in the different areas. 
There was a sense that employers could respond to and deal with these problems more 
easily through regional bargaining: 
One has greater control in your own area, and the various areas have 
different problems and it's probably easier to sort out your own problems in 
each area. 
These perceptions generally show little change to those expressed in 1991. But 
respondents were more conscious of the problems that these differences had on the 
process of negotiating at the national level. This primarily boiled down to a difficulty, 
anticipated by some employers in 1991, of employers producing a unified position at 
national negotiations given the regional differences that existed. According to one 
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respondent "there was more fighting amongst employers because at national we all have a 
different set of bases we are coming ofP'. This was the major problem identified by 
respondents with national bargaining. 
The 'leading' members of the CCMA and CK.IA were far more aware of this problem than 
those members who were less involved. One 'leading' employer stated that "for the people 
that participate in the negotiations it is a major frustration", but that "the people who don't 
are not that aware". He went on to outline the problem: 
To get a CCMA mandate is one thing. To then go to a national employer 
caucus and marry five or six different associations' mandates into one and 
then go back to your regions to get ratification for the compromises you 
have made - it is just such a ball-ache you can't believe it. 
As negotiations progress and new mandates need to be fashioned, this problem, according 
to the above respondent, becomes more complicated: 
It makes it very difficult to report back in four, five or six separate centres 
and to coordinate the direction of debate. So what would happen is the 
employer representatives sit nationally and we would have different 
viewpoints as to whether we could carry a particular point with our 
members. Then we would ... all report back. But what happens in practice -
there is a separate meeting in Natal. .. the same in the Eastern Cape, the 
same in the Western Cape and the same in the Transvaal. The outcome of 
those general meetings then get consolidated into a national employers' 
caucus and you find that you still have differences, they just are different... 
you still don't have a mandate that is compatible. Now how the hell do you 
actually do that ... If you are sitting in one meeting you see that there are a 
range of differences and you can actually direct the discussion towards a 
consensus position. But if you don't know what is busy happening in Natal 
or the Cape or whatever you still end up with these damn differences. 
Viewed from the perspective of the ordinary members, this process is equally problematic 
because they feel that they are forced into certain positions by the compromises being 
reached at the national level. One stated: 
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It is a major problem. Like they [the negotiators] come back to us and say: 
"We are at this point now". So we said: "But we said our mandate was 
that". [They say] "No, but three regions have already agreed to that". So 
we said: "Why ask for a mandate - just do it then ... " You get overridden in 
circumstances like that. 
In addition to the differences in economic circumstances in the regions, the existing 
regional agreements differ. The practical effect of these differences at national negotiations 
was pointed to by one respondent: 
For example, the annual bonus is a problem in the Cape but not in Natal 
because they already have it in their agreement, and other problems 
working the other way. So issues become issues that are not always 
relevant to your region and it becomes very frustrating if negotiations are 
held up over issues not affecting your region. 
This respondent claimed that the 1995 negotiations "nearly went off the road as a result" 
of one such difference. 
The tensions within the national employer caucus were not rooted only in differing 
regional circumstances or conditions of employment. A number of respondents noted that 
personalities played a role in dividing employers as well. One stated: 
I get a bit worried sometimes with personality clashes in it... I saw 
personality clashes. And possibly on our manufacturer's side we couldn't 
agree on national issues so we had to iron out a lot of internal differences; 
different nuances in different provinces. And we had a lot of grief there 
amongst ourselves to get this common agreement... But basically I saw 
personality clashes and differences amongst the associations ... 
Another interesting point is that 'leading' employers differed as to whether the regional 
differences and the tensions that these caused in the national employer caucus would 
disappear over time. One key respondent highlighted the divisions in the employer caucus 
at the 1995 negotiations, claiming that the "employers were in complete disarray" and that 
some regions had broken out of the employers' caucus during the negotiations. According 
130 
to this respondent these tensions would not be overcome in the years ahead because the 
divisions reflected the economic realities in the various regions. But another 'leading' 
respondent argued that "in the end it will iron itself out in the years to come". This 
prognosis was elaborated upon by another 'leading' respondent: 
It must improve. I mean your logic tells you it has to improve. Practice 
makes perfect... The more you do something the better you get at it and 
you find where the short-cuts are, you don't necessarily repeat the same 
mistakes over and over again, you get to know individuals better, you 
know what makes them tick and you know what makes them the hell in ... 
You build a better sense of a team spirit and a togetherness ... 
This raises the issue of what had happened to the regional variations in terms of 
employment, particularly wages, after three years of national bargaining. The question is 
an important one because the equalisation oflabour costs throughout the country had been 
one of the strongest arguments for national bargaining for many respondents in 1991. 
It appeared that national bargaining had made little impact on differences that existed in 
regional agreements. There are a number of reasons for this and employers responded to 
this issue in different ways. Firstly, although bargaining was conducted at the national 
level, a national industrial council had not yet been established. So the agreements reached 
at the National Bargaining Forum (NBF) were referred back to the existing regional 
industrial councils and were gazetted as regional agreements. The areas falling outside of 
the jurisdiction of those councils were therefore not covered by the provisions of the 
agreements reached at the NBF. So rural areas, 'decentralised' areas and the areas that 
previously fell inside the borders of what had been the TBVC states had been largely 
unaffected by national bargaining. 
For one employer this failing was the main reason for supporting regional bargaining. In 
other words, his preference would have been for national bargaining if this had secured 
uniformity in conditions of employment throughout the county. He stated: 
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National level at the moment is only controlling those firms that fall under 
industrial councils. But those that don't, like Newcastle and Babelegi and 
all the other places that don't fall under industrial councils... are paying 
forty percent of the wages everybody else is paying ... If we all came off the 
same base national would be better - it would take away the unfairness of 
competition. 
Because of this problem the respondent remained a supporter of regional bargaining. 
It seems unlikely that these differences are going to be eradicated in the short-term, even if 
a national industrial council (NIC) is formed. The line being taken by employers in 
negotiations over the constitution for the NIC was that its jurisdiction should initially 
comprise only the jurisdictions of the existing regional councils. New areas, they argued, 
should only be incorporated as and when the parties were representative in those areas. 
Agreements of the NIC would therefore probably not immediately solve the problems of 
undercutting by firins in certain regions. 
The second reason why national bargaining had made little impact on the differences 
between regions, concerned the areas falling within the jurisdictions of the five regional 
industrial councils. These can be divided into two categories. Firstly, there are the major 
regions, namely the Western Cape, Natal and Gauteng (previously Transvaal), where wage 
parity had almost been achieved prior to national bargaining. Then, secondly, there are the 
Eastern Cape and the Northern Cape/Free State regions, where wage rates lagged well 
behind those in the major regions. 68 It is important to emphasise, however, that besides the 
wage rates there were many other differences in terms and conditions in the regional 
agreements. 
The employers' associations and SACTWU had developed a creative way of achieving 
some sort of uniformity for national negotiations, but allowing flexibility at the regional 
level for dealing with the variations and peculiarities in the existing agreements (and 
therefore reducing the friction those differences could cause at the national level). The 
68 See footnote 4 7 at p. 66 above for the regional wage differentials that existed in 1991. 
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principle decided on was that the total labour cost package agreed at the national level 
must be the same for all the regions. But the regions could divide up this package in a way 
that they felt best suited the needs of that region. So, if a ten percent increase in labour 
costs is agreed at national negotiations this applies equally to all five regions, but they can 
agree separately how much of this goes to increase wages, how much goes to additional 
annual leave, how much goes to increase benefit fund contributions, etc. The nett effect of 
this model has been to by and large entrench the existing regional disparities in labour 
costs.69 
In the major regions this was not a serious issue because labour costs were reasonably 
close. Furthermore, there was a "broad commitment" by the parties at the national level 
that in "comparable circumstances in urban areas ... certainly let's say between Durban and 
the Cape and Transvaal... where there are currently disparities in terms of total labour 
cost. .. that we should move towards parity there". But this left the remaining regions with 
' 
total labour costs well below those in the major regions. 
It was the latter divide that confirmed some employers in their support for regional 
bargaining and heightened the dissatisfaction of others with national bargaining. On the 
one hand, for some respondents the acceptance of regional disparities by the union was an 
acknowledgement of the argument that they had been making all along for regional 
bargaining. One 'leading' employer, who was strongly in favour of regional bargaining in 
1991 and 1995, stated: 
That was the union's view from the start - one wage across the board - but 
at the beginning of this year they forsook that principle and said there is no 
ways they can force the Eastern Cape to up their levels to those of the 
Western Cape. 
69 A few respondents noted that at recent negotiations there had been a slight narrowing (by one-
half percent) but that this was insignificant. 
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Another 'leading' respondent agreed: 
The union is trying to put across it is a national concern but I don't agree it 
is. Because we have a situation where a certain increase was agreed upon 
and each region is structuring the package for the workers in that region. 
So they are also saying that our people aren't all the same and we want to 
give them a different package one way or another. 
In effect, what these respondents were saying was that regional negotiations were now 
being conducted at a national level. One argued that "we have gone for national bargaining 
but every time they reach an agreement everything gets referred back regionally and 
you've still got four regions which can disagree". 
On the other hand, there were those respondents that had been convinced by the argument 
for uniform employment conditions throughout the country, but who were now becoming 
extremely disenchanted with national bargaining because regional disparities were 
persisting. A 'leading' member of the GMA stated: 
But the playing fields are so uneven because of the union that we as CMT's 
are being, I think, compromised unbelievably... But we are not only 
fighting the union, we are fighting other employers, the CCMA, the NCMA 
and the TCMA, 70 and particularly the Northern Cape/Free State [and] 
Eastern Cape associations, because we... have a situation where we are 
talking about national negotiations... but it's just a fallacy. It's a fallacy 
because, for example, in the Eastern Cape their wages are about thirty 
percent to forty percent lower than mine. So we all sit centrally, we all 
negotiate like hell and then the union makes an agreement with an area 
whose garments go into Woolworths, Truworths, Edgars71 the same as 
mine do ... If it's national then let's make it national ... 
In 1994 a Parity/Disparity Sub-committee was set up by the NBF to address the issue of 
regional and urban/rural disparities. The parties effectively accepted the principle of labour 
cost disparity in the industry but must still agree on how this will be structured in practice. 
70 The NCMA is the Natal Clothing Manufacturers' Association and the TCMA is the Transvaal 
Clothing Manufacturers' Association. 
71 Woolworths, Truworths and Edgars are major retail groups. 
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While an agreed framework for disparities, perhaps with timetables for reducing those 
differences, might satisfy some employers, it is clear.that for others the main argument for 
national bargaining has been undermined. 72 
The risk of being drawn into national disputes because of problems that arose in other 
regions remained an important consideration for many employers. This has been touched 
on above because it is one of the perceived effects of regional economic differences and 
differences in the existing regional agreements. To a large extent this consideration was 
expressed through the concern felt by many respondents about the divisions that existed in 
the national employer caucus. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that in 1995 perceptions of differing productivity levels in 
the regions did not play an important role in employers' preferences for regional 
bargaining. Respondents remained divided as to whether this was a factor for or against 
regional bargaining and overall it had slipped to the bottom of most respondents' lists of 
reasons for supporting regional bargaining. The focus had shifted instead, as we have seen 
above, to the way in which a range of perceived regional differences was being dealt with 
at national negotiations. 
7.2.2 Convenience and democratic control 
7.2.2.1 Enterprise versus multi-employer bargaining 
As with the labour market considerations, many respondents were still strongly in favour 
of multi-employer bargaining because of its convenience. A \leading' employer summed up 
this viewpoint when he stated: 
Ninety-eight percent of the manufacturers don't have the infrastructure, the 
time or the skills or the knowledge or the know-how. And most 
importantly time. Even if they had the knowledge or the know-how, even if 
the could acquire the knowledge or the know-how, they simply don't have 
72 It is interesting to note that in 1991 just over half of the 3 2 respondents that answered the 
question were of the opinion that if a national· industrial council was established there should be no 
regional wage differentials. 
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the time. Seventy percent of our [i.e. CCMA] members are small 
businesses, [employing] a hundred or less... Those guys just simply don't 
have the time, even if the union had the resources to send out two hundred 
negotiators to do that. 
Although the concern about the dominance by big firms was still evident, it had become 
muted as the focus of employers shifted to the national level. 
7.2.2.2 Regional versus national multi-employer bargaining 
Three years of national bargaining had, for many respondents, confirmed their rejection of 
national bargaining on logistical grounds. This factor was usually expressed by 
respondents as part and parcel of the mandating problems and splits in the national 
employer caucus discussed above, but there were distinct logistical concerns as well. A 
'leading' employer summed these up when he stated that most employers believed that 
national bargaining was "extremely time consuming and that the costs [were] escalating at 
alarming levels". 
However, the perception of many respondents in 1991 that national bargaining would 
exclude most employers, particularly smaller firms, from participation in the mandating 
process had not materialised to the extent anticipated. While some respondents believed 
that bargaining was more removed, others argued that there was not a great deal of 
difference in the ability of firms to participate ifbargaining was national. 
There are a number of reasons for the latter perception. Firstly, it emerged from the 1991 
interviews that many firms felt fairly remote from negotiations at the regional level, either 
because they believed the process to be dominated by a few big firms or because they did 
not participate very actively. It was evident that for some respondents the shift to national 
bargaining had not greatly changed this situation and their perceptions of this drawback 
were therefore muted. Secondly, the CCMA and CK.IA had made considerable efforts to 
keep members in touch with the negotiations through faxed reports and report-back 
meetings. Finally, the negotiating sessions moved from centre to centre and when they 
were in Cape Town members had the opportunity to attend as observers. 
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A 'leading' employer summed up the above when she stated: 
It's always closer regionally but at the end of the day you still can go to all 
the general meetings and be part of the mandating process, the CCMA 
office updates all firms on the progress of the negotiations - Peter Cragg 
[the Executive Director of the CCMA] sends out memos after each round 
of negotiations - and you can be an observer when negotiations are in Cape 
Town although you can't when they are away. A lot of firms are not really 
concerned about the process. At the end of the day they are concerned with 
the bottom line and what the wage rates are going to be - they only get 
motivated if they feel the negotiating team are going to give in to higher 
wage increases or if there is going to be strike action. 
A respondent at a fairly small firm noted with approval that "we have been invited to 
attend when it's in Cape Town - it's quite transparent". Another noted that "when they had 
a round in Cape Town they advertised for observers so that is not such an issue". 
Dissatisfaction with the 'distance' of national negotiations was concentrated mainly 
amongst 'leading' employers, who had previously been much closer to the actual 
negotiations (rather than just the mandating process), but who were now much less in 
touch. One of these respondents stated: 
It is far more removed - definitely. Where one could get far more involved 
and understand these things you are not as close to it and actually 
experience the hiccoughs of negotiations which I experienced before. 
Because they are flying all over the country and it's quite costly for 
anybody to attend, so to cut costs they've only sent up two to three people 
from each region. 
Another acknowledged that Peter Cragg kept "the parties very well informed", but he 
complained that he could no longer "participate in that cut and thrust" of negotiations. 
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~-----------------------------------------------. 
7.2.3 Relations with SAC/WU and the trust.factor 
When discussing relations with SACTWU as a factor for supporting a particular level of 
bargaining, respondents tended to focus on the choice between regional and national 
bargaining rather than between enterprise and multi-employer bargaining. One employer 
did, however, note that at enterprise level one could develop "a closer relationship with 
your bargaining partner" in which "each side understands each others problems at a far 
more intimate level". 
But the same respondent was in favour of regional bargaining and argued that compared 
to national bargaining: 
It's closer and more intimate. You work with each other the whole year, 
not only at negotiations. You see each other at industrial council level, you 
see each other at something pleasant like a retirement function at the 
industrial .council... That personal contact does help us through difficult . 
times. 
A number of respondents agreed with this opinion. One argued that "one works very 
closely with the region~ union structure and you don't know the union in other areas, so 
one builds up a relationship but you lose that in national bargaining". Another respondent 
noted, however, that there were pro's and con's on this point: 
Yes and no. No because when you bargain nationally you bargain with the 
hierarchy of the union and that's a good thing because they know what they 
want, how far to go, and they know when to stop. But it becomes very 
impersonal because you might have negotiators from the Cape dealing with 
people from the Transvaal and they never get to know each other enough. 
Regional bargaining would probably be more amicable in that respect. You 
get to know the people and there might be more empathy for what the 
other side wants. 
The group of respondents who favoured regional bargaining were generally of the opinion 
that relations with the union were fairly good. The lack of trust of SACTWU was 
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therefore far more muted than in 1991 . A number of respondents had come to adopt a 
more pragmatic approach to this issue. One noted: 
You won't ever get a situation where there is absolute trust. The very 
nature of the conflict situation between the two parties always means that 
there is that suspicion ... It's still there but possibly it has improved, it's not 
as intense. 
Another was more convinced of an improvement in the level of trust. He stated: 
It has changed. It's definitely improved. They have matured ... and also shop 
stewards have been trained very well and I have a good relationship with 
our shop stewards. We have learnt to trust each other. 
Another agreed with this assessment and endorsed the importance of shop stewards in the 
relationship. He argued that "the relationship is strongly linked to the quality of shop 
stewards". He also noted the importance of the ability of the organiser. A two-day illegal 
strike at their factory had been resolved within an hour when a second, more experienced 
organiser had arrived to deal with the matter. 
One employer was, however, extremely angry at the illegal industrial action that took 
place during negotiations and alleged that this was organised by the union. For him the 
issue of trust remained important. He stated: 
The trust issue - absolutely still the case. Yesterday the union instructed 
their workers not to work between one and five. Absolutely illegally. They 
couldn't give a hoot about whether it is illegal or not. They felt it was time 
to put pressure on employers and that's what they did. And there are an 
increasing number of employers taking the view that they are not going to 
roll over. A deal needs to be a deal. 
Another respondent, who stated that there was still a lot of distrust between the parties, 
placed the blame primarily on the workforce rather than the union leaders. He argued that 
the union had become far more open with employers but that: 
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On the ground they have lost control. Their shop stewards override them 
totally and they have accepted that. They've come back in all honesty ... [to 
say] that they find it very difficult to sell certain of the things that they are 
negotiating. 
It is interesting to note that, contrary to 1991, the different attitudes discussed above were 
spread amongst all respondents. A concentration of distrust of the union amongst 'leading' 
employers who supported regional bargaining, was therefore no longer evident in 1995. 
7.2.4 Benefit funds 
In 1995 the provision of centralised medical and provident funds was of only moderate 
importance for employers choosing regional multi-employer bargaining. There was some 
support for the fact that many firms could not provide equivalent benefits or, in some 
cases, any benefits at the enterprise level. There was also some support for the fact that 
these funds could be administered better at the regional level. 
7.2.5 Power 
As with attitudes to relations with the trade union, when addressing the issue of power 
respondents focussed on the choice between regional and national bargaining. Two 
changes took place between 1991 and 1995. Firstly, power was no longer seen as an 
important factor in supporting regional rather than national bargaining. This probably 
reflects the realisation that the union was equally powerful at the regional and ·national 
levels. 
Secondly, unlike the 1991 interviews, but in line with perceptions of power as a factor in 
the change to national bargaining discussed in Chapter Six, a number of supporters of 
regional bargaining displayed a certain naivety on this point. Power was acknowledged as 
a factor only reluctantly or there was an attempt to deny that it played any role. One 
respondent stated: 
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agreements to non-parties. The associational tradition in the industry and the institutional 
framework therefore exerted considerable_ influence on their behaviour, if not their 
preferences. 
7.3.1 Negotiating on the basis of the.firm's ability to pay 
The preference to negotiate on the basis of the firm's ability to pay had a number of facets. 
Particularly important were changes in the environment in which firms were operating and 
strong negative perceptions of national bargaining. These factors seemed to cause the 
emergence in some respondents of an ideological aversion to aspects of multi-employer 
bargaining. However, not all the respondents who preferred enterprise bargaining were 
influenced by these factors. Furthermore, respondents expressed their reasons in quite 
different terms. 
Bargaining on the basis of the firm's ability to pay has three sides to it. All three were 
evident in the reasons given by respondents. Firstly, it can reflect a firm's difficulty in 
keeping up with the increases that are agreed at a multi-employer forum. These firms 
would therefore seek to reach agreements that enabled the firm to survive and employees 
to keep their jobs, albeit at a lower wage. Secondly, it can reflect a profitable firm's desire 
to structure a far better package of benefits for employees. This would reward more 
productive workers and act as an incentive for improvements in performance. The third 
side combines both of the above and allow firms greater flexibility in bad and good years. 
Closely allied with all three sides was the perception that employees at the enterprise 
would understand the situation of the firm far better, would be more prepared to 
compromise in the interests of the firm's survival, and that this would provide the basis for 
a better relationship between management and workers. 
Changes in the environment had impacted, in particular, on firms producing for the lower 
end of the market or producing standardised goods. The continued exclusion of certain 
regions from the ambit of national bargaining, the growing informal sector, and increasing 
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low wage competition from the Far East threatened the viability of these firms. National 
bargaining was too inflexible to accommodate the pressures faced by these sub-sectors and 
enterprise bargaining was seen as a better way of coping with this more hostile 
environment. A 'leading' employer outlined some of the frustrations felt by these firms: 
The industry is going to be decimated... and Ebrahim Patel [the Assistant 
General Secretary of SACTWU] can't understand this. I see no reason why 
it's going to be any different with the policies the union is pursuing to what 
has happened in Europe and what has happened in America and what has 
happened everywhere else in the world ... We are going to be flooded by 
imports of clothing from the East and there is no way you can compete ... 
And for people like the union... to have this continual argument about: 
We've got certain skill levels and therefore what we must do is go into 
niche markets and we must go into value-added products, and by 
implication then say that the mass volume items in the clothing chain will 
disappear ... What Ebrahim Patel has never done to his members is he's 
never told them what the effect of that is going to be on them. Now if you 
take the clothing industry and you analyse it, I would be very surprised if at 
least sixty percent of the clothing industry is not in the area that I think will 
disappear. And that is going to devastate the union and its membership, it's 
going to devastate the clothing industry, and they just cannot understand 
this. 
The important point to note is that respondents favouring enterprise bargaining saw more 
flexibility in collective agreements as the way to respond to trade liberalisation. This would 
maintain the competitiveness of local manufacturers and could also create employment 
opportunities. For example, one employer argued: 
What are you going to do with the millions of unemployed people in this 
country and the millions that are entering the workforce each year. You 
don't need to go as far as the Transkei, you can go to Khayalitsha right 
outside Cape Town. And at some stage this has to happen [lower wages 
for certain manufacturers] because if we continue with present trends we 
are going to lose our labour intensive industry. 
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Another 'leading' employer argued: 
I can open three plants in Guguletu now employing 3 000 or 10 000 people 
if there was greater flexibility on wage rates and the implications of that 
agreement on what I can and can't do. 
Most respondents did not, however, argue for complete deregulation. As noted above, the 
vast majority of employers that were in favour of enterprise bargaining supported the 
extension of agreements to non-parties. But agreements would have to be more flexible to 
retain jobs in threatened sub-sectors and to accommodate pressures for job creation. So 
these employers were not just concerned with their own firm's ability to pay. Another 
respondent argued: 
To put bargaining at a national level doesn't define the situation of a 
business. Take a business just opening up - they can't be competitive with a 
business that's been operating for five years. So national bargaining is 
cutting the grass from under the feet of people who want to start a business 
because they can't pay the minimum wage. This is where national 
bargaining has its downfall. They are looking at the majority and not at 
individual enterprises. 
For more profitable firms, particularly those producing in high-quality niche markets, the 
attraction of enterprise bargaining was to forge a close partnership with the workforce and 
to try to provide a better package than that provided by multi-employer bargaining. One 
· such respondent noted that they "would prefer not to see the union and prefer to deal with 
our people because they are [firm's name] and they know what [firm's name] is all about". 
This would not, however, "destroy the minimum rate"; in fact ."they would probably give 
better rates ... it would sometimes be far more beneficial for the workforce". 
A CMT firm more clearly reflected the ability of enterprise bargaining to accommodate the 
up's and down's of the firm's performance: 
So if the company is in a lucrative position for a year we may say: "Look 
guys we would like to do a bit better than what the market trend is". But 
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also when going through a recessionary period and people are more 
concerned about retaining their jobs, they would settle for a marginal 
increase. 
The experience of national bargaining had added to the attraction of enterprise bargaining. 
A respondent echoed the sentiments of a number of employers when he stated: 
And I say that in the context of being terribly disillusioned about the way in 
which this past negotiation has gone. Perhaps that is what is causing me to 
say that I would prefer to just do my own bloody thing ... The concerns that 
I had initially are really now coming to fruition. I actually don't believe that 
employers have had any benefit from the national bargaining structure. 
None whatsoever. And I am not saying that because of my previous views. 
I am saying that coolly analytically. I think the union has got a lot of 
benefits out of it but the benefits that the employers thought would accrue 
to them haven't happened. You know that continual pressurising of the 
negotiators through ad hoc action which the union claims is not 
orchestrated and it comes from the grass roots, and which anyone in the 
know knows is absolute bull-shit and knows the union is totally in control 
of I think that was the largest thing the employers hoped would disappear 
because we were removing the area of conflict away from the shopfloor, 
hasn't happened ... Having not got that as a benefit from moving centrally I 
can't see what benefits we have. A lot of negatives. 
Some employers' preference for enterprise bargaining was, however, not simply a reaction 
to national bargaining. Their favouring of enterprise bargaining was focussed more on the 
benefits of closer communication with the workforce and/or the ability to link wage 
improvements to productivity improvements. 
7.3.2 The relationship with SACIWU 
A second reason for favouring enterprise bargaining was that respondents believed that 
they could establish a far better relationship with the union at that level. A 'leading' 
employer expressed it as follows: 
We feel that the relationship between the employee, the union and the 
company is much more healthy when you sit around the table at plant level. 
Because when it goes to regional level [our firm) is just one issue where 
there are fifty or a hundred other companies' issues that must be dealt with. 
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So the quality of meetings between the union, the company and employees 
is much better at plant level than at the regional or national level. A much 
better relationship and much more openness and frankness. 
This perception was related to better communication and the ability to arrive at 
agreements that suited the workforce at an individual firm. The above respondent 
continued: 
So I would say the major advantages are [that] the people themselves 
understand the process much better, communication and feedback 
processes are much quicker... and less complex, and you can design an 
agreement or package that would suit the needs of your people far better. 
Another respondent agreed that a benefit of enterprise bargaining is that "from a 
communication side it is much easier, much more contained and intimate". But she 
discounted the effect that this would have on the relationship with the union: 
It wouldn't make a difference. We have a good relationship. It depends on 
how you treat them, how they will treat you. Irrespective of whether it was 
plant, regional or national we would have the same relationship. 
The attraction of better communication was for this respondent directly linked to the 
perception that this had been a particular weakness of national bargaining, at which level 
she argued there was a "lack of involvement, a lack of communication and a bit of a lack 
of understanding". 
7.3.3 Productivity bargaining 
A number of respondents believed that enterprise bargaining would have a positive effect 
on productivity. An employer stated: 
My relationship with my workforce would be a lot better, their productivity 
would be a lot higher and we would be streets ahead of where we are 
today, both them [i.e. the workforce] and ourselves ... Productivity would 
be better, attendance would be better, everything would be better. 
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This belief was, however, not supported by all respondents. One argued that "productivity 
is a managerial prerogative and it's a function of to what degree you have mechanised your 
plant to make yourself world competitive". Another took a very different line. She agreed 
that the wage/productivity link needed to be made but argued that this should not "only be 
done at plant level". Industry-wide programmes to improve employees' education and 
understanding were also necessary. 
7.3.4 Enterprise bargaining as a way of weakening the union 
There was a strong consensus amongst respondents that their preference for enterprise 
bargaining was not motivated by the argument that decentralised bargaining would stretch 
the resources of the union and dilute its power. One respondent argued that it would, in 
fact, have the opposite effect. He stated that the union's structures were ineffective at the 
local level "because of the concentration needed initially to get this whole national 
industrial council off the ground", but that this situation would improve if there was 
enterprise bargaining because "the union will be forced to have structures that are effective 
in each of the localities". 
7.3 .5 Enterprise bargaining as a way of lowering wage levels 
There was also a strong consensus that enterprise bargaining would not lead to a lower 
average industry wage. In line with the demand for greater flexibility there was a 
recognition that some firms would have lower wages but these would be balanced out by 
the firms paying higher wages. The nett effect would be an industry average at about the 
same level as that achieved through multi-employer bargaining. 
A CMT operator argued that "if you took everybody and averaged it out you'd get to 
about where we are now". Another stated that enterprise bargaining "would lead to a 
more harmonious industry and a better unit cost" but it would not "lead to lower wages". 
A 'leading' employer argued that fringe benefits at one firm might balance out higher 
wages at another: 
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I might pay a lower wage but my fringe benefits might add, in the sense 
that some guy might pay a higher wage but poor fringe benefits. What we 
stand for is to have an industrial council that is much more flexible because 
the current system is one that came out of the 1940s and 1950s. 
This issue was linked by some respondents to the need for job creation. One respondent, 
who acknowledged that enterprise bargaining would probably lead to lower wages, argued 
that "it1s all well and good the majority having a higher standard but what about the people 
with no standard of living ... Rl0,00 is better than nothing". 
7 .4 Reasons for supporting national bargaining 
There were two major reasons for nine employers supporting national bargaining but in 
many cases the respondents did not distinguish between these reasons. The most important 
reason was that the product and labour markets were national and firms throughout the 
country should be bound by the same wage rates to even out competition. The second 
reason was that a national agreement would cover areas that had previously fallen outside 
of the jurisdiction of the regional industrial councils. These were all important factors 
behind the support for national bargaining in 1991. 
It must be emphasised that not all of these respondents supported national bargaining 
because they calculated that the benefits of bargaining at this level outweighed the 
disadvantages. In some cases the choice of national bargaining was made because 
practically they saw there was no alternative. Their choice was therefore informed by the 
fact that this was the level at which the union wanted to bargain, and bargaining at other 
levels would only become feasible if there was a change in policy on the part of the union. 
Some employers therefore accepted national bargaining rather then favoured it, and they 
were as concerned about some of the problems experienced with national bargaining as 
the respondents that favoured regional or enterprise bargaining. 
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7.4.1 Levelling the playingfield<> nationally 
The strongest factor behind the support for national bargaining was that labour costs 
should be equalised nationally to provide a fair basis on which firms would compete. One 
employer argued: 
It's necessary because of the way the country was cut up before into bits 
and pieces, and some areas were development areas and wages there were 
completely out of line with the rest of the country which led to all sorts of 
abuses. Now if we are a country then everybody must pay the same no 
matter where they are - we are all on a level and we start at the same point. 
Another respondent stated that the reason was "that there would be an equitable wage 
structure right through and no unfair competition from certain areas". 
Generally these respondents were either not aware of the fact that three years of national 
bargaining had made little headway in equalising labour costs across the regions or they 
believed that this would still be achieved through national bargaining. Furthermore, they 
seemed unaware that the CCMA and CKIA was arguing for the proposed national 
industrial council to include only those areas already covered by the regional councils. A 
'leading' member of the GMA was, however, extremely frustrated with the existing 
national bargaining dispensation because it was, according to him, national bargaining in 
name only: 
If it's national then let's make it national, let's have a national industrial 
council. Then I agree with the union because then my competition is on fair 
ground. But if it's not and all those are allowed [i.e. low wage regions] then 
let me decide by supply and demand ... But don't on the one hand force me 
but my competition next door to me is not forced... So have one or the 
other but do either of them properly. 
He went on to note that these low wage regions were right on their doorstep and the 
problem was being exacerbated by the growing informal sector: 
149 
And within the Western Cape itself you've got an industrial council that, for 
example, doesn't cover Mitchells Plain74, or Kuils River, or Worcester. So 
those people do not fall under the jurisdiction of the industrial council. .. I 
mean in Mitchells Plain alone today we must have something like sixteen 
thousand clothing machines operating, where they don't fall under any 
policeman whatsoever, and they are killing the formal industry, particularly 
CMT formal industry. 
Another CMT operator went much further when he noted that there was another 
competitive threat besides the informal sector and those areas within the country that were 
not covered by industrial council agreements: 
It should not just cover that, it should also cover the whole Southern 
African aspect because there are firms just over the border in Namibia that 
are competing with us. They have an export processing zone... and they 
might have a national wage agreement but in those areas it doesn't apply ... 
I mean it's only a couple of hours from here and I know many plants have 
moved to there. And it obviously draws manufacturing away from the 
Cape. 
But the majority of the employers that favoured or accepted national bargaining did not 
express these concerns and supported the argument that national bargaining would "level 
the playing fields". 
Some of these respondents were "quite happy with things as they are on a national level". 
In most cases these were the smaller non-members who were unaware of some of the 
problems that other employers perceived or had experienced with national bargaining. But 
other respondents that supported national bargaining were very concerned about these 
problems, particularly the difficulty of the mandating process and the tensions within the 
national employer caucus; the time that national negotiations took and their expense; and 
the continuation of illegal industrial action during negotiations (together with the 
allegation that this was being orchestrated by the union). As one would expect, 
respondents differed in how they weighted these problems and also differed as to the 
likelihood of them being overcome in future. 
74 This is incorrect as Mitchells Plain does fall within the jurisdiction of the industrial council. 
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7 .5 The undecided respondents 
Two respondents were undecided about what level to bargain at and one respondent was 
against any bargaining with the trade union. Of the two respondents that were undecided, 
one was a CMT operator who was simply so ignorant of the issue that she could not make 
a choice. 75 The second respondent was a medium-sized knitwear manufacturer who saw 
his firm as operating in a particularly difficult sub-sector. He strongly favoured enterprise 
bargaining because of the ability to tailor agreements to the circumstances of the firm at 
that level. But he acknowledged that they did not have the management infrastructure or 
the time to deal with negotiations, so regional bargaining was practically the only feasible 
option (he was strongly opposed to national bargaining). He was in the end unable to 
make a clear choice one way or the other. 
The third firm, which had previously been in favour of national bargaining, adopted a 
strong anti-union stance in the 1995 interview. The respondent stated that he made it a 
condition of employment that employees do not belong to the trade union. This employer 
wanted to 'bargain' with individual employees according to their ability and performance. 
He also spoke of operating on a piece-work basis to complete certain orders over the 
weekend and how well this had suited both him and the employees. He was, however, 
rather ignorant of the industrial relations system as he stated that he was not against the 
industrial council, despite his admitted contraventions of its agreement. 
7.6 Determinants of employers' preferences 
As with the 1991 survey, the relationship between certain objective factors and 
preferences for particular levels of bargaining is eXamined. The same factors have been 
selected and their importance in determining employers' preferences in 1995 is measured. 
This allows for comparisons to be made between the 1991 and 1995 surveys and for an 
analysis of the importance of these factors in determining changes in preferences. Note 
75 This respondent had recently taken over the business from her husband (who had been 
interviewed in 1991). She could not, for example, clearly distinguish between the industrial council 
and the trade union. 
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that the aggregate preferences of respondents have been converted to percentages to take 
account of the reduction of the sample in 1995. 
7.6.1 Size of.firm 
The first determinant of preferences to be examined is the size of firms. A clear trend 
emerges in Table 14. 
Table 14. Size of firm 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Number of Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
employees or other 
91 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 
1-50 8 4 63 25 13 50 0 0 25 25 
% change -38 +37 0 0 
51-100 3 4 100 25 0 50 0 0 0 25 
% change -75 +50 0 +25 
101-250 9 8 56 38 11 38 22 25 11 0 
% change -18 +27 +3 -11 
251-500 13 10 77 60 8 10 8 20 8 10 
% change -10 +2 +12 +2 
501+ 9 9 100 44 0 22 0 33 0 0 
% change -56 +22 +33 0 
Firstly, there is a strong swing away from regional to national bargaining in the two 
smallest firm categories. Secondly, the next two categories show a stronger continuance 
of support for regional bargaining (although there has been a decline). Thirdly, there is a 
significant fall in support for regional bargaining amongst the biggest firms. The change is 
towards national and enterprise bargaining, with the latter particularly strong. 
It was noted above that the studies of Deaton and Beaumont (1980: 207-210), and 
Hendricks and Kahn (1982: 191), found an association between large firms and enterprise 
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bargaining. The trend towards enterprise bargaining in Table 14 tends to provide support 
for the thesis that bigger firms _will prefer to bargain on their own. However, this trend 
must be viewed against the strong support that these respondents previously showed for 
multi-employer bargaining at the regional level. The negative experience of national 
bargaining, discussed at various points above, had by 1995 persuaded some of these firms 
of the benefits of enterprise bargaining. This trend is, however, almost balanced by the 
swing by other large firms to national bargaining. 
7.6.2 Single or multi-plant.firms 
The trend amongst single and multi-plant firms followed, to some extent, the trend 
associated with firm size. 
Table 15. Single or multi-plant firms 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Number Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
of plants or other 
91 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 
Single plant 30 28 70 50 IO 25 IO 14 IO 11 
% change -20 +15 +4 +l 
Multi-plant 12 7 92 14 0 29 0 57 8 0 
% change -78 +29 +57 -8 
Single plant firms showed a moderate swing away from regional bargaining and gains in 
support for national bargaining. But amongst multi-plant firms there was a very strong 
swing away from regional bargaining towards national and, in particular, enterprise 
bargaining. As with the largest firm category, the experience of national bargaining 
provided some support for the thesis that multi-plant firms would favour enterprise 
bargaining.(Deaton and Beaumont, 1980: 208-210) But this was to some extent balanced 
by the swing to national bargaining. 
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7.6.3 Industrial relations management 
The employment of a specialist industrial relations manager is another factor the study 
done by Deaton and Beaumont showed will influence firms to bargain on their own.(1980: 
208-210) In 1991 this factor had little effect on employers attitudes to multi-employer 
bargaining, but in 1995 it had more significance. A strong trend towards enterprise 
bargaining amongst firms with an industrial relations manager can be seen in Table 16. 
Table 16. Industrial relations management 
Preferred level of bargaining 
IR Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
management or other 
91 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 
IR manager 7 7 86 29 0 29 0 43 14 0 
% change -57 +29 +43 -14 
No IR mgr. 35 28 74 46 9 25 9 18 9 11 
% change -28 +16 +9 +2 
It should be noted, however, that the majority of firms with an industrial relations manager 
continued to favour multi-employer bargaining. Furthermore, most of these respondents 
(including those that favoured enterprise bargaining) continued to play an important part 
in the CCMA and CKIA. This confirms the strength of the associational tradition in the 
Western Cape clothing industry, as well as the more pragmatic assessment that industrial 
relations managers brought to the question of alternatives to national bargaining. It should 
also be noted that the trend towards enterprise bargaining is to some extent balanced by 
trend to national bargaining. 
7.6.4 Sub-sector 
In 1991 different technologies, capital/labour ratios and product market conditions had an 
influence on employers' preferences for different levels of bargaining. This confirmed the 
findings in the studies by Deaton and Beaumont (1980: 207-210), and Hendricks and 
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Kahn (1982: 189). The influence was particularly evident in the support for national 
bargaining amongst CMT operators and dissatisfaction with multi-employer bargaining 
amongst knitters. There is a marked change in both of these sub-sectors in 1995. 
With regard to the preferences of CMT operators, Table 17 shows that there was a fall in 
support for national bargaining in 1995. This fall is primarily explained by one respondent's 
switch from support for national bargaining to a rejection of collective bargaining 
altogether. 76 It is inadvisable to generalise on the basis of such small numbers, but it was 
evident from the responses of other CMT operators that for them this is an attractive 
option. Some therefore see the alternatives in very stark terms: if there is not complete and 
effective regulation at the national level they will simply join their counterparts in the 
informal sector. 
Table 17. Sub-sector 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Sub-sector Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
or other 
91 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 
Clothing 27 24 81 46 0 29 4 25 15 0 
% change -35 +29 +19 -15 
Knitting 6 5 67 40 0 20 33 20 0 20 
% change -27 +20 -13 +20 
CMT 9 6 67 33 33 16 0 16 0 33 
% change -34 -17 +16 +33 
Turning to the knitters, the interviews conducted in 1995 found that the dissatisfaction 
expressed by some knitters with the multi-employer bargaining set-up had declined. This 
relative improvement in perceptions of multi-employer bargaining does not entirely explain 
the swing away from enterprise bargaining. If one examines the two firms that switched 
76 The fall in support for national bargaining is also partly explained by one of the 1991 supporters 
of national bargaining dropping out of the 1995 survey. 
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support away from enterprise bargaining, at one firm it was clearly a new interviewee that 
was the major reason for their change. 77 The other firm was somewhat anomalous. 
Whereas previously the respondent had argued that they could easily cope with 
negotiations at the enterprise, he now argued that it would be far too time consuming. To 
add to the anomaly, changes in the management infrastructure at the firm meant that in 
1995 they had more skills to deal with enterprise negotiations. 
The reason for the change in this respondent's perceptions of multi-employer bargaining 
was mainly pragmatic. The firm was a member of the CKIA and the respondent stated that 
employers "can't fight against the National Bargaining Forum". He now believed that the 
way to sort out the dominance of the clothing sector in the negotiations was for some sort 
of restructuring to take place which would allow knitters' concerns to be addressed 
separately. His response to the changes that had taken place since 1991 was therefore to 
view working within the associations as the most viable option. 
7.6.5 Product market area 
The perception that competition took place in a national product market was still 
predominant in 1995. While this factor played a role in employers' attitudes to national 
bargaining, Table IS shows that it was not overwhelmingly important and was in many 
cases outweighed by other factors. 
The significant change in Table 18 has taken place amongst the employers who perceived 
their product market to be regional or local. These were all CMT operators. The shift to 
'Undecided or other' is primarily explained by a new interviewee who was totally ignorant 
of the levels of bargaining issue and by the respondent that switched support from national 
bargaining to rejection of collective bargaining altogether. 
77 Both knitting firms that supported enterprise bargaining in 1991 changed their preference in 
1995; the knitter who supported enterprise bargaining in 1995 had previously supported regional 
bargaining. 
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Table 18. Product market area 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Product Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
market or other 
area 91 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 
National 36 29 75 45 6 28 8 24 11 3 
% change -30 +22 +16 -8 
Regional 6 6 83 33 17 17 0 17 0 33 
% change -50 0 +17 +33 
7.6.6 Location 
Only two of the three firms that were located in Atlantis remained in the sample in 1995. 
Table 19. Location of firm 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Location Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
or other 
91 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 ·91 % 95 91 % 95 
Cape Town 39 33 79 45 8 24 3 21 10 9 
% change -34 +16 +18 -1 
Atlantis 3 2 33 0 0 50 67 50 0 0 
% change -33 +50 -17 0 
The very small numbers involved make the identification of a trend hazardous, so the 
preferences of these firms will be discussed individually. Of the two firms in Atlantis, in 
1991 one had supported regional bargaining and the other enterprise bargaining. In 1995 
these firms supported enterprise and national bargaining respectively. In the case of the 
firm supporting national bargaining the change is largely explained by a new interviewee. 
The change to support for enterprise bargaining by the respondent at the other firm, is 
explained by the problems the he perceived employers had experienced with national 
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bargaining. In neither case was there any indication that location was an important factor 
in influencing their preferences. 
7.6. 7 Trade union density 
The vast majority of employees at firms in the sample were members of SACTWU. In 
1991 this corresponded with the very strong support for multi-employer bargaining, which 
confirmed the findings of Deaton and Beaumont that high union density is associated with 
multi-employer bargaining.(1980: 209-210) 
Table 20. Trade union density78 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Union Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
density or other 
91 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 
75-100% 40 32 80 44 5 25 5 25 10 6 
% change -36 +20 +20 -4 
50-74% 0 1 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% change +100 0 0 0 
0-49% 2 I 0 0 50 0 50 0 0 100 
% change 0 -50 -50 +100 
In 1995 this factor did not prevent a swing to enterprise bargaining, although this was 
balanced by the shift to national bargaining. The power of the union was an important 
reason why some employers accepted national bargaining (i.e. they 'supported' national 
bargaining because they believed that there was no realistic alternative given the policy of 
the union). This tends to confirm the use of union density as a proxy for union power. 
78 One respondent at a very small firm did not know which of his employees were union members 
and therefore did not answer this question. 
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7.6.8 Employers' as:.,ociation membership and participation 
The members of the CCMA and CK.IA followed a similar swing in preferences to the 
overall trend but, surprisingly, there was a significantly higher shift in favour of enterprise 
bargaining. A second surprise was that this trend was not followed by non-members. 
Table 21. Membership of employers' associations 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Association Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
or other 
91 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 
CCMA/CKIA 31 26 84 46 3 19 3 30 10 4 
% change -38 +16 +27 -6 
GMA 1 2 0 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 
% change 0 +100 0 -100 
Non-members 10 7 60 43 20 29 20 0 0 29 
% change -17 +9 -20 +29 
The reasons for the increased preference for enterprise bargaining in 1995 amongst 
CCMA and CK.IA members lie in their greater knowledge of and concern with the 
problems employers had experienced with national bargaining. Importantly, the 
preferences expressed for enterprise bargaining did not appear to signal an exodus of 
members from the associations. Their continued membership of the CCMA or CK.IA 
underlines the strength of the associational tradition amongst these respondents, as well as 
the pressure exerted by institutional arrangements and the power of the trade union. 
The reasons for the trend away from enterprise bargaining by non-members can be found 
in the preference shown for national bargaining by a new interviewee at one firm and by 
the non-participation by one firm in the 1995 leg of this study. This tends to confirm the 
finding of the 1991 survey that non-membership of the employers' associations did not 
necessarily mean a rejection of multi-employer bargaining. 
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The second aspect of membership of the employers' associations is the extent to which 
respondents participated in their decision-making processes. In 1991 greater involvement 
in the CCMA and CK.IA, particularly membership of the Executive Committee, 
concentrated support for regional bargaining. 
Table 22. Level of participation in the associations79 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Level of Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
participation or other 
91 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 
Minimal 5 3 60 0 0 67 0 33 40 0 
% change -60 +67 +33 -40 
N.B. meetings 6 6 67 50 17 17 17 33 0 0 
% change -17 0 +16 0 
Most meetings 8 3 88 67 0 33 0 0 13 0 
% change -21 +33 0 -13 
Executive 11 15 100 47 0 20 0 27 0 7 
% change -53 +20 +27 +7 
In 1995 there was a much greater spread of preferences. Particular noteworthy is the very 
big swing away from regional bargaining by members of the Executive Committee and by 
members who participated only minimally in the associations. While the Executive 
category showed an increase of support for national bargaining, it is interesting to note 
that this support was limited. Much more support was shown for enterprise bargaining in 
1995. This probably reflects the disenchantment felt by members close to the negotiations 
with the experience of national bargaining. 
79 In 1991 only members of the CCMA or CKIA were included in this table and one did not answer 
the question, hence the total of 30 respondents. In 1995 members of the GMA were added but one 
respondent again did not answer the question, so the total is 28 respondents. Note that the increase 
in the number of Executive Committee members in 1995 reflects the expansion of this body after 
1991. 
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It must be emphasised, however, that according to a number of members of the Executive 
Committee the CCMA and CKIA remained committed to making national bargaining 
work. These members contended that their agreement to engage in national bargaining 
bound them to bargaining at that level despite their preference for enterprise bargaining. 
The 1991 interviews pointed to the Executive Committee playing an important role in 
influencing the attitudes of other members on the levels of bargaining issue. The 
differences in preferences within this body in 1995 probably explains some of the spread 
amongst the rest of the members. 
7.6.9 Extension of agreements 
The majority of respondents continued to support the extension of industrial council 
agreements to non-members. 
Table 23. Extension of agreements 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Extension Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
of agreements or other 
91 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 
In favour 24 23 79 43 8 30 0 17 13 9 
% change -36 +22 +17 -4 
Against 8 5 50 40 12 0 25 40 12 20 
% change -10 -12 +IS +8 
Undecided 9 6 89 50 0 17 11 33 0 0 
or conditional 
% change -39 +17 +22 0 
There are two points of interest in Table 23. Firstly, support for the extension of 
agreements tends to be associated more with support for multi-employer bargaining and 
opposition to the extension of agreements tends to be associated with support for 
enterprise bargaining. These associations were evident in 1991 and became more 
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significant in 199 5. This is to be expected, although it must be noted that there were still 
supporters of multi-employer bargaining that were against the extension of agreements. 
Secondly, it is interesting to note that in 1995 none of the respondents in favour of 
national bargaining were against the extension of agreements, although one's support for 
extension was conditional. This tends to reflect the concern of many of these respondents 
that the labour market should be more effectively regulated to eliminate low wage 
competition from areas not covered by industrial councils and from the informal sector. 
7.6.10 Productiviry incentive schemes 
In 1991 productivity incentive schemes or payment by results systems did not correspond 
significantly with a preference for enterprise bargaining. A very clear trend associating 
these schemes with a preference for enterprise bargaining emerges in 1995. 
Table 24. Productivity incentive schemes80 
Preferred level of bargaining 
Productivity Total firms Regional National Enterprise Undecided 
incentive scheme or other 
91 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 91 % 95 
No scheme 23 17 74 41 9 35 4 12 13 12 
% change -33 +26 +8 -1 
Some or all 18 17 78 47 6 12 11 35 6 6 
workers 
% change -31 +6 +24 0 
On the one hand, firms without productivity incentive schemes showed a stronger 
preference for national bargaining, and, on the other hand, firms with such schemes 
showed a stronger preference for enterprise bargaining. The latter trend had not 
undermined national bargaining in practice, but the swing in preferences adds some 
credence to Flanders' argument (referred to by Deaton and Beaumont) that the operation 
80 In 1991 and 1995 this question was not answered by one respondent. 
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of productivity incentive schemes contradicts multi-employer bargaining.(Deaton and 
Beaumont, 1980: 206-207) 
The trend largely reflects the growmg concern by some employers to respond to 
competitive threats through greater efficiency and higher productivity rather than purely 
through wider or more effective labour market regulation. One respondent stated: 
All we do is pay more wages but there is no more output, absenteeism 
doesn't improve, and the commitment doesn't improve. And all that is 
happening is that we are just inflating and prices are going up and we are 
selling less ... Wage increases of twelve or thirteen percent are very, very 
high for this industry. We can't recover it from retailers, they just don't pay 
us those prices. So what it has done is made us look inwards and try and 
become far more efficient to make it up. We recognise that our workers 
should be paid well and we don't get it in return. So just putting up the 
wages hasn't helped us at all. So it's put pressure on management to do 
something about getting it back. So in a way it's put the screws on us to 
become more efficient. .. 
The way that many respondents chose to increase their efficiency was to offer incentives 
to workers to improve performance. These employers showed a greater preference for 
enterprise bargaining because they believed that those incentives could be more easily 
negotiated at that level. A 'leading' employer argued: 
That can be done at plant level. Every year one of the employers' demands 
is productivity. For the last five years ... we haven't reached any agreement 
on productivity. It's a farce. We are just wasting our time putting it on the 
negotiating table. You can't negotiate productivity at the regional or 
national level, you can only do it at the plant level because systems, 
techniques and approaches change from plant to plant. 
It is evident from Table 24 that enterprise bargaining is not a precondition for such 
schemes; many firms had them in place under the existing dispensation (either introduced 
unilaterally or after consultations with workers and shop stewards). But the trend in the 
table clearly points to a perception by respondents that enterprise bargaining would be a 
more effective way of introducing and managing these schemes. 
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7. 7 Conciusion 
The interviews carried out in 1995 showed that the change to national bargaining had led 
to a greater spread in preferences for different levels of bargaining. But overall support for 
national bargaining did not increase a great deal. The 1991 interviews showed that 83% of 
respondents expressed a dear preference for bargaining at a level other than national; in 
1995 this had dropped to 72%. The experience of national bargaining had therefore gained 
additional support for bargaining at that level, but its main effect seemed to be to either 
strengthen employers in their support for regional bargaining or to shift their preference to 
enterprise bargaining. This is confirmed by the reasons given by many respondents for 
supporting enterprise and regional bargaining. 
The reasons for supporting regional and national bargaining did not, in general, change 
very much between 1991 and 1995. But the reasons for supporting enterprise bargaining 
showed the influence of changes in the environment, such as perceptions of increasing 
international competition and the threat posed by the growth of the informal sector. 
Probably more important though was the experience of national bargaining, which tended 
to colour the way that employers responded to other changes. Attitudes overall pointed to 
a great deal of dissatisfaction with national bargaining. Even where respondents supported 
national bargaining, it was in many cases a pragmatic acceptance rather than support, and 
the problems with national bargaining were readily acknowledged. 
This points strongly to the power of SACTWU as the key factor maintaining bargaining at 
the national level, just as it was a key factor in persuading employers to change to national 
bargaining. A factor such as the ability of a national agreement to even out labour costs 
throughout the country does not emerge as a sufficient reason for employers staying in a 
national bargaining structure. Allied to the power of SACTWU is the strength of the 
associational tradition amongst employers, which assisted in maintaining a certain level of 
commitment to the change agreed to by the CCMA and CKIA in 1992. This commitment 
appears firm despite the opinion of some 'leading' respondents that employers have not 
benefitted in any way from the change. 
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Importantly, infrastructural factors such as the size of firms, number of plants, and 
industrial relations management, as well as productivity incentive schemes, begin to 
emerge in 1995 as stronger influences on employers' perceptions than they were in 1991. 
These factors underpinned a growing belief that national bargaining had not provided a 
flexible enough structure for the industry to respond to changes in the economic 
environment. Enterprise bargaining (if firms had the management infrastructure) or 
regional bargaining were seen as levels at which some employers felt themselves to be 
much more "in control of [their] own destiny". 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this chapter is to engage the empirical findings of this study with the 
theoretical approaches discussed in Chapter Three, thereby providing the basis for 
developing a theoretical explanation of the role of employers in determining levels of 
bargaining, and for advancing the broader theorisation of the determination of different 
levels of bargaining. This will be followed by a brief discussion of the contribution that the 
methodological approach makes to the development of a theory of levels of bargaining. 
However, it is first necessary to sum up the major empirical findings of the case study. 
This opening section will focus on the factors and forces that influenced employers' 
preferences about the level at which they wished to bargain, .as well as the way that 
employers interpreted factors that favoured or opposed certain levels of bargaining and 
how they made decisions about the level at which they wished to bargain. 
8.1 A summary of the empirical findings 
8.1.1 The reasons for employers' preferences 
The 1991 interviews showed that there was very strong support for the existing regional 
multi-employer bargaining arrangement. The major reasons cited by employers for 
preferring this level of bargaining were administrative and logistical convenience, the 
nature of the labour market, the power of SACTWU, distrust of the union, and the 
economics and convenience of centrally administered benefit funds. An important factor 
favouring support of national bargaining was the country-wide ambit of the product 
market, but for most employers this was outweighed by the reasons mentioned above 
when they articulated their preference for regional bargaining. 
Many of the reasons cited by employers for supporting their preferred level of bargaining 
corresponded with the determinants of bargaining levels identified in previous research, for 
example the study done by Deaton and Beaumont (1980) and the case studies referred to 
therein. However, the research highlighted certain factors that have not been given 
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attention before. One such factor was the participation by employers in the CCMA or 
CK.IA. The research revealed that this participation was a significant influence on 
respondents' perceptions of the most appropriate level of bargaining. The research also 
revealed that influence of the employers' associations was not without contradictions. 
'Leading' employers were seen as critical in shaping the choices of employers but also 
caused considerable dissatisfaction because of their perceived dominance in the 
associations. 
A second additional factor that emerged in the study was the attitudes of employers to 
SACTWU, and, more specifically, the distrust of the union and the translation thereof into 
opposition to national bargaining. Employers' attitudes to the union pointed to the 
context-specific nature of their thinking on the issue of preferred level of bargaining. It 
was evident that many employers had been unprepared for and had still not come to terms 
with the emergence of a far more powerful and aggressive union in the industry. Negative 
attitudes were therefore rooted in the sudden change to the long history of benign 
industrial relations in the region. The distrust of SACTWU, mainly evident amongst 
'leading' employers, highlighted the influence of the recent history of industrial relations on 
employers' thinking and underlined the importance of context for decision-making about 
the most appropriate level of bargaining. 
The lack of strong associations between infrastructural and institutional variables (such as 
the size of firms and the statutory framework for collective bargaining), and aggregate 
preferences for different levels of bargaining, tended to contradict most of the findings of 
the large-scale quantitative studies done by Deaton and Beaumont (1980), and Hendricks 
and Kahn (1982). The divergence of preferences from the findings of those quantitative 
studies once again points to the importance of history and context. The interviews with 
employers showed that their perceptions were deeply influenced by the history and 
dynamics of the regional bargaining structure that had existed for many years. The broader 
history of tpe political and economic development of the country was also important. For 
example, the impact of the system of apartheid on the South African labour market, and 
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particularly the Western Cape labour market, gave rise to a racial stereotyping of the 
regional labour forces. This stereotyping played a powerful part in many employers' 
support for the existing regional bargaining structure. 
The 1995 interviews showed both continuities and changes in employers' perceptions. 
Support by employers for regional bargaining declined but it remained the most favoured 
level of bargaining, and there was increased support for both national and enterprise 
bargaining. The reasons for supporting regional and national bargaining had not changed 
very much since 1991, but an important new factor was the experience of three years of 
national bargaining. Many respondents identified the tensions that had emerged between 
employer representatives from the different regions at the national negotiations, as the 
cause of dissatisfaction with the national bargaining arrangement. This confirmed the 
reservations that some respondents had had about national bargaining and entrenched their 
support for bargaining at the regional level. The dissatisfaction also contributed to the 
swing by other employers in favour of enterprise bargaining. 
The additional reasons for the increased support for enterprise bargaining generally 
pointed to the benefits of the greater flexibility of bargaining at that level. The main 
reasons were the ability to tailor enterprise-level agreements according to the firm's ability 
to pay, the potential for developing a better relationship with the union, and the ability to 
link wage increases and productivity improvements in negotiations at the level of the 
enterprise. 
The 1995 interviews also revealed a change in the relationship between aggregate 
preferences for different levels of bargaining and certain infrastructural variables. In 
particular, preferences for enterprise bargaining tended to be more closely associated with 
larger firm size, multi-plant firms, the employment of specialist industrial relations 
management, and operation of productivity incentive schemes. It is argued that broader 
changes in the economic environment, such as increased competitive pressures resulting 
from trade liberalisation and the growth of the informal sector, were linked to the more 
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significant association that these factors had with preferences for enterprise bargaining. 
Employers believed that these pressures demanded greater flexibility of the bargaining 
structure, which could be provided more easily by enterprise bargaining, or even regional 
bargaining. 
The switch to national bargaining and the maintenance of bargaining at that level through 
to 1995, despite strong support by many employers for regional and enterprise bargaining, 
emphasises the importance of the power of SACTWU as a determinant of the level of 
bargaining. An additional factor was the changing balance of power in the wider society 
during the political transition to majority rule and the prospective election of what was 
perceived to be a labour-friendly government. Many employers were conscious of the 
added weight that this transition gave to the power that SACTWU was wielding at the 
industry level over its demand for national bargaining. 
8.1.2 How employers intel]Jret factors and make decisions about the level of bargaining 
The findings showed that employers took into account a wide range of factors when 
forming their preferences about the level at which they wished to bargain. Employers' 
choices were, however, not determined functionally by these factors. Rather, the process 
through which employers interpreted these factors was complex and defies easy 
generalisation. There was, firstly, an enormous diversity in the way that employers thought 
about this issue. Employers arrived at the same conclusions from very different starting 
points, took different paths to get to those conclusions, and explained their conclusions in 
different ways. They also sometimes arrived at different conclusions. Secondly, there was 
a great deal of misconception and contradiction in many employers' thinking on the issue. 
Often employers had little or no information on the issue, a limited capacity to process that 
information, and their poor understanding of the issue restricted their ability to make 
strategic choices. 
The finding that many employers had limited decision-making capacity in a situation of 
uncertainty regarding the costs and benefits of alternative levels of bargaining, gave 
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immense power to the employers' associations, particularly the ·leading' employers within 
the associations. It emerged that it was largely within the Executive Committee of the 
associations that strategic decision-making took place on the level of bargaining issue. 
Many employers allowed their own decisions to be shaped by the recommendations made 
by the Executive Committee and were dependent on the strategic direction given by the 
' leading' employers within this committee. Power in the employers' associations therefore 
played a critical role in determining employers' decisions about the most appropriate level 
at which to bargain. In other words, decision-making on this issue was essentially a 
political process. 
Within this context, the power of SACTWU had a decisive influence on the course taken 
by the employers' associations. The strength of the union meant that it held the upper-hand 
in the engagement with employers and the strategies the union developed in pursuing 
national bargaining continually kept employers on the back foot. The nature of the 
strategic choices made by the ' leading' employers on the levels of bargaining issue were 
therefore primarily reactive and defensive. They acknowledged that national bargaining 
was inevitable and their first step was to delay the inevitable for as long as possible. They 
would not, however, engage in an open fight with the trade union over the issue, nor did 
they wish to be dragged into a bargaining structure developed solely by the union. Their 
strategy was to delay up to a point but then to engage with the union over the nature of 
the structure to ensure that their interests were represented in its formation. 81 The ' leading' 
employers were able to convince the body of the membership that this was the best course 
81 Since the agreement to enter a national bargaining forum, the ' leading' employers have continued 
to pursue a defensive strategy. Firstly, the labour cost model has been developed for negotiations at 
the National Bargaining Forum to ensure that the regions retain some autonomy in the way in 
which increases are apportioned. This has reduced some of the friction that would have arisen at 
the national level between the representatives of the regional employers' associations if the union 
had attempted to eliminate all the differences between the regional agreements. Secondly, in the 
negotiations over the constitution of the national industrial council the ' leading' employers were 
trying to restrict its jurisdiction to the areas covered by the existing regional councils. This would 
block the immediate inclusion of low-wage areas, and employer representatives from those areas, 
that would probably be disruptive to employer unity at the national level. 
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of action, despite the strong opposition that had been displayed to national bargaining in 
the 1991 interviews. 
8.2 A contribution to a theory of levels of bargaining 
8.2.1 Aframeworkfor theory 
If one wants to move beyond the theoretical statements discussed in Chapter Three and 
develop a theory of levels of bargaining there are six aspects, that together lead to the 
establishment and maintenance of a bargaining structure at a particular level, which need 
to be considered. These six aspects are: 
( 1) the factors and forces that employers take account of in developing their preferences 
for different levels of bargaining, including those that might not be explicitly 
articulated but which are associated with particular levels; 
(2) the way that employers interpret those factors and forces in developing preferences 
and how they make decisions about the level at which they wish to bargain; 
(3) the factors and forces that trade unions' take account of in developing a preference 
for a certain level of bargaining, including those that might not be explicitly 
articulated but which are associated with particular levels; 
( 4) the way that the trade unions' interpret those factors and forces and develop a policy 
about the level at which they want to bargain; 
(5) the power of employers and unions and the strategies they pursue to 'compel' each 
other to bargain at a particular level; and, 
( 6) the fluctuation of all of the above aspects during industrial development, which 
induce pressures and resistance to change in the level of bargaining. 
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In addressing the question of theory, it is important to note that this case study has 
focussed primarily on employers. The study has therefore dealt mainly with the first two 
aspects in the above framework, as well as the fifth aspect (albeit through the eyes of 
employers only). In addition, the third and sixth aspects of this framework were dealt with 
to a certain extent in Chapter Four. The focus of the study therefore to some extent limits 
the development of a comprehensive theory of the determination of bargaining levels, but 
it does provide the basis for a theoretical explanation of the role of employers in the 
process of determination. Furthermore, the study fills an important gap by examining 
employers' preferences and decision-making processes, and it therefore makes a 
contribution to the advancement of a comprehensive theory of levels of bargaining. 
A second point to note about the development of a theory of levels of bargaining is that 
such a theory should have general application. In other words, the theory should rise 
above case-by-case explanations and identify a general logic that explains the behaviour of 
employers and trade unions with regard to the determination of particular levels of 
bargaining. The limitations of a case study such as this one in making the step up from 
specific to general are obvious. However, it is argued that · the findings of the study can 
make an important contribution to evaluating and modifying the existing theoretical 
approaches to explaining the determination of levels of bargaining and this study therefore 
does have relevance for theoretical development. 
In the section that follows the findings of the study will be used to examine the theoretical 
approaches discussed in Chapter Three. The limitations of these approaches will be 
discussed and the contributions that this study makes will be explored. This exercise will 
provide the basis for advancing the theorisation of levels of bargaining along the lines of 
the above framework, albeit with limitations identified in the preceding paragraphs. 
8.2.2 The engagement of empirical findings with theory 
The findings of this study provide a number of lessons for a theory of levels of bargaining. 
Firstly, employers took account of a wide range of factors in developing preferences for a 
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particular level of bargaining. Most of these factors have been identified in previous 
research but the study also discovered additional factors. However, these factors took a 
particular form in the West em Cape clothing industry in the period during which the 
research was conducted, and employers' perceptions of these factors were therefore 
context dependent and historically rooted. 
Second, there was a great deal of diversity in the way that employers interpreted factors 
and forces that favoured or opposed alternative levels of bargaining. Not only did they 
choose different factors but they also prioritised their reasons differently and articulated 
them in different ways. Political and ideological positions played a part in the variety of 
reasoning that employers displayed, as well as their individual work experiences. 
Preferences were therefore not functionally determined by environmental factors . 
Third, employers did not pursue narrow econormc interests when evaluating the 
appropriateness of bargaining at a particular level. While economic interests were the most 
important considerations for employers, they were not able to simply divorce themselves 
from their role as actors in the wider society when they evaluated the pro's and con's of 
different levels of bargaining. Employers, as social actors, introduced additional 
considerations which sometimes distorted or contradicted their purely economic interests. 
Fourth, the decision-making process engaged in by employers was not ' rational' in the 
sense that rational choice theorists use the term. Decision-making was fraught with 
problems of limited understanding and information, as well as fear of the risks and 
uncertainty attached to an untried bargaining structure. In this situation the politics of 
collective decision-making within the employers' associations was at least as important as 
the ' rational' assessment of costs and benefits irt arriving at a decision about the level of 
bargaining. 
Fifth, power emerged as the key determinant of the level of bargaining. The power of the 
trade union was of great importance in convincing many employers that they needed to 
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face the union as a collective entity. The union's power therefore underpinned a preference 
for multi-employer bargaining. SACTWU's power was also fundamental to gaining the 
agreement by employers to change to national bargaining. Furthermore, in a situation of 
multi-employer bargaining, the exercise of power by certain ' leading' employers within the 
employers' associations played a critical part in shaping employers choices about the level 
at which they would bargain. 
The above lessons point to the limitations of the theoretical statements drawn from the 
case studies referred to and endorsed by Deaton and Beaumont (1980), and Hendricks and 
Kahn (1982). While those studies advance our understanding of the significance of a 
variety of determinants of levels of bargaining within and across sectors, the imputation of 
a cost-benefit analysis to employers in making their choice about the level of bargaining is 
a vast over-simplification of this process. This study shows that employers are not a 
homogeneous entity that follows a uniform cost-benefit analysis to arrive at a decision 
about the level of bargaining. Furthermore, the unproblematic acceptance of rational 
choice theory in the large-scale studies leads to an implied structural determinism that the 
findings of this study oppose. History, social context, and power are all factors that can 
override the influence of industry infrastructure, thereby leaving the outcome of the level 
of bargaining issue relatively open-ended. 
A sixth lesson for theory that emerges from the findings of this case study is the change in 
the importance of factors over time as changes occurred in the business and industrial 
relations environment, as well as in the broader political-economy of the country. 
Detennining influences on preferences for different levels of bargaining therefore seem to 
be in a continual dynamic interplay, with some more prominent than others during certain 
periods, and with some creating pressures for change while others constrain those 
pressures and stabilise the existing bargaining arrangement. 
This lesson, as well as some of the preceding lessons, are addressed in the comparative 
historical studies that throw light on the determination of bargaining levels. These studies 
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introduce a perspective of trends in levels of bargaining. This perspective points to the 
historical fluctuation of forces that impact on preferences for different levels of bargaining 
and identifies that way that country-specific factors, for example the national industrial 
relations system, mediate between those forces and preferences on the part of employers 
and unions. The nature of these country-specific factors can resist or facilitate the effects 
of these forces on bargaining structures. This approach therefore highlights the 
relationship between economic structure, the historical and social context of a country or 
sector, and levels of bargaining. Furthermore, the comparative historical studies also 
introduce a far more explicit recognition of power, and the exercise of this power between 
adversaries with conflicting interests, in the determination of levels of bargaining. 
The comparative historical approach therefore makes a substantial contribution to the 
development of a theory of levels of bargaining. The significance of factors can be 
evaluated across countries and time, and their interrelationship with one another in each 
context can be examined and compared. The approach also accords the power of 
employers and trade unions a central role. However, the comparative historical approach 
tends to treat employers as an undifferentiated entity and, as noted in Chapter Two, it 
attributes preferences and strategic choices to employers based on outcomes. Both of 
these problems arise to a large extent from the methodology of the comparative historical 
approach, which must by its nature take a historical perspective and generalise about 
employers preferences and behaviour. This approach, however, ignores an examination of 
the process through which employers interpret influences and make decisions about the 
most appropriate level of bargaining. 
The concept of strategy promises much in examining the interface between the structure-
action duality in the choice of an appropriate level of bargaining by employers, but this 
promise is only partially fulfilled . Strategy emphasises the relative autonomy of actors' 
choices from structural determination, but much of the literature on strategy tends to 
overestimate the ' rationality' of employers' thinking and the extent of the forward-planning 
that precedes a choice being made. It therefore runs foul of the criticism that strategy lies 
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more in the eyes of theorists than in the minds of employers. In other words, strategy can 
be attributed to actors retrospectively where none actually existed. The real process of 
interpretation and decision-making is therefore abstracted from and over-simplified. The 
findings of this study support this criticism to a large extent. The study showed that there 
was limited knowledge and information on the issue amongst many respondents, which 
tended to breed doubt and intransigence rather than strategic decision-making. 
This criticism does not, however, mean that employers are not future-oriented. The 
methodological approach adopted for this study revealed that employers were not only 
deeply influenced by their environment and their history, but that they were also to a 
greater or lesser extent future-oriented. They therefore brought with them a perceptual 
framework wrought in a particular historical context but they also evaluated future 
prospects and possibilities in order to seek proactive solutions to the questions that faced 
them. However, it must be emphasised that this future-oriented thinking was not 
necessarily strategic, in the sense of being part of a carefully thought through plan based 
on a thorough examination of all available information and all alternatives. 
Having made this criticism, it should be noted that the study found that certain employers 
had engaged in strategic thinking on the issue of the level of bargaining, although this was 
primarily defensive. This strategic thinking was largely confined to the 'leading' employers 
in the CCMA and CKIA, which in tum entrenched their power within the associations. 
This underlines the fact that the development of a strategy by employers was essentially a 
political process. The defensive strategy emerged out of the debates within the Executive 
Committees and general meetings of the associations. It also evolved over time and was 
influenced and constrained by the union's strategies. This finding confirms the ' political 
approach' to explaining industrial relations strategy identified by Ahlstrand (1990), and is 
noted as part of the fifth lesson for theory above. It is only recently that theory has begun 
to take account of the heterogeneity of employers' interests and the role of the exercise of 
power between employers in moulding collective interests. This in tum focusses more 
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attention on the process that employers go through in forming preferences and making 
decisions. 
The findings of this study strongly support the contention of Schmitter and Streeck that 
employers' associations are "producers of group interests".( Quoted in Tolliday and 
Zeitlin, 1991 : 21) Furthermore, decision-making by employers within these associations 
might, because it brings together a range of skills and capacities not possessed by 
individual members, more closely approximate an 'ideal' cost-benefit decision, but the 
process of aniving at a decision is at root political. It is the employers that possess 
resources and articulate representatives that wield the power at the associations. These 
employers therefore play a key role in the formation of preferences by members and also 
play a disproportionate role in decision-making. A theory of bargaining levels must take 
account of the role and interests of ' leading' employers. 
This case study therefore argues for greater recognition of the importance of the politics 
of collective decision-making by employers in a theory of levels of bargaining. Such 
recognition can give a new perspective on the relationship of multi-employer bargaining 
with structural determinants. For example, although multi-employer bargaining is said to 
be associated with industries where there are many small firms, it is apparent from this 
study that multi-employer bargaining is critically dependent on the support and active 
participation of larger firms in the industry. Without their participation, the many small 
firms might prefer multi-employer bargaining but would be unlikely to have the resources 
to make it work. A failure to take account of the decision-making process within 
employers' associations will lead to this type of dynamic remaining obscured. 
It should also be noted that the power of the trade union played an important role in 
enabling employers to overcome the centrifugal pressures that existed between them and 
act collectively. This study therefore supports Schmitter and Streeck's argument that 
"employers' associations seem to need the support of strong interlocutors, in particular 
trade unions" in order to represent collective interests effectively. (Quoted in Tolliday and 
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Zeitlin, 1991 : 20) A theory of levels of bargaining should therefore take account of trade 
union power, not only in its own right but also in the effect this has on building solidarity 
amongst employers. 
8.2.3 Conclusion: Towards a theory of bargaining levels 
How does the above contribute to a theory of levels of bargaining? Firstly, the case study 
method highlights a certain contextual uniqueness, both in terms of the configuration of 
structural factors and social forces and the dynamics of organisational characteristics, of 
the establishment and maintenance of bargaining structures at particular levels. A theory of 
levels of bargaining must recognise, despite its own need for generalisation, a certain 
degree of contextual specificity. This should not, however, obscure the fact that there are 
factors and forces common to different sectors and countries, that are associated with 
differ(1nt levels of bargaining or pressures towards particular levels of bargaining. A theory 
of levels of bargaining must therefore take account of both the commonality and 
specificity of determinants through an explanation of the way that factors and forces 
assume particular forms and significance in each setting and across time. 
Secondly, this study emphasises the role of employers in the establishment of bargaining 
structures at particular levels. It, furthermore, highlights the diversity of interests amongst 
employers and the differences that exist in the way that they view their interests and 
approach the issue of levels of bargaining. A theory of levels of bargaining cannot 
therefore assume a homogeneity of interests on the part of employers or a uniformly 
'rational' decision-making process. The theory must provide for an explanation of 
interpretation and decision-making by employers that recognises diversity of interests, 
bounded rationality, non-optimal satisficing decision-making, and the influence of wider 
social and political considerations. The theory must also recognise that decision-making by 
employers is a political process. 
Thirdly, the diversity of employers' interests poses the problem for theory of explaining the 
determination of multi-employer bargaining structures. The study shows that the power of 
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' leading' employers within employers' associations plays a key role in consolidating and 
directing employers' interests. Furthermore, employers' perceptions of trade union power 
plays a fundamental role in their recognition of the need to act collectively, which 
underpins multi-employer bargaining arrangements. An analysis of power, both within the 
employer collectivity and between employers and unions, is therefore central to the ability 
of a theory of levels of bargaining to explain multi-employer bargaining. 
As noted above, the focus of this case study has limitations for providing a comprehensive 
theory of bargaining levels, as outlined in the six point framework at the start of this 
section. However, the above three points provide a theoretical explanation of the role of 
employers in determining the level of bargaining, and are proposed as crucial for 
advancing existing theory on the determination of levels of bargaining. 
8.2.4 A.final comment on the research methodology 
It is argued that many of the insights gained from this study were primarily the result of 
the nature of the methodology adopted. The in-depth focus on employers' subjective 
expressions of preferences has brought out the diversity, nuances, and texture of 
employers' perceptions of their interests. This approach has also identified the way in 
which the politics of decision-making in the employers' associations played a crucial role in 
shaping those preferences into a workable consensus. At the same time, the quantitative 
(or structural) component has balanced the emphasis on the subjective reality of 
respondents and allows for an evaluation of the significance of objective factors for the 
determination of the level of bargaining. 
The methodology has therefore allowed for an exploration of the interface between 
structure and action in the context of employers' perceptions and decisions about the most 
appropriate level of bargaining. The contemporaneous focus of the methodology and the 
longitudinal nature of the study aids this exploration. The approach adopted in the study 
therefore avoids the deterministic explanations of some existing theoretical statements and 
highlights the need to take account of the structure-action interface for a full exposition of 
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the determination of levels of bargaining. However, the methodology also reveals the 
complexity of this interface and raises it as a challenge for further theoretical development. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEWEES 
Interviews were held with the following people, in addition to the 42 employers that were 
interviewed 1: 
Peter Cragg, Director of the CCMA and CK.IA; 
Two spokespersons for the GMA who chose to remain anonymous; 
Ronald Bemickow, Western Cape Regional Organiser of SACTWU; 
Wayne Van Der Rheede, Western Cape Regional Secretary of SACTWU; 
Howie Gabriels, previously Western Cape Regional Secretary of SACTWU; 
J. Vaughn, previously Secretary of the Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry (Cape); 
D. Ackerman, Secretary of the Industrial Council for the Clothing Industry (Cape). 
1 Note that because of the contentious nature of the issue of bargaining levels (particularly in 
1991 ), interviews were obtained with employers on the basis of confidentiality, that is, no employer 
or firm would be identified by name. It is therefore not possible to provide a list of the firms that 
made up the samples in 199 l and 1995 . 
APPENDIX 8 
1991 QUESTIONNAIRES 
Questionnaire for Employer (Member) 
A. Profile of the firm: Basic features 
1. Is the firm a clothing, knitwear or CMT operation. 
2. Does the firm produce a specific line or lines of clothing or knitwear. Give details. 
3. How long has the firm been in operation. 
4. Is it a subsidiary of another firm (give name of holding company). 
*Does it have subsidiary firms (give names) . 
5. How many plants does the firm have and where are these situated. 
* Indicate whether the plants are clothinglknitwear/CMT operations, and whether they 
specialise in certain lines. 
6. What is the size of your workforce (per plant). 
7. Approximately how many of these are union members. 
B. Profile of the firm: The production process 
8. Can you briefly describe the production process at the firm. 
9. Does this differ significantly from other clothing/knit-wear/CMT operations, and if so 
are you faced with higher or lower unit labour costs as a result of this difference. 
10. Do you have any productivity incentive schemes. Give details. 
11. Has your firm reorganised its production process significantly over the last 10 years or 
introduced any major technological innovations in this period. If so describe and give 
the reasons. 
C. Profile of the firm: The labour market 
12_ Do you draw your workforce from the Western Cape locally or the Cape region, or 
nationally (i .e. is the labour market local, regional or national) . 
13 . Do you find that there is a ready supply of clothing workers of all categories, or are 
certain categories in short supply. Specify. 
ii 
14. Do you have a policy about paying the minimum wages set down in the Ind. Council 
agreement or do you pay certain workers or certain categories above the minimum 
rates. Give the reasons and, if necessary, specify which workers or categories are paid 
above the minimum rates. 
D. Profile of the firm: The product market 
15 . Is the market that you compete in local, regional or national (i .e. are the buyers of 
your products also buying similar products from manufacturers in the other regions). 
16. Is the market you compete in in any way distinct from the general clothing market, in 
that it has specific circumstances or constraints which make your overheads bigger or 
smaller, or which make your margins bigger or smaller (e.g. higher quality clothing 
which has a higher mark-up). 
17. If you had to rank the market that you compete in in terms of the intensity of 
competition on a scale of 1 to 5, where would you place it: 
1. No competition - i.e. monopoly; 
2. Limited competition but not very relevant; 
3. Competitive but some room to manoeuvre; 
4. Very competitive with tight conditions; 
5. Highly competitive with cut-throat conditions. 
18. Do you have a significant market share. 
Insignificant 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% - etc. 
19. Is the market very sensitive to seasonal variations. 
* Is the market very sensitive to the business cycle. 
20. Do you export clothing. Give details. 
21 . Have there been any major trends in the market over the last 10 years (e.g. has it 
moved in a higher quality, value-added direction, or a cheaper, mass-produced 
direction). 
E. Profile of the firm: IR management 
22. Does the firm have an IR manager. 
*If not, which manager(s) deal with the IR functions (e.g. who attends the CCMA 
meetings, negotiates with the union, etc.). 
iii 
23 . If the firm does not have an IR manager how important are the following reasons: 
(a) The firm can't afford one; 
(b) The firm is not big enough for one; 
( c) The existing management has the time and the skills to deal with all IR matters; 
( d) We use a consultant or get advice from the CCMA or CK.IA and this is adequate for 
our requirements. 
* Specify if there are other reasons besides those given above and indicate their 
importance. 
24. Ifthere is no IR manager would the firm ideally like to employ one. 
25 . What is the extent of your participation in the CCMA or the CK.IA: 
(a) Non-existent; 
(b) We only go to meetings if there is a crisis; 
( c) We attend meetings on a regular basis; 
( d) We are represented on the Executive Committee; 
*Would this increase significantly if you had an IR manager, or would you no longer see a 
need for participating. 
F. Centralised bargaining and level of bargaining 
26. Do you support or reject centralised bargaining. Give your reasons in detail. 
27. If you support centralised bargaining comment on the importance of the following 
factors for your support: 
(a) It balances union power, i.e. the firm is not strong enough to face the union on its 
own; 
(b) The firm prefers negotiations to be removed from its own shopfloor and from direct 
worker participation; 
(c) It is convenient for negotiations to be handled by an employers' organisation, i.e. the 
firm does not have the resources, skills or manpower to negotiate with the union 
directly, 
( d) The firm has a developed managerial philosophy that supports centralised bargaining; 
( e) The clothing industry is extremely competitive and is labour intensive, and the labour 
and product markets would become chaotic if firms were competing on the basis of 
wages; 
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(f) Our production process and cost structure is basically the same as all the firms in the 
industry so it makes sense for wages and conditions of employment to be uniform; 
(g) Minimum wages and conditions of employment are essential to protect workers and 
stop the development of sweatshops; 
(h) The firm' s unit labour costs are lower than the industry's and it is therefore profitable 
to be part of an industry-wide forum; 
(i) The firm fears leapfrog bargaining by the union; 
G) The firm could not on its own provide medical and provident funds for its workers 
and a centralised forum is a convenient way of providing workers with these benefits; 
(k) There has always been centralised bargaining in the clothing/knitwear industry and 
we have gone along with it without ever giving it much thought; 
28. If you reject centralised bargaining comment on the importance of the following 
factors for your rejection: 
(a) The firm is capable of facing the union on its own and would prefer to negotiate on 
the basis of its own ability to pay; 
(b) The firm has a managerial philosophy that favours decentralised bargaining; 
( c) Centralised bargaining does not take account of the requirements or circumstances of 
individual firms; 
( d) The wage levels favour the bigger firms and restrict our ability to compete with 
them; 
( e) The agreements restrict the firm's flexibility and its ability to respond quickly to 
market conditions; 
(f) Because of the type of clothing/knitwear we produce our unit labour costs are higher 
than the average clothing/knitwear firm and the wage levels in the agreements 
therefore restrict our ability to utilise labour cost-effectively; 
(g) Wage increases should be linked to increases in productivity and this can only be 
done if negotiations are conducted at plant level; 
29. At present collective bargaining in the Western Cape is centralised to the regional level 
(i.e. it covers the Western Cape). Do you support or reject centralisation to this 
particular level. Give your reasons in detail. 
30. Comment on the importance of the following factors for your support for this level of 
centralisation: 
(a) The employers are more powerful at this level than the trade union; 
v 
(b) Our firm can participate effectively in a regional forum; 
(c) It would not be feasible for employers to organise at a higher level than this, i.e. to 
cover a wider area; 
( d) The geographical concentration of firms in the Western Cape and its distance from 
other regions make this a logical level to bargain at; 
( e) Regional level negotiations can more effectively accommodate particular regional 
problems and circumstances; 
(f) This area covers the labour market for the clothing industry in the Western Cape and 
wages should therefore be bargained at this level; 
(g) This area covers the product market that the firm competes in and wages should 
therefore be bargained at this level; 
(h) Centralised bargaining in the clothing/knitwear industry has always been conducted 
at this level; 
31 . Would you support or reject centralisation of collective bargaining to the national 
level. Give your reasons in detail. 
32. Comment on the importance of the following arguments for supporting centralisation 
of bargaining to the national level: 
(a) Employers will be able to organise themselves better at a national level and could 
counter the union more effectively at this level; 
(b) The clothing market is national and therefore all employers should be bound by the 
same wage rates, i.e. a national forum would be able to establish national minimum 
wage rates which would stop regions with lower wage levels from undercutting firms 
in the Wes tern Cape; 
(c) It will mean that the decentralised areas will be covered by the minimum wage rates; 
( d) Benefit funds set up at the national level will be able to provide better benefits for 
workers; 
( e) The clothing industry is a national industry and it would become more efficient and 
competitive if wages and conditions of employment were coordinated at a national 
forum; 
33 . Comment on the importance of the following factors for your opposition to 
centralisation of bargaining to the national level: 
(a) The trade union will be more powerful at a national bargaining forum than 
employers; 
(b) Individual firms will have no voice at a national level; 
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( c) The logistics of organising on a national level, the difficulty of obtaining an 
acceptable mandate from all the regions, and the possible lengthening of the 
negotiations, would make a national forum unwieldy; 
( d) Every region has its own economic circumstances and regional forums are therefore 
the most appropriate levels to bargain at; 
(e) Workers in the various regions are not all equally productive and therefore national 
wage rates will prejudice those regions with less productive workers; 
G. The industrial council 
34. You are a member of the CCMA or CKIA. Give your reasons in detail. 
35. Indicate the importance of the following factors for being a member: 
(a) It is to support centralised bargaining; 
(b) It is a way of getting advice and assistance with IR problems; 
( c) It is a way of staying in touch with what the union is doing and how employers are 
responding; 
( d) It is a way of getting information on developments in the industry, e.g. markets, 
trends, new technology, etc .. 
* Specify if there are other reasons besides those given above and indicate their 
importance. 
36. Do you believe that you have a meaningful say in the Council negotiations through 
your membership. If not, give reasons. 
3 7. Do you have any criticisms of the way the Association operates, and if so, what 
improvements could you suggest. 
38. There are now three separate employers' associations in the clothing industry in the 
Western Cape. Do you think this is beneficial for employers in negotiations in the 
Council, or would it be better if they amalgamated. Give reasons. 
39. Do you have any criticisms of the present area or scope of the Industrial Council. 
40. Do you have any criticisms of the present structure and operation of the Industrial 
Council. 
* Specifically, do you agree that the clothing and knitting sectors should have separate 
agreements. Give reasons in detail. 
* Secondly, do you think their are valid grounds for the CMT firms to have a separate 
agreement. Give reasons in detail. 
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41 . Which length of agreement suits your firm best: 1 year 
18 mths 
2 years 
3 years 
42. In terms of the Labour Relations Act the Minister of Manpower has the ability to 
extend the Council's agreement to cover non-parties. Do you agree with the extension 
of agreements to non-parties. Give reasons or, if necessary, possible alternatives. 
43 . In terms of the Labour Relations Act strikes over issues covered by the Council 
agreement are illegal during the currency of the agreement. Is this a strong reason for 
your supporting the Council. 
44. Is the closed shop clause in the Council agreement a strong reason for your support 
for the Council. 
45 . The wage table in the Council agreement details a full range of jobs together with 
applicable wages. Does this wage table correspond with your requirements given the 
production process at your firm. 
46. Do you think that all categories of work are valued correctly (e.g. some employers say 
that qualified machinists can possess a variety of skills and that it is unfair that these 
are not recognised and that there is only a single wage rate for machinists). 
47. Are you in favour of across-the-board wage increases being negotiated. 
48. Have the Council wage increases ever caused the firm to reduce its labour force. 
49. Do you think the present wage table could be simplified to just 6 - 8 broad grades 
reflecting levels of skill, into which all the present categories could be fitted . 
* If so, would you prefer such a wage table or is the present detailed wage table more 
suitable. Give reasons. 
50. Do you think such a wage table could be used for both the clothing and knitting 
industries, and therefore enable them to be covered by the same agreement. 
51 . Do you think the present Council benefit funds (i.e. the Provident Fund and the Sick 
Fund) provide adequate benefits. 
* If not, indicate in what way they are unsatisfactory. 
* Secondly, do these funds clash with any company funds or schemes. 
52. What is your attitude to a" Wage Slack Fund", i.e. a fund which employers and 
employees contribute to and which can be drawn on when a firm has to work short-
time. 
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53 . Do you at present, or would you in future be prepared to bargain at company or plant 
level with the trade union over issues not covered by the Council agreement (e.g. over 
a retrenchment procedure). 
54. Do you think that the council in its present form could accommodate bargaining over 
issues such as employment creation, investment, and price controls. 
* Give your reasons for supporting or rejecting the bargaining such issues. 
55. Could you comment on the Clothing Industry Training Board and the training needs of 
the industry, i.e. is the C.I.T.B. providing adequate training. 
H. The demand for a national industrial council 
56. Would this benefit or disadvantage your firm in any particular way. 
57. If clothing employers did participate should they organise themselves on a national 
basis, or would you prefer the CCMA and CKIA to participate in its present form so 
as to represent the Western Cape region. 
58. If wages were negotiated nationally do you think that certain areas should be allowed 
lower wage levels, ~ .g . rural areas. 
59. Do you think an appropriate bargaining structure could be one which has a national 
forum together with regional forums with different issues being dealt with at each 
level. 
* And if so, at which level do you think that wages should be bargained. 
60. The trade union has stated that at a national council the following issues could be dealt 
with: 
Employment creation 
Inflation 
Economic growth 
Investment 
Incomes policy 
Training 
Productivity 
* Would you agree to negotiate these issues at the proposed national council. 
* Do you think that all these issues can be negotiated. 
61 . Do you think that in future productivity bargaining should be linked to wage 
bargaining. 
* If so, at what level should this take place. 
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62. The trade union has established a National Forum together with the employers' 
associations from the other regions. At present the CCMA and CKIA are not 
participating in this Forum - do you agree with this position (note that the National 
Forum is not a bargaining forum at present - it is a consultative forum only). 
* What issues do you think should be discussed at this Forum. 
63. Would you be prepared to pull out of the Council rather than participate in a national 
council. 
64. A number of employers have stated that they felt that the union could not be 'trusted', 
i.e. the union did not honour agreements and did not conduct itself as it should in the 
bargaining relationship. Give your comments on this allegation and indicate whether 
your attitude to a national industrial council is influenced by this lack of 'trust'. 
65 . What do you see happening in the next 5 years in the clothing industry around the 
issue of levels of bargaining. 
* How do you see relations between the employers and the trade union developing in 
general. 
x 
Questionnaire for Employer (Non-Member) 
A. Profile of the firm: Basic features 
1. Is the firm a clothing, knitwear or CMT operation. 
2. Does the firm produce a specific line or lines of clothing or knitwear. Give details. 
3. How long has the firm been in operation. 
4. Is it a subsidiary of another firm (give name of holding company). 
*Does it have subsidiary firms (give names). 
5. How many plants does the firm have and where are these situated. 
* Indicate whether the plants are clothing/knitwear/CMT operations, and whether they 
specialise in certain lines. 
6. What is the size of your workforce (per plant). 
7. Approximately how many of these are union members. 
B. Profile of the firm: The production process 
8. Can you briefly describe the production process at the firm. 
9. Does this differ significantly from other clothing/knit-wear/CMT operations, and if so 
are you faced with higher or lower unit labour costs as a result of this difference. 
10. Do you have any productivity incentive schemes. Give details. 
11. Has your firm reorganised its production process significantly over the last 10 years or 
introduced any major technological innovations in this period. If so describe and give 
the reasons. 
C. Profile of the firm: The labour market 
12. Do you draw your workforce from the Western Cape locally or the Cape region, or 
nationally (i.e. is the labour market local, regional or national). 
13 . Do you find that there is a ready supply of clothing workers of all categories, or are 
certain categories in short supply. Specify. 
14. Do you have a policy about paying the minimum wages set down in the Ind. Council 
agreement or do you pay certain workers or certain categories above the minimum 
rates. Give the reasons and, if necessary, specify which workers or categories are paid 
above the minimum rates. 
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D. Profile of the firm: The product market 
15. Is the market that you compete in local, regional or national (i.e. are the buyers of 
your products also buying similar products from manufacturers in the other regions). 
16. Is the market you compete in in any way distinct from the general clothing market, in 
that it has specific circumstances or constraints which make your overheads bigger or 
smaller, or which make your margins bigger or smaller (e.g. higher quality clothing 
which has a higher mark-up) . 
17. If you had to rank the market that you compete in in terms of the intensity of 
competition on a scale of 1 to 5, where would you place it: 
1. No competition - i.e. monopoly; 
2. Limited competition but not very relevant; 
3. Competitive but some room to manoeuvre; 
4. Very competitive with tight conditions; 
5. Highly competitive with cut-throat conditions. 
18. Do you have a significant market share. 
Insignificant 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% - etc. 
19. Is the market very sensitive to seasonal variations. 
* Is the market very sensitive to the business cycle. 
20. Do you export clothing. Give details. 
21. Have there been any major trends in the market over the last 10 years (e.g. has it 
moved in a higher quality, value-added direction, or a cheaper, mass-produced 
direction). 
E. Profile of the firm: IR management 
22. Does the firm have an IR manager. 
*If not, which manager(s) deal with the IR functions (e.g. who attends the CCMA 
meetings, negotiates with the union, etc.). 
23 . If the firm does not have an IR manager how important are the following reasons: 
(a) The firm can't afford one; 
(b) The firm is not big enough for one; 
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( c) The existing management has the time and the skills to deal with all IR matters; 
(d) We use a consultant which is adequate for our requirements. 
* Specify if there are other reasons besides those given above and indicate their 
importance. 
24. If there is no IR manager would the firm ideally like to employ one. 
25 . Would you join the CCMA or the CKIA if you got an IR manager, or would you have 
even less reason for joining. 
F. Centralised bargaining and level of bargaining 
26. Do you support or reject centralised bargaining. Give your reasons in detail. 
27. If you support centralised bargaining comment on the importance of the following 
factors for your support: 
(a) It balances union power, i.e. the firm is not strong enough to face the union on its 
own; 
(b) The firm prefers negotiations to be removed from its own shopfloor and from direct 
worker participation; 
(c) It is convenient for negotiations to be handled by an employers' organisation, i.e. the 
firm does not have the resources, skills or manpower to negotiate with the union 
directly; 
( d) The clothing industry is extremely competitive and is labour intensive, and the labour 
and product markets would become chaotic if firms were competing on the basis of 
wages; 
( e) Our production process and cost structure is basically the same as all the firms in the 
industry so it makes sense for wages and conditions of employment to be uniform; 
(f) Minimum wages and conditions of employment are essential to protect workers and 
stop the development of sweatshops; 
(g) The firms unit labour costs are lower than the industry's and it is therefore profitable 
to be part of an industry-wide forum; 
(h) The firm fears leapfrog bargaining by the union; 
(i) The firm could not on its own provide medical and provident funds for its workers 
and a centralised forum is a convenient way of providing workers with these benefits; 
(j) There has always been centralised bargaining in the clothing/knitwear industry and we 
have gone along with it without ever giving it much thought; 
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28 . If you reject centralised bargaining comment on the importance of the following 
factors for your rejection: 
(a) The firm is capable of facing the union on its own and would prefer to negotiate on 
the basis of its own ability to pay; 
(b) The firm has a managerial philosophy that favours decentralised bargaining; 
( c) Centralised bargaining does not take account of the requirements or circumstances of 
individual firms; 
( d) The wage levels favour the bigger firms and restrict our ability to compete with 
them; 
(e) The agreements restrict the firm's flexibility and its ability to respond quickly to 
market conditions; 
(f) Because of the type of clothing/knitwear we produce our unit labour costs are higher 
than the average clothing/knitwear firm and the wage levels in the agreements 
therefore restrict our ability to utilise labour cost-effectively; 
(g) Wage increases should be linked to increases in productivity and this can only be 
done if negotiations are conducted at plant level; 
29. At present collective bargaining in the Western Cape is centralised to the regional level 
(i.e. it covers the Western Cape). Do you support or reject centralisation to this 
particular level. Give your reasons in detail. 
30. Comment on the importance of the following factors for your support for this level of 
centralisation: 
(a) The employers are more powerful at this level than the trade union; 
(b) The geographical concentration of firms in the West em Cape and its distance from 
other regions make this a logical level to bargain at; 
( c) Regional level negotiations can more effectively accommodate particular regional 
problems and circumstances; 
( d) This area covers the labour market for the clothing industry in the Western Cape and 
wages should therefore be bargained at this level; 
( e) This area covers the product market that the firm competes in and wages should 
therefore be bargained at this level; 
(f) Centralised bargaining in the clothing/knitwear industry has always been conducted at 
this level; 
31 . Would you support or reject centralisation of collective bargaining to the national 
level. Give your reasons in detail. 
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32. Comment on the importance of the following arguments for supporting centralisation 
of bargaining to the national level: 
(a) Employers will be able to organise themselves better at a national level and could 
counter the union more effectively at this level; 
(b) The clothing market is national and therefore all employers should be bound by the 
same wage rates, i.e. a national forum would be able to establish national minimum 
wage rates which would stop regions with lower wage levels from undercutting firms 
in the Western Cape; 
( c) It will mean that the decentralised areas will be covered by the minimum wage rates; 
( d) Benefit funds set up at the national level will be able to provide better benefits for 
workers; 
(e) The clothing industry is a national industry and it would become more efficient and 
competitive if wages and conditions of employment were coordinated at a national 
forum; 
33 . Comment on the importance of the following factors for your opposition to 
centralisation of bargaining to the national level: 
(a) The trade union will be more powerful at a national bargaining forum than 
employers; 
(b) Individual firms will have no voice at a national level; 
( c) The logistics of organising on a national level, the difficulty of obtaining an 
acceptable mandate from all the regions, and the possible lengthening of the 
negotiations, would make a national forum unwieldy; 
( d) Every region has its own economic circumstances and regional forums are therefore 
the most appropriate levels to bargain at; 
(e) Workers in the various regions are not all equally productive and therefore national 
wage rates will prejudice those regions with less productive workers; 
G. The industrial council 
34. You are not a member of the CCMA or CKIA. Give your reasons in detail. 
*Are you a member of the GMA. Give your reasons for membership or non-membership. 
3 5. If you are a member of the GMA comment on the importance of the following factors 
for being a member: 
(a) It is to support centralised bargaining; 
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(b) It is a way of getting advice and assistance with IR problems; 
( c) It is a way of staying in touch with what the union is doing and how employers are 
responding; 
( d) It is a way of getting information on developments in the industry, e.g. markets, 
trends, new technology, etc .. 
* Specify ifthere are other reasons besides those given above and indicate their 
importance. 
36. Do you have any criticisms of the present area or scope of the Industrial Council . 
37. Do you have any criticisms of the present structure and operation of the Industrial 
Council. 
* Specifically, do you agree that the clothing and knitting sectors should have separate 
agreements. Give reasons in detail. 
* Secondly, do you think their are valid grounds for the CMT firms to have a separate 
agreement. Give reasons in detail. 
38. Which length of agreement suits your firm best: 1 year 
18 mths 
2 years 
3 years 
39. In terms of the Labour Relations Act the Minister of Manpower has the ability to 
extend the Council's agreement to cover non-parties. Do you agree with the extension 
of agreements to non-parties. Give reasons or, if necessary, possible alternatives. 
40. The wage table in the Council agreement details a full range of jobs together with 
applicable wages. Does this wage table correspond with your requirements given the 
production process at your firm. 
41 . Do you think that all categories of work are valued correctly (e.g. some employers say 
that qualified machinists can possess a variety of skills and that it is unfair that these 
are not recognised and that there is only a single wage rate for machinists). 
42. Are you in favour of across-the-board wage increases being negotiated. 
43. Have the Council wage increases ever caused the firm to reduce its labour force. 
44. Do you think the present wage table could be simplified to just 6 - 8 broad grades 
reflecting levels of skill, into which all the present categories could be fitted . 
* If so, would you prefer such a wage table or is the present detailed wage table more 
suitable. Give reasons. 
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45 . Do you think such a wage table could be used for both the clothing and knitting 
industries, and therefore enable them to be covered by the same agreement. 
46. Do you think the present Council benefit funds (i.e. the Provident Fund and the Sick 
Fund) provide adequate benefits. 
* If not, indicate in what way they are unsatisfactory. 
* Secondly, do these funds clash with any company funds or schemes. 
47. What is your attitude to a "Wage Slack Fund", i.e. a fund which employers and 
employees contribute to and which can be drawn on when a firm has to work short-
time. 
48. Do you at present, or would you in future be prepared to bargain at company or plant 
level with the trade union over issues not covered by the Council agreement (e.g. over 
a retrenchment procedure). 
49. Could you comment on the Clothing Industry Training Board and the training needs of 
the industry, i.e. is the C.I.T.B. providing adequate training. 
H. The demand for a national industrial council 
50. Would this benefit or disadvantage your firm in any particular way. 
51 . If wages were negotiated nationally do you think that certain areas should be allowed 
lower wage levels, e.g. rural areas. 
52. Do you think an appropriate bargaining structure could be one which has a national 
forum together with regional forums with different issues being dealt with at each 
level. 
* And if so, at which level do you think that wages should be bargained. 
53 . Do you think that in future productivity bargaining should be linked to wage 
bargaining. 
* If so, at what level should this take place. 
54. What do you see happening in the next 5 years in the clothing industry around the 
issue of levels of bargaining. 
* How do you see relations between the employers and the trade union developing in 
general. 
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Questionnaire for the Director of the Cape Clothing Mftrs' Association 
and the Cape Knitting Industry Association 
A. The Area, Scope, Structure and Functions of the CCMA and the CKIA 
1. What is the area and scope for which the CCMA and the CKIA are registered? 
2. What are the functions of the CCMA and the CKIA? 
3. When were the CCMA and CKIA established, and have there been major changes to 
the area, scope or functions of the organisations since then? Give the reasons for these 
changes. 
4. Do the Associations have links to other bodies or organisations (e.g. the other regional 
clothing/knitting employers' associations, the Cape Chamber of Industries, the National 
Clothing Federation, SACOB, and SACCOLA)? Describe these links in detail. 
* Secondly, do the Associations have links to the CITB? 
5. Explain why the CCMA and the CKIA have been constituted as separate bodies. To 
what extent do they function together as a single body? 
6. What are the chances of the CCMA and the CKIA merging into a single body? 
7. Describe the structure of the two associations and list the present office bearers (and 
their companies). 
8. Describe the local committee structure and explain the reasons for the introduction of 
this structure. 
9. Do you think the level of representativity of the Associations is satisfactory at present? 
If not, what are your plans in this regard (e.g. do you actively go out and recruit firms)? 
10. Could you give a racial breakdown of the membership of the Associations? 
11 . What is the membership fee to join the CCMA or the CKIA, and what is the annual 
subscription? 
12. What is the CCMA's policy towards the GMA, i.e. do you think that there is any 
chance of a merger? 
13 . Have you any idea of the level ofrepresentativity of the GMA? 
14. Could you briefly describe the procedure whereby a mandate is obtained from 
members for negotiations with the trade union. Is the resulting counter-proposal and 
settlement decided by majority vote or consensus? 
* Secondly, on what criteria do the members base their counter-proposal (e.g. last years 
profits, or what the other regions are paying, or the inflation rate, etc.)? 
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* Thirdly, to what extent do negotiations take account of the fact that the workforce in the 
clothing industry is almost entirely made up of women? 
B. The Industrial Council 
15 . Have the Associations any specific criticisms of the existing area and scope of the 
Industrial Council? 
16. Have the Associations any criticisms of the existing structure and functioning of the 
Industrial Council? 
* Specifically, what are the reasons for the clothing and knitting sectors having separate 
agreements? Is there a chance that these agreements could be consolidated into one 
agreement? 
* Secondly, do the Associations believe that there are valid grounds for the CMT firms to 
have a separate agreement? Give the reasons in detail. 
17. SACTWU has proposed the incorporation of the Millinery sector into the Council. 
What is the thinking of the Associations with regard to this demand? If a merger does 
take place how will the Council be re-structured to accommodate the Millinery sector? 
18. Which length of agreement suits the Associations best: 1 year 
18 months 
2 years 
3 years? 
19. Are the Associations satisfied with the existing wage tables in the Council's 
agreements? 
* Specifically, do they agree that all the categories of work are valued correctly? 
* Secondly, do they agree that the existing wage table could be simplified to just 6 - 8 
broad grades reflecting levels of skill, into which all the present categories could be 
fitted? 
20. Would the wage table referred to above be able to be used for both the clothing and 
the knitting industries? 
21. Are the Associations in favour of across-the-board wage increases being negotiated? 
22. What is the policy of the Associations on the existing Council benefit funds (i.e. the 
Provident Fund and the Sick Fund)? 
23 . What are the Associations' views on a Wage Slack Fund, i.e. a fund for the employees 
of firms that are working short-time? 
24. In recent years a "Side Agreement" has been established at the Council. What was the 
background to this and what has the effect been? 
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25 . Certain unions argue that the councils set minimum rates and actual wages should be 
negotiated at plant-level over and above the minimum rate, according to the particular 
firms ability to pay. What are the Associations' responses to this argument? 
26. Do you know what the extent of plant-level bargaining over issues not covered by the 
Council's agreements is amongst the Associations' members in the Western Cape. 
27. Do you think that the Council is a suitable forum for negotiating over productivity. 
28. What would be the Associations' policies on the negotiation of issues such as 
employment creation, price controls and investment in the present Council? 
29. Do the Associations support the closed shop clause in the Council's agreements? 
C. Centralised Bargaining and Level of Bargaining 
30. What are the policies of the Associations towards centralised bargaining? Give the 
reasons for these policies in detail. 
31 . At which level do the Associations support centralised bargaining, i.e. at regional or 
national level? Give reasons for supporting a particular level in detail. 
32. Are these policies shared by all the members or are certain members arguing for a 
different policy? If so, what is this alternative policy and what are the reasons 
underlying it? 
33 . SACTWU has demanded the formation of a national industrial council through the 
amalgamation of existing regional councils. What are the Associations' policies on this 
demand? Give reasons in detail. 
34. If a national council was to be formed would the CCMA and the CKIA merge with the 
other regional associations to form a national association, or would all the associations 
merge into the NCF? Or would the Associations sit on the national council as regional 
bodies? 
3 5. Do you think that an appropriate bargaining structure could be one which has a 
national forum together with regional forums with different issues being dealt with at 
each level? 
36. If a national industrial council was to be formed would the Associations demand that 
wage negotiations take account of regional circumstances and differences, or would 
they agree to uniform national wage rates? 
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37. SACTWU has stated that at a national council the following issues could be dealt 
with: 
Employment creation 
Inflation 
Economic growth 
Investment 
Incomes policy 
Training 
Productivity 
* Do you think that all these issues could be dealt with by a national council. 
* Secondly, do you think that such a forum should be an industrial council or should it be 
an alternative structure (e.g. the National Forum)? 
38. The Associations have recently agreed to participate in the National Forum. Could you 
describe the background to this decision and indicate on what conditions the 
Associations are participating. 
* Secondly, could you briefly describe what the main objections were to participating prior 
to this decision being taken. 
39. A number of employers have stated that they felt that the union could not be ' trusted', 
i.e. the union did not honour agreements and did not conduct itself in the bargaining 
relationship as it should. Do the Associations also subscribe to this view and does this 
play a part in the Associations' policies on the union's call for a national industrial 
council? 
40. What do you see happening in the next 5 years in the clothing industry around the 
issue of levels of bargaining? 
41. How do you see relations between the employers and the trade union developing in 
general over the next 5 years? 
D. The State and the Industrial Council 
42. Do the Associations support the extension of the Council's agreement to non-parties? 
Give reasons. 
43 . Do you agree that the Minister of Manpower should have an absolute discretion with 
regard to the publication and extension of the Council's agreement? 
*Do you think that this question can be determined according to other criteria? 
44. How would the Associations react to the refusal of the Minister to extend an 
agreement? 
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45 . What do you think the state's intentions are with regard to industrial councils? Can 
you illustrate with examples of some of the problems experienced by the Council. 
46. In SACTWU's opposition to the National Minimum Wage it indicates that it would 
support legislation compelling firms to bargain with representative trade unions in 
industrial councils. What would the Associations' policy be to such legislation? 
47. The NMC has proposed that legislation introduce a duty to bargain and the Industrial 
Court would be able to decide on the level at which that bargaining will take place if 
the parties cannot decide this themselves. What would the Associations' policy be to 
such legislation? 
48. What do you think the future holds for the industrial council system in general? 
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Questionnaire for the Garment Manufacturers' Association 
A. The Area, Scope, Structure and Functions of the GMA 
I . What is the area and scope for which the GMA is registered? 
2. What are the functions of the GMA? 
3. When was the GMA established, and have there been major changes to the area, scope 
or functions of the organisation since then? Give the reasons for any changes that have 
taken place. 
4. Explain why the GMA was formed. 
5. Does the GMA have links to other bodies or organisations (e.g. the other regional 
clothing/knitting employers' associations, the Cape Chamber of Industries, the National 
Clothing Federation, SACOB, and SACCOLA)? Describe these links in detail. 
* Secondly, does the GMA have links to the CITB? 
6. What is the GMA's policy towards the CCMA, i.e. do you think that there is any chance 
ofa merger? 
* Secondly, do you think a merger would strengthen the employer side during 
negotiations? 
7. Describe the structure of the GMA and name the office bearers (and their companies). 
8. How many firms are members and approximately how many workers do these firms 
employ in total? 
* Could we have a list of your members and the number of workers employed by each of 
your members? 
9. Do you think the level of representativity of the GMA is satisfactory at present? If not, 
what are your plans in this regard (e.g. do you actively go out and recruit firms)? 
10. Could you give a racial breakdown of the membership of the GMA? 
11 . What is the membership fee to join the GMA and what is the annual subscription? 
12. Could you briefly describe the procedure whereby a mandate is obtained from 
members for negotiations with the trade union. Is the resulting counter-proposal and 
settlement decided by majority vote or consensus? 
* Secondly, on what criteria do the members base their counter-proposal (e.g. last years 
profits, or what the other regions are paying, or the inflation rate, etc.)? 
* Thirdly, to what extent do negotiations take account of the fact that the workforce in the 
clothing industry is almost entirely made up of women? 
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B. The Industrial Council 
13 . Has the GMA any specific criticisms of the existing area and scope of the Industrial 
Council? 
14. Has the GMA any criticisms of the existing structure and functioning of the Industrial 
Council? 
* Specifically, does the GMA agree with the clothing and knitting sectors having separate 
agreements? 
* Secondly, does the GMA believe that there are valid grounds for the CMT firms to have 
a separate agreement? Give the reasons in detail. 
15. SACTWU has proposed the incorporation of the Millinery sector into the Council. 
What is the thinking of the GMA with regard to this demand? If a merger does take 
place how should the Council be re-structured to accommodate the Millinery sector? 
16. Which length of agreement suits the GMA best: 1 year 
18 months 
2 years 
3 years? 
17. Is the GMA satisfied with the existing wage table in the Council's agreement? 
* Specifically, does the GMA agree that all the categories of work are valued correctly? 
* Secondly, does the GMA agree that the existing wage table could be simplified to just 6 
to 8 broad grades reflecting levels of skill, into which all the present categories could be 
fitted? 
18. Would the wage table referred to above be able to be used for both the clothing and 
the knitting industries? 
19. Is the GMA in favour of across-the-board wage increases being negotiated? 
20. What is the policy of the GMA on the existing Council benefit funds (i.e. the Provident 
Fund and the Sick Fund)? 
21. What is the GMA's views on a Wage Slack Fund, i.e. a fund for the employees of firms 
that are working short-time? 
22. In recent years a "Side Agreement" has been established at the Council. What is the 
GMA's policy towards this Agreement? 
23 . Certain unions argue that the councils set minimum rates and actual wages should be 
negotiated at plant-level over and above the minimum rate, according to the particular 
firms ability to pay. What is the GMA's response to this argument? 
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24. Do you know what the extent of plant-level bargaining over issues not covered by the 
Council's agreements is amongst the GMA's members in the Western Cape? What is 
the GMA's policy in this regard? 
25 . Do you think that the Council is a suitable forum for negotiating over productivity. 
26. What would the GMA's policies be on the negotiation ofissues such as employment 
creation, price controls and investment in the present Council? 
27. Does the GMA support the closed shop clause in the Council's agreements? 
C. Centralised Bargaining and Level of Bargaining 
28. What is the policy of the GMA towards centralised bargaining? Give the reasons for 
this policy in detail. 
29. At which level does the GMA support centralised bargaining, i.e. at regional or 
national level? Give reasons for supporting a particular level in detail . 
30. Is this policy shared by all the members or are certain members arguing for a different 
policy? If so, what is this alternative policy and what are the reasons underlying it? 
31 . SACTWU has demanded the formation of a national industrial council through the 
amalgamation of existing regional councils. What is the GMA's policy on this demand? 
Give reasons in detail. 
32. If a national council was to be formed would the GMA merge with the other regional 
associations to form a national association, or would the GMA sit on the national 
council with its present regional structure? 
33 . Do you think that an appropriate bargaining structure could be one which has a 
national forum together with regional forums with different issues being dealt with at 
each level? 
34. If a national industrial council was to be formed would the GMA demand that wage 
negotiations take account of regional circumstances and differences, or would they 
agree to uniform national wage rates? 
35. SACTWU has stated that at a national council the following issues could be dealt 
with: 
Employment creation 
Inflation 
Economic growth 
Investment 
Incomes policy 
Training 
Productivity 
* Do you think that all these issues could be dealt with by a national council? 
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* Secondly, do you think that such a forum should be an industrial council or should it be 
an alternative structure (e.g. the National Forum)? 
36. The CCMA and the CK.IA have recently agreed to participate in the National Forum. 
What is the GMA's policy towards this Forum? 
37. A number of employers have stated that they felt that the union could not be ' trusted', 
i.e. the union did not honour agreements and did not conduct itself in the bargaining 
relationship as it should. Does the GMA also subscribe to this view and does this play 
a part in the Association's policy on the union's call for a national industrial council? 
38. What do you see happening in the next 5 years in the clothing industry around the 
issue of levels of bargaining? 
39. How do you see relations between the employers and the trade union developing in 
general over the next 5 years? 
D. The State and the Industrial Council 
40. Does the GMA support the extension of the Council's agreement to non-parties? Give 
reasons. 
41 . Do you agree that the Minister of Manpower should have an absolute discretion with 
regard to the publication and extension of the Council's agreement? 
* Do you think that this question can be determined according to other criteria? 
42. How would the GMA react to the refusal of the Minister to extend an agreement? 
43 . What do you think the state's intentions are with regard to industrial councils? 
44. In SACTWU's opposition to the National Minimum Wage it indicates that it would 
support legislation compelling firms to bargain with representative trade unions in 
industrial councils. What would the GMA's policy be to such legislation? 
45 . The NMC has proposed that legislation introduce a duty to bargain and the Industrial 
Court would be able to decide on the level at which that bargaining will take place if 
the parties cannot decide this themselves. What would the GMA's policy be to such 
legislation? 
46. What do you think the future holds for the industrial council system in general? 
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Questionnaire for the South African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union 
A. The Scope, Area and Representativity of the. Union 
1. Describe the scope and area for which the union is registered. 
2. How many workers are there in the clothing industry nationally and how many are 
SACTWU members? 
3. Approximately how many finns are there in the industry nationally and how many of 
these are organised (i.e. have over 50% trade union membership)? 
4. How many workers are there in the clothing industry in the Western Cape and how 
many are members of SACTWU? 
5. Approximately how many firms are there in the Western Cape and how many of these 
are organised (i.e. have over 50% trade union membership)? 
6. What is the level of representativity outside of the five regional industrial councils? 
B. The Structure of the Union 
7. Describe the structure of the union in the Western Cape as well as the national 
structure, and how the two relate to each other. 
* Specifically does the union have a regional or sectoral structure? 
8. Describe the shop steward structures in the Western Cape and how these relate to the 
union structure and the national shop steward structures. 
9. Describe the process of getting a mandate from members prior to and during 
negotiations. 
10. How are the union representatives to the Council decided upon? How many are 
officials and how many are workers? 
C. The Industrial Council 
11 . Is the union satisfied with the present area of coverage of the Cape Council's 
agreement? Do you have any proposals in this regard? 
12. The Cape Industrial Council has 3 agreements (and the Clothing agreement has a 
' patchy' coverage). What is the reason for this and is it satisfactory as far as the union 
is concerned? 
13 . Has the union got any proposals regarding the structure and functioning of the existing 
Council? 
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14. The union has proposed to bring the Millinery sector into the Clothing Council. What 
is the reason for this, what progress has been made, and how do you propose to 
restructure the Council to accommodate this sector? 
15. How have employers in the Millinery and Clothing sectors responded to this proposal? 
16. Do you think that the existing wage table in the agreement for the clothing industry 
could be replaced by a simpler system comprising just 6 to 8 broad grades? 
* Is this an important strategy for the further centralisation of bargaining across sectors 
and regions? 
17. Do you think that the existing Council benefit funds are adequate (i.e. the Sick Pay 
Fund, Sick Benefit Fund and the Provident Fund)? 
* What are the union's proposals with regard to these funds? 
18. Are many exemptions applied for and what is the union's policy in this regard? 
19. A few years ago the union entered a ' Side Agreement' with the employers. Could you 
give the background to this agreement? 
20. What factors led to the union deciding to remain in the Council? 
21 . Has there been opposition to participation in the Council from members in the clothing 
industry? What are the reasons for the opposition and does it still exist? 
22. How has the GWU(WP) tradition and experience influenced collective bargaining, 
particularly in the Council? 
23 . What is the union's policy on plant level bargaining in the Clothing industry? What is 
its policy on this issue in the Textile and Leather industries? 
24. What is the extent of plant level bargaining in the clothing industry in the Western 
Cape, and what are the issues being bargained at this level? 
25. Has the union found that firms with an IR manager are more in favour of plant level 
bargaining than firms without an IR manager? 
26. What is the extent of wage drift in the industry across all the categories of work? What 
are the main reasons for this? 
27. What is the union's policy on across-the-board wage increases being negotiated at the 
Council? 
D. The Demand for a National Industrial Council 
28. The union has demanded the formation of a national industrial council. What are the 
reasons for this demand? 
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29. What is the union's strategy to achieve this? 
30. To what extent has this demand been debated by members and reflects their aims? 
31 . Do you believe that a national council is financially viable? 
32. What is the proposed structure for the national council: 
*Will the council allow for some regional/sectoral differentiation? 
* What sectors will be included in the council? 
* Will the council cover the entire country including the decentralised areas? 
* Will there be scope for some regional autonomy to deal with certain issues? 
*What issues do you propose to bargain at the council (i.e. what issues do you see the 
national council dealing with that are not currently being dealt with)? 
33 . SACTWU has stated that at a national industrial council the following issues could be 
dealt with: 
Employment creation 
Inflation 
Economic growth 
Investment 
Incomes policy 
Training 
Productivity 
34. The above issues have not traditionally been negotiated at industrial councils, and at 
present some of these issues are being dealt with at the National Forum: 
*Do you think that employers will agree to bargain these issues, most of which have been 
exclusively the concern of employers historically? Or will they claim that these are 
consultative issues only and refuse to deal with them outside of the National Forum? 
* Will the national industrial council require a particular structure to deal with these 
issues? 
* Do you envisage any problems when engaging with industrial councils over these sorts 
ofissues1 
*To what extent will workers continue to have a say in such negotiations? Give details of 
the mechanisms that the union will rely on to ensure such control. 
*Are some of these issues not better dealt with at an economy-wide forum (e.g. the 
COSATU/NACTU/SACCOLA forum) or do you see such a forum as just another stage 
to the national industrial council? 
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* If the union is forced to bargain only wages, conditions of employment and the standard 
benefits at the national council would it still continue to support such a demand? 
* What is the union's policy on productivity bargaining, and if this were to take place at 
what level would such negotiations be situated? 
3 5. What has been the employers' response in the various regions to the demand for a 
national industrial council? 
36. Where are the discussions at present regarding the national council? 
37. If the employers reject the demand for a national council will you be prepared to 
pursue the demand with a national strike? 
* If so, are you not concerned that a national strike could result in the existing regional 
councils collapsing? 
E. The State and Industrial Councils 
38. How would the union respond to a refusal by the Minister to extend the Council's 
agreement? What do you think the effect on the Council would be? 
39. Do you think that the Minister should have an absolute discretion with regard to the 
publication and extension of agreements? 
* What other criteria could be used? 
40. What is the union's thinking on the clause in the LRA which prohibits strikes during 
the currency of an industrial council agreement? 
41 . What do you think the state's intentions are with regard to industrial councils? Can you 
give any examples from your experience on the Council? 
42. In what ways has the state's policy of deregulation affected the clothing industry? 
43. In SACTWU's opposition to the NMW it indicates that it would support legislation 
compelling firms to bargain with representative trade unions in industrial councils. 
Could you expand on this proposal. 
44. The NMC has proposed that legislation be introduced to create a duty to bargain and 
the Industrial Court will be able to decide on the level at which that bargaining should 
take place. What is the union's policy on this proposal? 
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Questionnaire for the Secretary of the Industrial Council 
A. The Area, Scope, Structure and Agreements of the Council 
1. Why is the area of coverage and scope of the clothing agreement so ' patchy', i.e. 
paragraph (b)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the "Scope of Application of Agreement" . 
2. Have there been any changes in the area of coverage or scope of the Council in the last 
ten years. If so, give the reasons for these changes. 
3. Do you think that the area of coverage or scope of the Council could be extended in 
anyway. 
4. What are your views on the incorporation of the Millinery sector into the Council, and 
how would the Council be structured to accommodate this sector if it were to be 
incorporated. 
5. There are at present three separate Main Agreements. What are the reasons, and what 
are the chances of them being combined into a single Main Agreement. 
6. How is the Council structured to accommodate three bargaining forums. 
7. Do you think that it would be possible to introduce a wage table that had just 6 or 8 
broad grades, i.e. all the existing categories would be fitted into these 6 or 8 grades. 
8. Do you think such a wage table could facilitate the consolidation of the existing 
agreements into a single agreement with one wage table. 
9. The Council introduced a "Side Agreement" a few years ago. Could you briefly describe 
the background to this agreement and explain why it has not been gazetted. 
10. Have any of the parties expressed dissatisfaction with the existing area, scope or 
structure of the Council. If so, what proposals have they made. 
11. The Council has a number of Management Committees, Investigating Committees, 
etc. Could you briefly describe their functions. 
12. How do the various committees relate to the Council and to each other, and how often 
do they meet. 
13 . Do you believe that this structure is adequate and is functioning efficiently. 
14. The Council administers certain benefit funds . Describe these briefly and indicate if 
they could be expanded or improved in any way. 
15. Do you think there is scope for any other funds (e.g. a Wage Slack Fund). 
16. How is the Council financed and what are its main expenses. 
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17. What are the main reasons for some employers not participating in the Council and 
what is their attitude to being covered by the agreement. 
18. Do you find that most contraventions of the agreement are by non-party employers. 
19. Are any employers exempted from the Council's agreement and what is the Council's 
policy on exemptions. 
20. Is there any overlap between the agents' functions and those of shop stewards. 
B. Centralised Bargaining and Level of Bargaining 
21 . What do you think the main reasons are for employers supporting centralised 
bargaining in the form of an industrial council in the clothing industry. 
22. What are the reasons for the trade union supporting this form of bargaining. 
23 . Why do you think that employers have historically supported centralised bargaining at 
a regional level and continue to support this level of bargaining. 
24. Why did the trade union historically support this level of bargaining. 
25 . What do you think the reasons are for SACTWU's call for a national industrial council. 
26. What is your thinking on a national industrial council for the clothing industry. 
27. Do you think that a national industrial council would be financially and 
administratively feasible. 
28. How do you think such a council should be structured. 
29. Do you think that an appropriate bargaining structure could be one where there is a 
national council at which certain issues are negotiated, together with regional councils 
at which certain issues are negotiated. This would be a coordinated structure and the 
same issues would not be bargained at both levels. 
30. SACTWU states that at a national industrial council a wide range of issues could be 
dealt with : 
Policies on employment creation 
Inflation 
Economic growth 
Investment 
Incomes policy 
Training 
Productivity 
* Do you think that such issues can be negotiated in a national industrial council. 
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31 . Do you think the national structure should be a council or do you think an alternative 
forum would be more appropriate. 
32. Do you think that the Council could, given its present structure, deal with the issues 
listed above. 
33 . Certain unions argue that industrial councils set minimum wages and conditions of 
employment, and actual wages should be negotiated at plant or company level 
according to the firms ability to pay. What is your thinking in this regard with 
reference to the clothing industry. 
34. Do you think many employers would leave the Council if they were in addition forced 
to bargain at plant level. 
35. Do you know what the extent of wage drift is across all categories of worker covered 
by the three Main Agreements. 
36. What is your thinking on across-the-board wage increases. 
37. Do you think that it would be possible to link productivity bargaining with wage 
bargaining. If so, how would such bargaining be structured, i.e. could it be dealt with 
by the Council, or would it have to be a combination of bargaining at the Council and 
at company level. 
C. The State and the Council 
38. Do you agree with the extension of agreements to non-parties. Give reasons. 
39. Do you believe that the Minister should have an absolute discretion to extend 
agreements. Or do you think that this question could be determined according to other 
criteria. 
40. What would be the effect on the Council of a refusal by the Minister to extend an 
agreement. 
41. Have you experienced any difficulties with the Minister with regard to the Council's 
representativity, the publication and extension of agreements, etc. 
42. Has the Council been affected in any way by the state's policy of deregulation. 
43 . What do you think the state's intentions are with regard to the industrial council 
system. 
44. In SACTWU1s opposition to the National Minimum Wage it indicates that it would 
support legislation compelling firms to bargain with representative trade unions in 
industrial councils. What would your attitude be to such legislation. 
45 . The NMC has proposed that legislation introduce a duty to bargain and the Industrial 
Court will be able to decide on the level at which that bargaining should take place. 
What is your thinking on this proposal. 
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46. What do you think the future holds for the Clothing Council in the Western Cape. 
* And what does the future hold for the industrial council system in general. 
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APPENDIX C 
1995 QUESTIONNAIRES 
Questionnaire for Employer (Member) 
A. Profile of the firm: Basic features 
1. Is the firm (primarily) a clothing, knitwear or CMT operation? 
2. Does the firm specialise in producing particular lines of clothing/knitwear? Describe 
briefly. 
3. Is the firm independently owned or is it a subsidiary of another firm? Briefly outline 
the ownership structure. 
4. Does the firm itself have subsidiary firms or plants in the clothing/knitting industry other 
than this one? If so, what are their names and/or where are they situated? 
5. What is the size of your weekly-paid workforce at this factory (and at each of the 
subsidiaries/plants)? 
6. Approximately how many of these workers (at this factory and at each of the 
subsidiaries/plants) are members of the trade union (i.e. SACTWU)? 
B. Profile of the firm: The production process 
7. Has your firm reorganised its production process significantly over the last 3 years or 
introduced any new technology or technological innovations in this period? If so, 
describe these changes. 
8. Do you engage in productivity bargaining (with the union or shop stewards), or have 
any productivity incentive schemes in place? If so, briefly outline. 
C. Profile of the firm: The labour market 
9. From which localities is your weekly-paid workforce mainly drawn? 
10. Roughly what proportion of your weekly-paid workforce is Coloured, African, Asian, 
and white? 
11 . Do you find that there is a ready supply of workers for all the categories of work, or 
are certain categories in short supply? If so, specify which categories are in short 
supply and indicate the seriousness of the shortage. 
12. Do you have a policy about setting wages at the minimum rate set down in the IC 
agreement or do you pay certain workers/categories above the minimum rates? If so, 
specify which workers or categories are paid above the minimum rates and give the 
reasons. 
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D. Profile of the firm: The product market 
13 . Is the market that you compete in local, regional or national (i .e. are the buyers of 
your products also buying similar products from manufacturers in the other regions in 
the country)? 
14. Is the market you compete in distinct from the rest of the clothing/knitwear market in 
any way? If so, specify in what way this market is distinct and indicate whether the 
profit margins or unit labour costs in this market are lower or higher than in the rest of 
the clothing market. 
15. Is the market that you produce for subject to significant variations in demand? 
16. If you had to rank the market that you compete in in terms of the intensity of 
competition on a scale of 1-5 where would you place it: 
1. No competition - i.e. we have a monopoly? 
2. Limited competition but not very relevant? 
3. Competitive but some room to manoeuvre? 
4. Very competitive with tight conditions? 
5. Highly competitive with cut-throat conditions? 
17. Do you have a significant market share? If so, indicate the proportion. 
18. Does your firm export clothing/knitwear? If so, when did the firm start exporting and 
roughly what proportion of your annual output is exported? 
19. Can you identify any significant trends in the market over the last 3 years (e.g. has it 
moved in a higher quality, value-added direction, or a cheaper, mass-produced 
direction)? 
E. Profile of the firm: IR management 
20. Does the firm have an IR manager? 
21. If the firm has an IR manager, who does he/she have to report to on matters of IR 
policy and practice, or is he/she authorised to make all such decisions autonomously 
(i.e. what is the IR management structure at the firm)? 
OR 
If the firm does not have an IR manager, who deals with the IR functions, e.g. who 
meets with the union organiser and shop stewards, etc. (i.e. what is the IR management 
structure at the firm)? 
F. The preferred level of bargaining and reasons 
22. Collective bargaining normally takes place at one of three levels - the firm level, the 
regional level (e.g. the Western Cape), or at a national level. Which level of 
bargaining would your firm most pref er? 
x,xxvi 
* Give your reasons in detail for this preference. 
23 . Are there any specific factors associated with bargaining at either of the other levels 
that you reject that you would like to mention or highlight? 
24. Can you identify any positive factors associated with bargaining at the other levels? 
25 . If you favour firm level bargaining can you comment on the importance of the 
following factors for your preference: 
(a) If all firms bargained at this level with the trade union its resources would be 
stretched and its power would be diluted; 
(b) The firm has a specialist IR manager and therefore believes that it could negotiate 
more effectively with the trade union at firm level; 
( c) The firm would prefer to negotiate with the union on the basis of its own ability to .../ 
pay; 
( d) The IC wage levels favour the bigger firms and restrict our ability to compete with 
them; 
( e) Decentralised bargaining would lead to lower wage levels throughout the industry; 
(f) The IC agreement restricts the firm's ability to utilise labour flexibly and cost-
effectively; 
(g) Wage increases should be linked to increases in productivity and this can only b 
done if negotiations are conducted at plant level; 
(h) A better relationship can be established with the trade union through firm level ../ 
negotiations; 
* The trust factor - has the lack of trust of the trade union changed and, if so, why? 
(i) The firm has a strong free market philosophy that opposes labour market regulation 
by industrial council bargaining, particularly the extension of agreements to non-
parties. 
26. If you favour regional level bargaining can you comment on the importance of the 
following factors for your preference: 
(a) It is the level that maximises the power of employers and most effectively balances 
the power of the trade union, i.e. the firm is not strong enough to face the union on 
its own in firm level bargaining and the union is more powerful than the employers' 
associations at the national level, so employers are stronger or at least equal in power 
to the union at the regional level; 
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(b) It is convenient for negotiations to be handled by an employers' association (i .e. the 
firm does not have the resources, skills or personpower to negotiate with the union 
directly), but the logistics of organising on a national level, the difficulty of obtaining 
an acceptable mandate from all the regions, and the possible lengthening of the 
negotiations, make national negotiations very problematic; 
( c) An individual firm can participate effectively in a regional employers' association 
(and regional negotiations), as opposed to the national level (i.e. as an individual firm 
we have no voice at the national level); 
( d) Every region has its own economic circumstances and regional bargaining is the 
most appropriate level to accommodate these circumstances and facilitate regional 
development; 
( e) The clothing industry is extremely competitive and the product market would be 
disrupted if firms had differing wage agreements, but the firm competes in a regional 
product market (i.e. the Western Cape) and wages should therefore be bargained at 
the regional level; 
(f) The clothing industry is labour intensive and the labour market would become 
chaotic if firms had differing wage agreements, but the labour market is regional (i .e. 
the Western Cape) and wages should therefore be bargained at the regional level; 
* If the interviewee agrees with the latter statement, why does he/she see the labour 
market as regional (given the wage rates in the major regions are now almost equal); 
(g) The firm prefers regional bargaining as this means that negotiations are removed 
from its own shopfloor and from direct worker participation, but it is wary of 
national bargaining as this could involve employers in the Western Cape in disputes 
that arise in the other regions; 
(h) A better relationship can be established with the union at the regional level; 
* The trust factor - has the lack of trust of the trade union changed and, if so, why? 
(i) The firm could not on its own provide medical and provident funds for its workers 
and a centralised forum is a convenient way of providing these benefits, but the funds 
can be more efficiently administered at the regional level than the national level; 
G) There was always regional level centralised bargaining in the clothing/knitwear 
industry until three years ago and it worked without any problems so we would 
prefer it to stay that way, i.e. at the regional level; 
(k) The firm's unit labour costs are lower than the industry's and it is therefore profitable 
to be part of an industry-wide forum, either at the regional or national level; 
(I) Workers in the various regions are not all equally productive and therefore national 
wage rates will prejudice those regions with less productive workers. 
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27. If you favour national level bargaining can you comment on the importance of the 
following factors for your preference: 
(a) Employers are more powerful at the national level than the trade union and can 
therefore negotiate more effectively at this level; 
(b) The clothing market is national and therefore all employers should be bound by the 
same wage rates, i.e. national negotiations should establish national minimum wage 
rates which would stop regions with lower wage levels from undercutting firms in 
the Western Cape; 
( c) The labour market is national and therefore all employers should be bound by the 
same wage rates, i.e. national negotiations should establish national minimum wage 
rates which would stop regions with lower wage levels from undercutting firms in the 
Western Cape; 
( d) A comprehensive national wage agreement will cover what were previously the 
TBVC states, the ' homelands', and the decentralised areas; 
( e) The stakes are much higher in national negotiations and they should therefore lead to 
more rational bargaining and less likelihood of industrial action; 
(£)Benefit funds set up at the national level will be able to provide better benefits for 
workers; 
(g) A national bargaining forum will provide a basis for developing a national training 
programme for the industry; 
(h) A national bargaining forum is the most appropriate and powerful institution within 
which employers and the trade union can develop policies on tariffs and other forms 
of protection to place before or negotiate with government; 
(i) The clothing industry needs to develop a nationaldevelopment plan or industrial 
strategy together with the trade union that will counter the threat of international 
competition and provide the basis for improved export performance. A national 
bargaining forum is the most appropriate institution within which to develop such a 
plan or strategy; 
G) A better relationship can be established at the national level with the trade union 
(particularly if more consensual issues such as training, tariffs, and industrial policy 
are also dealt with at a national bargaining forum); 
* The trust factor - ·has the lack of trust of the trade union changed and, if so, why? 
(k) The firm's unit labour costs are lower than the industry's and it is therefore profitable 
to be part of an industry-wide forum, either at the regional or national level. 
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G. The effect of the legal framework 
28. The agreements that result from centralised collective bargaining at the industrial 
council are usually extended to cover non-parties by the Minister of Labour which 
stops undercutting by competitors who are non-members of the employers' 
associations. Is this an important factor for supporting centralised bargaining in either 
a regional or national industrial council? 
29. In terms of the Labour Relations Act strikes over issues covered by the industrial 
council agreement are illegal during the currency of the agreement so centralised 
bargaining within this framework brings stability to the industry from one year's 
negotiations to the next. Is this an important factor for supporting centralised 
bargaining in either a regional or national industrial council? 
3 0. Is the closed shop clause in the industrial council agreement an important factor for 
supporting centralised bargaining in either a regional or national industrial council (i.e. 
is it an important reason for your membership of the CCMA or CK.IA or the GMA, 
and/or does it restrict union rivalry and the instability that often results from such 
rivalry)? Or do you disagree with the principle of the closed shop? 
H. The change from regional to national bargaining: The decision-making process, 
the reasons and the problems 
31. Early in 1993 the CCMA and CK.IA and the GMA agreed to negotiate at a national 
level with the trade union and agreed in principle to establish a national industrial 
council. Was your firm party to this decision? 
32. If your firm was not a party to the above decision explain why not, e.g. was the firm 
simply not represented at the meeting or did you argue against and vote against this 
proposal at the meeting? 
33 . Which managers in the firm discussed and made the decision regarding bargaining at 
the national level? 
34. Did the firm bring in any outside expertise or assistance to inform these discussions 
before making a decision? 
3 5. What were the important factors or reasons that were raised at these discussions 
regarding this issue? 
36. When you attended this meeting were you bound by the firm's mandate or were you 
free to make your own decision on the basis of the debate within the CCMA and 
CK.IA (or the GMA)? 
3 7. If your firm was a party to the above decision can you comment on the importance of 
the following factors for you or your firm when you agreed: 
(a) The power of the union and their threat of a national strike over this issue; 
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(b) The ANC was likely to win the election and once in power (under the influence of 
COSATU) it would probably compel or strongly encourage national centralised 
bargaining; 
( c) The establishment of a national bargaining forum would allow employers and the 
trade union to formulate their own developmental strategies and policies for the 
industry and therefore pre-empt interference by the government. 
( d) The constructive role that the union had played in 1991/2 in attempting to develop a 
strategy for restructuring the clothing and textile industries in the Hatty Committee 
and later the Panel and Task Group; 
( e) Key employers in the CCMA and CK.IA (or the GMA) argued in favour of national 
bargaining. Or was it because the Executive Committee had decided in favour of 
national bargaining and the rest of the membership followed this decision? 
38. Describe the process through which this proposal was brought before members: 
* Over what period and how many meetings was this issue debated? 
* Was it debated first within the Executive and then a decided position presented to the 
general membership for debate? 
* Do you believe that the issue was adequately debated by all members? 
39. Was the decision to engage in national negotiations made on the basis of a majority 
vote or was it a consensus decision? 
40. National bargaining took place in 1993, 1994 and again this year. What do you think 
the major problems have been with national bargaining? 
41 . Can you comment on the importance of the following problems: 
(a) The logistics of organising on a national level, the difficulty of coordinating mandates 
from all the regions, and the drawing out of negotiations; 
(b) The difficulty of individual firms participating in and controlling the national 
negotiating process. 
42. Have the agreements reached at the national bargaining forum had a direct impact on 
the operations or profitability of your firm? 
H. The employers' associations 
43 . What are the reasons for this firm being a member of the CCMA or CK.IA (or the 
GMA)? 
44. What is the extent of your participation in the CCMA or CK.IA (or the GMA), e.g. do 
you never go to meetings, or only if there is a crisis, or on a regular basis, or is the 
firm represented on the Executive? 
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45 . Who from the firm attends the CCMA or CKIA (or GMA) meetings? 
46. Do you have any criticisms of the way the CCMA or CK.IA (or the GMA) operates? 
47. Do you believe that you have a meaningful say in the decisions of the CCMA or CKIA 
(or the GMA) through your membership? If not, give reasons. 
H. The national industrial council 
48 Do you think that a national industrial council will be formed for the clothing industry? 
If so, when will this take place? 
49. If you do not believe that a national council will be formed, give your reasons. 
50. If a national council is formed : 
(a) Do you believe that some of the problems that you have identified with national 
bargaining could be overcome by having longer-term agreements, e.g. 2 or 3 year 
agreements? Briefly give reasons. 
(b) Should clothing/knitwear employers remain in regional organisations for national 
negotiations or should they organise themselves on a national basis? Briefly give 
reasons. 
(c) Should the national council only negotiate over certain issues (e.g. wages, basic 
conditions of employment and the benefit funds) and regional bargaining continue 
over certain other issues (e.g. when the annual shutdown takes place and sick leave 
provisions)? Briefly give reasons. 
( d) Should the knitting sector be included in the council (or should it have separate 
agreements)? Briefly give reasons. 
(e) Should certain areas be allowed lower wage levels, e.g. rural areas? Briefly give 
reasons. 
(f) Should special arrangements be made for small firms or CMT firms, e.g. a separate 
wage schedule? Briefly give reasons. 
(g) Should productivity bargaining be linked to wage bargaining in the council? Or is 
this not possible at the national level? 
xlii 
Questionnaire for Employer (Non-Member) 
A. Profile of the firm: Basic features 
1. Is the firm (primarily) a clothing, knitwear or CMT operation? 
2. Does the firm specialise in producing particular lines of clothing/knitwear? Describe 
briefly. 
3. Is the firm independently owned or is it a subsidiary of another firm? Briefly outline 
the ownership structure. 
4. Does the firm itself have subsidiary firms or plants in the clothing/knitwear industry 
other than this one? If so, what are their names and/or where are they situated? 
5. What is the size of your weekly-paid workforce at this factory (and at each of the 
subsidiaries/plants)? 
6. Approximately how many of these workers (at this factory and at each of the 
subsidiaries/plants) are members of the trade union (i.e. SACTWU)? 
B. Profile of the firm: The production process 
7. Has your firm reorganised its production process significantly over the last 3 years or 
introduced any new technology or technological innovations in this period? If so, 
describe these changes. 
8. Do you engage in productivity bargaining (with the union or shop stewards), or have 
any productivity incentive schemes in place? If so, briefly outline. 
C. Profile of the firm: The labour market 
9. From which localities is your weekly-paid workforce mainly drawn? 
10. Roughly what proportion of your weekly-paid workforce is Coloured, African, Asian, 
and white. 
11 . Do you find that there is a ready supply of workers for all the categories of work, or 
are certain categories in short supply? If so, specify which categories are in short 
supply and-indicate the seriousness of the shortage. 
12. Do you have a policy about setting wages at the minimum rate set down in the IC 
agreement or do you pay certain workers/categories above the minimum rates? If so, 
specify which workers or categories are paid above the minimum rates and give the 
reasons. 
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D. Profile of the firm: The product market 
13 . Is the market that you compete in local, regional or national (i.e. are the buyers of 
your products also buying similar products from manufacturers in the other regions in 
the country)? 
14. Is the market you compete in distinct from the rest of the clothing/knitwear market in 
any way? If so, specify in what way this market is distinct and indicate whether the 
profit margins or unit labour costs in this market are lower or higher than in the rest of 
the clothing market. 
15. Is the market that you produce for subject to significant variations in demand? 
16. If you had to rank the market that you compete in in terms of the intensity of 
competition on a scale of 1-5 where would you place it: 
1. No competition - i.e. we have a monopoly? 
2. Limited competition but not very relevant? 
3. Competitive but some room to manoeuvre? 
4. Very competitive with tight conditions? 
5. Highly competitive with cut-throat conditions? 
17. Do you have a significant market share? If so, indicate the proportion. 
18. Does your firm export clothing/knitwear? Is so, when did the firm start exporting and 
roughly what proportion of your annual output is exported? 
19. Can you identify any significant trends in the market over the last 3 years (e.g. has it 
moved in a higher quality, value-added direction, or a cheaper, mass-produced 
direction)? 
E. Profile of the firm: m management 
20. Does the firm have an IR manager? 
21. If the firm has an IR manager, who does he/she have to report to on matters of IR 
policy and practice, or is he/she authorised to make all such decisions autonomously 
(i.e. what is the IR management structure at the firm)? 
OR 
If the firm does not have an IR manager, who deals with the IR functions, e.g. who 
meets with the union organiser and shop stewards, etc. (i.e. what is the IR management 
structure at the firm)? 
F. The preferred level of bargaining and reasons 
22. Collective bargaining normally takes place at one of three levels - the firm level, the 
regional level (e.g. the Western Cape), or at a national level. Which level of 
bargaining would your firm most prefer? 
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* Give your reasons in detail for this preference. 
23 . Are there any specific factors associated with bargaining at either of the other levels 
that you reject that you would like to mention or highlight. 
24. Can you identify any positive factors associated with bargaining at the other levels. 
25 . If you favour firm level bargaining can you comment on the importance of the 
following factors for your preference: 
(a) If all firms bargained at this level with the trade union its resources would be 
stretched and its power would be diluted; 
(b) The firm has a specialist IR manager and therefore believes that it could negotiate 
more effectively with the trade union at firm level; 
( c) The firm would prefer to negotiate with the union on the basis of its own ability to 
pay; 
( d) The IC wage levels favour the bigger firms and restrict our ability to compete with 
them; 
( e) Decentralised bargaining would lead to lower wage levels throughout the industry; 
(f) The IC agreement restricts the firm's ability to utilise labour flexibly and cost-
effectively; 
(g) Wage increases should be linked to increases in productivity and this can only be 
done if negotiations are conducted at plant level; 
(h) A better relationship can be established with the trade union through firm level 
negotiations; 
* The trust factor - has the lack of trust of the trade union changed and, if so, why? 
(i) The firm has a strong free market philosophy the opposes labour market regulation 
by industrial council bargaining, particularly the extension of agreements to non-
parties. 
26. If you favour regional level bargaining can you comment on the importance of the 
following factors for your preference: 
(a) It is the level that maximises the power of employers and most effectively balances 
the power of the trade union, i.e. the firm is not strong enough to face the union on 
its own in firm level bargaining and the union is more powerful than the employers' 
associations at the national level, so the employers are stronger or at least equal in 
power to the union at the regional level; 
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(b) It is convenient for negotiations to be handled by an employers' association (i .e. the 
firm does not have the resources, skills or personpower to negotiate with the union 
directly), but the logistics of organising on a national level, the difficulty of obtaining 
an acceptable mandate from all the regions, and the possible lengthening of the 
negotiations, make national negotiations very problematic; 
( c) Every region has its own economic circumstances and regional bargaining is the most 
appropriate level to accommodate these circumstances and facilitate regional 
development; 
( d) The clothing industry is extremely competitive and the product market would be 
disrupted if firms had differing wage agreements, but the firm competes in a regional 
product market (i.e. the Western Cape) and wages should therefore be bargained at 
the regional level; 
( e) The clothing industry is labour intensive and the l'1;bour market would become 
chaotic if firms had differing wage agreements, but the labour market is regional (i.e. 
the Western Cape) and wages should therefore be bargained at the regional level; 
* If the interviewee agrees with the latter statement, why does he/she see the labour 
market as regional (given the wage rates in the major regions are now almost equal); 
(f) The firm prefers regional bargaining as this means that negotiations are removed 
from its own shopfloor and from direct worker participation, but it is wary of 
national bargaining as this could involve employers in the Western Cape in disputes 
that arise in the other regions; 
(g) A better relationship can be established with the union at the regional level; 
* The trust factor - has the lack of trust of the trade union changed and, if so, why? 
(h) The firm could not on its own provide medical and provident funds for its workers 
and a centralised forum is a convenient way of providing these benefits, but 
the funds can be more efficiently administered at the regional level than the national 
level; 
(i) There was always regional level centralised bargaining in the clothing/knitwear 
industry until three years ago and it worked without any problems so we would 
prefer it to stay that way, i.e. at the regional level; 
G) The firm's unit labour costs are lower than the industry's and it is therefore profitable 
to be part of an industry-wide forum, either at the regional or national level; 
(k) Workers in the various regions are not all equally productive and therefore national 
wage rates will prejudice those regions with less productive workers. 
27. If you favour national level bargaining can you comment on the importance of the 
following factors for your preference: 
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(a) Employers are more powerful at the national level than the trade union and can 
therefore negotiate more effectively at this level; 
(b) The clothing market is national and therefore all employers should be bound by the 
same wage rates, i.e. national negotiations should establish national minimum wage 
rates which would stop regions with lower wage levels from undercutting firms in 
the Western Cape; 
( c) The labour market is national and therefore all employers should be bound by the 
same wage rates, i.e. national negotiations should establish national minimum wage 
rates which would stop regions with lower wage levels from undercutting firms in the 
Western Cape; 
( d) A comprehensive national wage agreement will cover what were previously the 
TBVC states, the ' homelands', and the decentralised areas; 
( e) The stakes are much higher in national negotiations and they should therefore lead to 
more rational bargaining and less likelihood of industrial action; 
(f) Benefit funds set up at the national level will be able to provide better benefits for 
workers; 
(g) A national bargaining forum will provide a basis for developing a national training 
programme for the industry; 
(h) A national bargaining forum is the most appropriate and powerful institution within 
which employers and the trade union can develop policies on tariffs and other forms 
of protection to place before or negotiate with government; 
(i) The clothing industry needs to develop a national development plan or industrial 
strategy together with the trade union that will counter the threat of international 
competition and provide the basis for improved export performance. A national 
bargaining forum is the most appropriate institution within which to develop such a 
plan or strategy; 
G) A better relationship can be established at the national level with the trade union 
(particularly if more consensual issues such as training, tariffs, and industrial policy 
are also dealt with at a national bargaining forum); 
* The trust factor - has the lack of trust of the trade union changed and, if so, why? 
(k) The firm's unit labour costs are lower than the industry's and it is therefore profitable 
to be part of an industry-wide forum, either at the regional or national level. 
G. The legal framework 
28. The agreements that result from centralised collective bargaining at the industrial 
council are usually extended to cover non-parties by the Minister of Labour, i.e. 
competitors who are non-members of the employers' associations. Do you agree with 
such extensions? 
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29. If you do not agree, would you prefer to bargain with the trade union at the firm level 
and not be protected by the restriction on striking during the currency of the industrial 
council agreement? 
30. Do you agree with the closed shop provision in the industrial council agreement? 
31 . Does the closed shop provision restrict your firm's ability to employ the labour that it 
needs? 
H. The employers' associations 
32. What are your reasons (in detail) for not joining either the CCMA or CKIA or the 
GMA? 
33 . To what extent is your non-membership a rejection of the industrial council and 
centralised bargaining? 
34. Which manager(s) made the decision not to join either of these associations? 
3 5. Was this decision made on the basis of a systematic analysis of what these associations 
could offer and what membership entailed? 
I. National bargaining 
36. National bargaining has taken place since 1993. Has the substance of any of the 
agreements that have resulted from national bargaining had a direct impact on the 
operations or profitability of your firm? 
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Questionnaire for the Director of the Cape Clothing Mftrs' Association 
and the Cape Knittin2 Industry Association 
A. Scope, membership and structure 
1. Approximately how many members does the CCMA and CKIA have at present and 
how many employees do these members employ in total? 
2. Does the CCMA and CKIA still have the same scope and area of organisation? 
3. Does the CCMA and CKIA still have the same functions? 
4. Have any changes taken place to the organisational structure of the CCMA or the 
CKIA. 
B. The preferred level of bargaining and reasons 
5. CoUective bargaining normally takes place at one of three levels - the firm level, the 
regional level (e.g. the Western Cape), or at a national level. Which level would the 
CCMA and CKIA prefer to see collective bargaining taking place? 
* Give the reasons in detail for this preference. 
6. Are there any specific factors associated with bargaining at either of the other levels 
that the CCMA and CKIA rejects that you would like to mention or highlight? 
7. Does the CCMA and CK.IA recognise any positive factors associated with bargaining at 
the other levels? 
C. The change from regional to national bargaining: The decision-making process, 
the reasons and the problems 
8. Early in 1993 the CCMA and CKIA agreed to negotiate with SACTWU at a national 
bargaining forum and agreed in principle to establish a national industrial council by 
1995. What were the main reasons for this agreement given that the CCMA and CKIA 
has previously been strongly opposed to national bargaining? 
9. Describe the process through which this proposal was put before members (i.e. over 
what period and how many meetings was this issue debated) and comment on whether 
you thought it was adequately debated by all members (i.e. was all the necessary 
information provided to members and were all viewpoints canvassed). 
10. Did the Core Negotiating Team debate the issue first and reach a decision and then 
present this to the Executive Committee which debated the issue and then presented 
its decision to the general membership, or was the issue debated in full by the general 
membership? 
11 . Were SACTWU or representatives from the other regions or ' experts' invited to 
address members on this issue? 
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12. Was the decision to engage in national bargaining made on the basis of a majority vote 
or was it a consensus decision? 
* What was the level of opposition to national bargaining and how did this change over 
time? 
13 . National bargaining took place in 1993, 1994 and again this year. What have been the 
major problems with national bargaining? 
D. The national industrial council 
14. What progress has been made with the establishment of a national industrial council 
for the clothing industry? 
15. If a national council is formed, what would the position of the CCMA and CKIA be on 
the following aspects of its structure: 
(a) Do you believe that some of the problems that you have identified with national 
bargaining could be overcome by having longer-term agreements, e.g. 2 or 3 year 
agreements? Briefly give reasons. 
(b) Should clothing/knitwear employers remain in regional organisations for national 
negotiations or should they organise themselves on a national basis? Briefly give 
reasons. 
(c) Should the national council only negotiate over certain issues (e.g. wages, basic 
conditions of employment and the benefit funds) and regional bargaining continue 
over certain other issues (e.g. when the annual shutdown takes place and sick leave 
provisions)? Briefly give reasons. 
( d) Should the knitting sector be included in the council (or should it have separate 
agreements)? Briefly give reasons. 
(e) Should certain areas be allowed lower wage levels, e.g. rural areas? Briefly give 
reasons. 
(f) Should special arrangements be made for small firms or CMT firms, e.g. a separate 
wage schedule? Briefly give reasons. 
(g) Should productivity bargaining be linked to wage bargaining in the council? Or is 
this not possible at the national level? 
I 
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Questionnaire for Garment Manufacturers' Association 
A. Scope, membership and structure 
I. Is the GMA still organising only CMT operators in the Western Cape region? 
2. Approximately how many members does it have at present and how many employees 
do these members employ in total? 
3. Briefly outline the organisational structure of the GMA. 
B. The preferred level of bargaining and reasons 
4. Collective bargaining normally takes place at one of three levels - the firm level, the 
regional level (e.g. the Western Cape), or at a national level. Which level would the 
GMA as an organisation prefer to see collective bargaining taking place? 
* Give the reasons in detail for this preference. 
5. Are there any specific factors associated with bargaining at either of the other levels 
that the GMA rejects which you would like to mention or highlight? 
6. Does the GMA recognise any positive factors associated with bargaining at the other 
levels? 
C. The change from regional to national bargaining: The decision-making process, 
the reasons and the problems 
7. Early in 1993 the CCMA and CKIA agreed to negotiate with SACTWU at a national 
bargaining forum and agreed in principle to establish a national industrial council by 
199 5. Did the GMA also agree at ab~ut that time to participate in national bargaining? 
8. If the GMA did agree to national bargaining, what were the main reasons for making 
this decision (given that in 1991 the organisation was strongly opposed to national 
bargaining)? 
*Can you comment on the importance of the followirtg factors for members in making 
this decision: 
(a) The power of the union and their threat of a national strike oyer this issue; 
(b) The ANC was likely to win the election and once in power (under the influence of 
COSATU) it would probably compel or strongly encourage national centralised 
bargaining; 
( c) The establishment of a national bargaining forum would allow employers and the 
trade union to formulate their own developmental strategies and policies for the 
industry and therefore pre-empt interference by the government. 
.. 
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( d) The constructive role ~hat the unio~ had playe~ in_ 1991 /~ in_ attempting to develop a 
strategy for restructunng the clothmg and textile mdustnes m the Hatty Committee 
and later the Panel and Task Group; 
( e) Key employers in the GMA argued in favour of national bargaining. Or was it 
because the Executive Committee had decided in favour of national bargaining and 
the rest of the membership followed this decision? 
9. If the GMA did not agree, what were the reasons and what form has the organisation's 
opposition to national bargaining taken? 
10. Describe the process through which this proposal was put before members (i.e. over 
what period and how many meetings was this issue debated) and comment on whether 
you thought it was adequately debated by all members (i.e. was all the necessary 
information provided to members and were all viewpoints canvassed). 
11 . Did the Executive Committee debate this issue and reach a decision first that was then 
presented to the general membership or was the issue debated in full by the general 
membership? 
12. Did the GMA bring in outside expertise to assist in making this decision (e.g. a 
consultant)? 
13 . Was the decision to engage in national bargaining made on the basis of a majority vote 
or was it a consensus decision? 
* What was the level of opposition to national bargaining and how did this change over 
time? 
14. National bargaining took place in 1993, 1994 and again this year. What do you think 
the major problems have been with national bargaining? 
D. The national industrial council 
15. What progress has been made with the establishment of a national industrial council 
for the clothing industry? 
16. Is the GMA in agreement that such a council be formed? 
17. If such a council is formed will the GMA consider merging with the CCMA or would 
it investigate mergers with other CMT organisations in the other regions? 
18. If a national council is formed what would the position of the GMA be on the 
following aspects of its structure: 
(a) Do you believe that some of the problems that you have identified with national 
bargaining could be overcome by having longer-term agreements, e.g. 2 or 3 year 
agreements? Briefly give reasons. 
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(b) Should clothing employers remain in regional organisations for national negotiations 
or should they organise themselves on a national basis? Briefly give reasons. 
(c) Should the national council only negotiate over certain issues (e.g. wages, basic 
conditions of employment and the benefit funds) and regional bargaining continue 
over certain other issues (e.g. when the annual shutdown takes place and sick leave 
provisions)? Briefly give reasons. 
( d) Should the knitting sector be included in the council (or should it have separate 
agreements)? Briefly give reasons. 
(e) Should certain areas be allowed lower wage levels, e.g. rural areas? Briefly give 
reasons. 
(f) Should special arrangements be made for small firms or CMT firms, e.g. a separate 
wage schedule? Briefly give reasons. 
(g) Should productivity bargaining be linked to wage bargaining in the council? Or is 
this not possible at the national level? 
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Questionnaire for the South African Clothing and Textile Workers' Union 
1. Briefly describe how the final agreement was arrived at to shift to national negotiations. 
Was the original agreement for a trial period only? 
2. How far has the establishment of the National Industrial Council got? 
3. When I interviewed Ronald Bemickow in 1991 he stated that the main reason for the 
union demanding national bargaining was to secure wage parity between the regions. 
Negotiations have taken place at the national level for three years now. What progress 
has been made in reducing wage differentials? 
* What will the union's policy be in the Wage Parity Sub-committee that has been formed 
by the national bargaining forum? 
4. What progress has been made in getting uniformity in the other terms in the regional 
industrial council agreements? 
5. What progress has been made in merging the regional provident and sick benefit funds 
into national funds? 
6. A major complaint of many employers that I have interviewed is the illegal industrial 
action that takes place during the annual negotiations. They argue strongly that this 
industrial action either takes place with the knowledge and approval of the union or is 
actually organised by the union? Some go further and state that employers have 
incontrovertible proof that the union is behind this illegal action. What is the union's 
position on these allegation? 
*Could you comment on the following statement made in 1991 by one of the employers 
regarding this issue. 
* Many employers are disenchanted with national bargaining because they believed that 
their agreement to negotiate nationally would result in the ending of illegal industrial 
action during negotiations. Could you comment? 
7. What are the union's intentions with regard to the knitting sector, i.e. will it continue to 
be part of the clothing industry negotiations or will it fall under the textile industry in 
future? 
8. What has happened in regard to the involvement of the union in industrial policy 
formulation (i.e. the textile and clothing pipeline initiative), particularly around the issue 
of trade and tariff policy? 
9. The following are some common perceptions by employers that are related to their 
attitudes on the question of the most appropriate level of bargaining. Could you 
comment on each of these perceptions: 
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* Some employers allege that there is poor communication by the union to shop stewards 
and members, e.g. they don't know about agreements weeks after they have been struck 
or they misunderstand the terms of those agreements. This causes unnecessary tensions 
and disputes to arise at individual firms . 
-
* Some employers acknowledge the validity of the statements and arguments being made 
by the union's leadership about the need to jointly develop policies to improve 
productivity and make the industry internationally competitive, but they argue that 
workers at the level of the enterprise show no interest in raising productivity (e.g. there 
is still high absenteeism and abuse of sick leave, late coming and poor work discipline). 
These employers believe that the union should be focussing its attention on changing the 
attitudes of its members to work at the firm level. 
* Some employers allege that there are deep racial differences within the union that tend 
to follow regional lines. They therefore argue that national bargaining is going to prove 
problematic for the union. 
* What policy is the union adopting in the Affirmative action or Equal opportunity sub-
committee that has been established by the National Bargaining Forum? 
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Questionnaire for the Secretary of the Industrial Council 
1. Can you supply figures for the number of registered firms and the number of registered 
employees for the years :from 1991 to 1994? 
2. When did the blanket exemption for micro enterprises come into operation and does the 
industrial council still keep a record of and inspect these exempted firms? 
3. What are the latest estimates of the size of the informal clothing manufacturing sector in 
the W estem Cape in term of output and employment (as a percentage of the formal 
sector)? 
4. A number of employers have mentioned that Mitch ells Plain is no longer covered by the 
industrial council agreement. They also referred to a court case in this regard. Can you 
explain what the situation is at present? 
5. Has there been a trend by employers to relocate outside the jurisdiction of the industrial 
council, e.g. to Worcester? 
6. Some respondents have referred to another organisation of employers in the industry 
under the leadership of Frank Leighton (of Manco). Do you have any information 
about this initiative? 
7. Is the closed shop enforced on the employer side? 
8. When did the change take place to the Sick Pay rules, i.e. was it decided at the national 
bargaining forum or was it an issue decided in the West em Cape that happened to 
coincide with the shift to national bargaining? 
9. I have been going through the industrial council agreements for the various regions and 
I find that most of them are being published in the Government Gazette a month or two 
before they are due to expire, i.e. they are being published almost a year after they came 
into force. How are the terms of agreements publicised in the interim and are non-party 
employers complying with these agreements? 
10. Can you comment briefly on what the situation is with regard to wage differentials 
between the regions, as well as differences in other terms of employment. 
Ivi 
